top of page
  • Writer's pictureLLC

written statement

It has been common practice for the parties to take long adjournments for filing written statements. The legislature with a view to curb this practice and to avoid unnecessary delay and adjournments, has provided for the maximum period within which the written statement is required to be filed. The mandatory or directory nature of Order VIII Rule 1 shall have to be determined by having regard to the object sought to be achieved by the amendment. It is, thus, necessary to find out the intention of the legislature. The consequences which may follow and whether the same were intended by the legislature have also to be kept in view. In Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur v. The Municipal Board, Rampur [AIR 1965 SC 895], a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the question whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule and it would depend upon the facts of each case and for that purpose the object of the statute in making out the provision is the determining factor. The purpose for which the provision has been made and its nature, the intention of the legislature in making the provision, the serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons resulting from whether the provision is read one way or the other, the relation of the particular provision to other provisions dealing with the same subject and other considerations which may arise on the facts of a particular case including the language of the provision, have all to be taken into account in arriving at the conclusion whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory.

In Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal Kotah & Anr. [AIR 1955 SC 425], considering the provisions of the Code dealing with the trial of the suits, it was opined that:

"Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a Penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.

Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle. "

In Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corporation Bank [(2002) 6 SCC 33], the question for consideration was whether the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission could grant time to the respondent to file reply beyond total period of 45 days in view of Section 13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. It was held that the intention to provide time frame to file reply is really made to expedite the hearing of such matters and avoid unnecessary adjournments. It was noticed that no penal consequences had been prescribed if the reply is not filed in the prescribed time. The provision was held to be directory. It was observed that the provision is more by way of procedure to achieve the object of speedy disposal of the case.

Supreme Court of India

Salem Advocate Bar ... vs Union Of India on 2 August, 2005

The use of the word 'shall' in Order VIII Rule 1 by itself is not conclusive to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory. We have to ascertain the object which is required to be served by this provision and its design and context in which it is enacted. The use of the word 'shall' is ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the provision but having regard to the context in which it is used or having regard to the intention of the legislation, the same can be construed as directory. The rule in question has to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. The rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules or procedure are handmaid of justice and not its mistress. In the present context, the strict interpretation would defeat justice. In construing this provision, support can also be had from Order VIII Rule 10 which provides that where any party from whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or Rule 9, fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such other order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. On failure to file written statement under this provision, the Court has been given the discretion either to pronounce judgment against the defendant or make such other order in relation to suit as it thinks fit. In the context of the provision, despite use of the word 'shall', the court has been given the discretion to pronounce or not to pronounce the judgment against the defendant even if written statement is not filed and instead pass such order as it may think fit in relation to the suit. In construing the provision of Order VIII Rule 1 and Rule 10, the doctrine of harmonious construction is required to be applied. The effect would be that under Rule 10 of Order VIII, the court in its discretion would have power to allow the defendant to file written statement even after expiry of period of 90 days provided in Order VIII Rule 1. There is no restriction in Order VIII Rule 10 that after expiry of ninety days, further time cannot be granted. The Court has wide power to 'make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit'. Clearly, therefore, the provision of Order VIII Rule 1 providing for upper limit of 90 days to file written statement is directory. Having said so, we wish to make it clear that the order extending time to file written statement cannot be made in routine. The time can be extended only in exceptionally hard cases. While extending time, it has to be borne in mind that the legislature has fixed the upper time limit of 90 days. The discretion of the Court to extend the time shall not be so frequently and routinely exercised so as to nullify the period fixed by Order VIII Rule 1. Section 39 Section 39(1) of the Code provides that the Court which passed a decree may, on the application of the decree-holder send it for execution to another court of competent jurisdiction. By Act 22 of 2002, Section 39(4) has been inserted providing that nothing in the section shall be deemed to authorise the Court which passed a decree to execute such decree against any person or property outside the local limits of its jurisdiction. The question is whether this newly added provision prohibits the executing court from executing a decree against a person or property outside its jurisdiction and whether this provision overrides Order XXI Rule 3 and Order XXI Rule 48 or whether these provisions continue to be an exception to Section 39(4) as was the legal position before the amendment. Order XXI Rule 3 provides that where immoveable property forms one estate or tenure situate within the local limits of the jurisdiction of two or more courts, any one of such courts may attach and sell the entire estate or tenure. Likewise, under Order XXI Rule 48, attachment of salary of a Government servant, Railway servant or servant of local authority can be made by the court whether the judgment-debtor or the disbursing officer is or is not within the local limits of the court's jurisdiction. Section 39 does not authorise the Court to execute the decree outside its jurisdiction but it does not dilute the other provisions giving such power on compliance of conditions stipulated in those provisions. Thus, the provisions, such as, Order XXI Rule 3 or Order XXI Rule 48 which provide differently, would not be effected by Section 39(4) of the Code. Section 64(2) Section 64(2) in the Code has been inserted by Amendment Act 22 of 2002. Section 64, as it originally stood, has been renumbered as Section 64(1). Section 64(1), inter alia, provides that where an attachment has been made, any private transfer or delivery of property attached or of any interest therein contrary to such attachment shall be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment. Sub-section (2) protects the aforesaid acts if made in pursuance of any contract for such transfer or delivery entered into and registered before the attachment. The concept of registration has been introduced to prevent false and frivolous cases of contracts being set up with a view to defeat the attachments. If the contract is registered and there is subsequent attachment, any sale deed executed after attachment will be valid. If it is unregistered, the subsequent sale after attachment would not be valid. Such sale would not be protected. There is no ambiguity in sub-section (2) of Section 64. Order VI Rule 17 Order VI Rule 17 of the Code deals with amendment of pleadings. By Amendment Act 46 of 1999, this provision was deleted. It has again been restored by Amendment Act 22 of 2002 but with an added proviso to prevent application for amendment being allowed after the trial has commenced, unless court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. The proviso, to some extent, curtails absolute discretion to allow amendment at any stage. Now, if application is filed after commencement of trial, it has to be shown that in spite of due diligence, such amendment could not have been sought earlier. The object is to prevent frivolous applications which are filed to delay the trial. There is no illegality in the provision. Service through Courier Order V Rule 9, inter alia, permits service of summons by party or through courier. Order V Rule 9(3) and Order V Rule 9-A permit service of summons by courier or by the plaintiff. Order V Rule 9(5) requires the court to declare that the summons had been duly served on the defendant on the contingencies mentioned in the provision. It is in the nature of deemed service. The apprehension expressed is that service outside the normal procedure is likely to lead to false reports of service and passing of ex parte decrees. It is further urged that courier's report about defendant's refusal to accept service is also likely to lead to serious malpractice and abuse.

While considering the submissions of learned counsel, it has to be borne in mind that problem in respect of service of summons has been one of the major causes of delay in the due progress of the case. It is common knowledge that the defendants have been avoiding to accept summons. There have been serious problems in process serving agencies in various courts. There can, thus, be no valid objection in giving opportunity to the plaintiff to serve the summons on the defendant or get it served through courier. There is, however, danger of false reports of service. It is required to be adequately guarded. The courts shall have to be very careful while dealing with a case where orders for deemed service are required to be made on the basis of endorsement of such service or refusal. The High Courts can make appropriate rules and regulations or issue practice directions to ensure that such provisions of service are not abused so as to obtain false endorsements. In this regard, the High Courts can consider making a provision for filing of affidavit setting out details of events at the time of refusal of service. For instance, it can be provided that the affidavit of person effecting service shall state as to who all were present at that time and also that the affidavit shall be in the language known to the deponent. It can also be provided that if affidavit or any endorsement as to service is found to be false, the deponent can be summarily tried and punished for perjury and the courier company can be black-listed. The guidelines as to the relevant details to be given can be issued by the High Courts. The High Courts, it is hoped, would issue as expeditiously as possible, requisite guidelines to the trial courts by framing appropriate rules, order, regulations or practice directions.

Adjournments Order XVII of the Code relates to grant of adjournments. Two amendments have been made therein. One that adjournment shall not be granted to a party more than three times during hearing of the suit. The other relates to cost of adjournment. The awarding of cost has been made mandatory. Costs that can be awarded are of two types. First, cost occasioned by the adjournment and second such higher cost as the court deems fit.

While examining the scope of proviso to Order XVII Rule 1 that more than three adjournments shall not be granted, it is to be kept in view that proviso to Order XVII Rule 2 incorporating clauses (a) to (e) by Act 104 of 1976 has been retained. Clause (b) stipulates that no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party, except where the circumstances are beyond the control of that party. The proviso to Order XVII Rule 1 and Order XVII Rule 2 have to be read together. So read, Order XVII does not forbid grant of adjournment where the circumstances are beyond the control of the party. In such a case, there is no restriction on number of adjournments to be granted. It cannot be said that even if the circumstances are beyond the control of a party, after having obtained third adjournment, no further adjournment would be granted. There may be cases beyond the control of a party despite the party having obtained three adjournments. For instance, a party may be suddenly hospitalized on account of some serious ailment or there may be serious accident or some act of God leading to devastation. It cannot be said that though circumstances may be beyond the control of a party, further adjournment cannot be granted because of restriction of three adjournments as provided in proviso to Order XVII Rule 1. In some extreme cases, it may become necessary to grant adjournment despite the fact that three adjournments have already been granted (Take the example of Bhopal Gas Tragedy, Gujarat earthquake and riots, devastation on account of Tsunami). Ultimately, it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, on the basis whereof the Court would decide to grant or refuse adjournment. The provision for costs and higher costs has been made because of practice having been developed to award only a nominal cost even when adjournment on payment of costs is granted. Ordinarily, where the costs or higher costs are awarded, the same should be realistic and as far as possible actual cost that had to be incurred by the other party shall be awarded where the adjournment is found to be avoidable but is being granted on account of either negligence or casual approach of a party or is being sought to delay the progress of the case or on any such reason. Further, to save proviso to Order XVII Rule 1 from the vice of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it is necessary to read it down so as not to take away the discretion of the Court in the extreme hard cases noted above. The limitation of three adjournments would not apply where adjournment is to be granted on account of circumstances which are beyond the control of a party. Even in cases which may not strictly come within the category of circumstances beyond the control of a party, the Court by resorting to the provision of higher cost which can also include punitive cost in the discretion of the Court, adjournment beyond three can be granted having regard to the injustice that may result on refusal thereof, with reference to peculiar facts of a case. We may, however, add that grant of any adjournment let alone first, second or third adjournment is not a right of a party. The grant of adjournment by a court has to be on a party showing special and extra- ordinary circumstances. It cannot be in routine. While considering prayer for grant of adjournment, it is necessary to keep in mind the legislative intent to restrict grant of adjournments. Order XVIII Rule 2 Order XVIII Rule 2(4) which was inserted by Act 104 of 1976 has been omitted by Act 46 of 1999. Under the said Rule, the Court could direct or permit any party, to examine any party or any witness at any stage. The effect of deletion is the restoration of the status quo ante. This means that law that was prevalent prior to 1976 amendment, would govern. The principles as noticed hereinbefore in regard to deletion of Order XVIII Rule 17(a) would apply to the deletion of this provision as well. Even prior to insertion of Order XVIII Rule 2(4), such a permission could be granted by the Court in its discretion. The provision was inserted in 1976 by way of caution. The omission of Order XVIII Rule 2(4) by 1999 amendment does not take away Court's inherent power to call for any witness at any stage either suo moto or on the prayer of a party invoking the inherent powers of the Court.

In Order XVIII Rule 2 sub-rules (3A) to 3(D) have been inserted by Act 22 of 2002. The object of filing written arguments or fixing time limit of oral arguments is with a view to save time of court. The adherence to the requirement of these rules is likely to help in administering fair and speedy justice.

Order VII Rule 14 Order VII Rule 14 deals with production of documents which are the basis of the suit or the documents in plaintiff's possession or power. These documents are to be entered in the list of documents and produced in the Court with plaint. Order VII Rule 14(3) requires leave of Court to be obtained for production of the documents later. Order VII Rule 14(4) reads as under:

"Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, or, handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory."

In the aforesaid Rule, it is evident that the words 'plaintiff's witnesses' have been mentioned as a result of mistake seems to have been committed by the legislature. The words ought to be 'defendant's witnesses'. There is a similar provision in Order VIII Rule 1A(4) which applies to a defendant. It reads as under: "Nothing in this rule shall apply to documents 

(a) produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, or

(b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory."

Order VII relates to the production of documents by the plaintiff whereas Order VIII relates to production of documents by the defendant. Under Order VIII Rule 1A(4) a document not produced by defendant can be confronted to the plaintiff's witness during cross-examination. Similarly, the plaintiff can also confront the defendant's witness with a document during cross-examination. By mistake, instead of 'defendant's witnesses', the words 'plaintiff's witnesses' have been mentioned in Order VII Rule (4). To avoid any confusion, we direct that till the legislature corrects the mistake, the words 'plaintiff's witnesses, would be read as 'defendant's witnesses' in Order VII Rule 4. We, however, hope that the mistake would be expeditiously corrected by the legislature. Costs Section 35 of the Code deals with the award of cost and Section 35A with award of compensatory costs in respect of false or vexatious claims or defences. Section 95 deals with grant of compensation for obtaining arrest, attachment or injunction on insufficient grounds. These three sections deal with three different aspects of award of cost and compensation. Under Section 95 cost can be awarded upto Rs.50,000/- and under Section 35A, the costs awardable are upto Rs.3,000/-. Section 35B provides for award of cost for causing delay where a party fails to take the step which he was required by or under the Code to take or obtains an adjournment for taking such step or for producing evidence or on any other ground. In circumstances mentioned in Section 35-B an order may be made requiring the defaulting party to pay to other party such costs as would, in the opinion of the court, be reasonably sufficient to reimburse the other party in respect of the expenses incurred by him in attending the court on that date, and payment of such costs, on the date next following the date of such order, shall be a condition precedent to the further prosecution of the suit or the defence. Section 35 postulates that the cost shall follow the event and if not, reasons thereof shall be stated. The award of the cost of the suit is in the discretion of the Court. In Sections 35 and 35B, there is no upper limit of amount of cost awardable. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that many unscrupulous parties take advantage of the fact that either the costs are not awarded or nominal costs are awarded on the unsuccessful party. Unfortunately, it has become a practice to direct parties to bear their own costs. In large number of cases, such an order is passed despite Section 35(2) of the Code. Such a practice also encourages filing of frivolous suits. It also leads to taking up of frivolous defences. Further wherever costs are awarded, ordinarily the same are not realistic and are nominal. When Section 35(2) provides for cost to follow the event, it is implicit that the costs have to be those which are reasonably incurred by a successful party except in those cases where the Court in its discretion may direct otherwise by recording reasons thereof. The costs have to be actual reasonable costs including the cost of the time spent by the successful party, the transportation and lodging, if any, or any other incidental cost besides the payment of the court fee, lawyer's fee, typing and other cost in relation to the litigation. It is for the High Courts to examine these aspects and wherever necessary make requisite rules, regulations or practice direction so as to provide appropriate guidelines for the subordinate courts to follow.

Section 80 Section 80(1) of the Code requires prior notice of two months to be served on the Government as a condition for filing a suit except when there is urgency for interim order in which case the Court may not insist on the rigid rule of prior notice. The two months period has been provided for so that the Government shall examine the claim put up in the notice and has sufficient time to send a suitable reply. The underlying object is to curtail the litigation. The object also is to curtail the area of dispute and controversy. Similar provisions also exist in various other legislations as well. Wherever the statutory provision requires service of notice as a condition precedent for filing of suit and prescribed period therefore, it is not only necessary for the governments or departments or other statutory bodies to send a reply to such a notice but it is further necessary to properly deal with all material points and issues raised in the notice. The Governments, Government departments or statutory authorities are defendants in large number of suits pending in various courts in the country. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that in large number of cases either the notice is not replied or in few cases where reply is sent, it is generally vague and evasive. The result is that the object underlying Section 80 of the Code and similar provisions gets defeated. It not only gives rise to avoidable litigation but also results in heavy expense and cost to the exchequer as well. Proper reply can result in reduction of litigation between State and the citizens. In case proper reply is sent either the claim in the notice may be admitted or area of controversy curtailed or the citizen may be satisfied on knowing the stand of the State. There is no accountability in the Government, Central or State or the statutory authorities in violating the spirit and object of Section 80. These provisions cast an implied duty on all concerned governments and States and statutory authorities to send appropriate reply to such notices. Having regard to the existing state of affairs, we direct all concerned governments, Central or State or other authorities, whenever any statute requires service of notice as a condition precedent for filing of suit or other proceedings against it, to nominate, within a period of three months, an officer who shall be made responsible to ensure that replies to notices under Section 80 or similar provisions are sent within the period stipulated in a particular legislation. The replies shall be sent after due application of mind. Despite such nomination, if the Court finds that either the notice has not been replied or reply is evasive and vague and has been sent without proper application of mind, the Court shall ordinarily award heavy cost against the Government and direct it to take appropriate action against the concerned Officer including recovery of costs from him. Section 115 of the Code vests power of revision in the High Court over courts subordinate to it. Proviso to Section 115(1) of the Code before the amendment by Act 46 of 1999 read as under : "Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section vary or reverse any order made, or may order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding except where 

(a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding; or

(b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made."

Now, the aforesaid proviso has been substituted by the following proviso. :

"Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings."

The aforesaid clause (b) stands omitted. The question is about the constitutional powers of the High Courts under Article 227 on account of omission made in Section 115 of the Code. The question stands settled by a decision of this Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors. [2003 (6) SCC 675] holding that the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is always in addition to the revisional jurisdiction conferred on it. Curtailment of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code does not take away and could not have taken away the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. The power exists, untrammeled by the amendment in Section 115 and is available to be exercised subject to rules of self-discipline and practice which are as well settled.

Section 148 The amendment made in Section 148 affects the power of the Court to enlarge time that may have been fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code. The amendment provides that the period shall not exceed 30 days in total. Before amendment, there was no such restriction of time. Whether the Court has no inherent power to extend the time beyond 30 days is the question. We have no doubt that the upper limit fixed in Section 148 cannot take away the inherent power of the Court to pass orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of Court. The rigid operation of the section would lead to absurdity. Section 151 has, therefore, to be allowed to fully operate. Extension beyond maximum of 30 days, thus, can be permitted if the act could not be performed within 30 days for the reasons beyond the control of the party. We are not dealing with a case where time for doing an act has been prescribed under the provisions of the Limitation Act which cannot be extended either under Section 148 or Section 151. We are dealing with a case where the time is fixed or granted by the Court for performance of an act prescribed or allowed by the Court.

In Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das [AIR 1961 SC 882], this Court considered a case where an order was passed by the Court that if the Court fee was not paid by a particular day, the suit shall stand dismissed. It was a self-operating order leading to dismissal of the suit. The party's application filed under Sections 148 and 151 of the Code for extension of time was dismissed. Allowing the appeal, it was observed: "How undesirable it is to fix time peremptorily for a future happening which leaves the Court powerless to deal with events that might arise in between, it is not necessary to decide in this appeal. These orders turn out, often enough to be inexpedient. Such procedural orders, though peremptory (conditional decree apart), are, in essence, in terrorem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. For example, it cannot be said that, if the appellant had started with the full money ordered to be paid and came well in time, but was set upon and robbed by thieves the day previous, he could not ask for extension of time or that the Court was powerless to extend it. Such orders are not like the law of the Medes and the Persians."

There can be many cases where non-grant of extension beyond 30 days would amount to failure of justice. The object of the Code is not to promote failure of justice. Section 148, therefore, deserves to be read down to mean that where sufficient cause exists or events are beyond the control of a party, the Court would have inherent power to extend time beyond 30 days.

Order IX Rule 5 The period of seven days mentioned in Order IX Rule 5 is clearly directory.

Order XI Rule 15 The stipulation in Rule 15 of Order XI confining the inspection of documents 'at or before the settlement of issues' instead of 'at any time' is also nothing but directory. It does not mean that the inspection cannot be allowed after the settlement of issues.

Supreme Court of India

Desh Raj vs Balkishan (D) Through Proposed Lr ... on 20 January, 2020

However, it would be gainsaid that although the unamended Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC is directory, it cannot be interpreted to bestow a free hand to on any litigant or lawyer to file written statement at their own sweet­will and/or to prolong the lis. The legislative objective behind prescription of timelines under the CPC must be given due weightage so that the disputes are resolved in a time­bound manner. Inherent discretion of Courts, like the ability to condone delays under Order VIII Rule 1 is a fairly defined concept and its contours have been shaped through judicial decisions over the ages. Illustratively, extreme hardship or delays occurring due to factors beyond control of parties despite proactive diligence, may be just and equitable instances for condonation of delay.

17. However, it is clear from the facts on record that numerous opportunities had been accorded to the appellant. He was served on 01.05.2017 and entered appearance through counsel on 15.05.2017. As per Order VIII Rule I of CPC, the appellant ideally ought to have filed his written statement by 31.05.2017; and at the very latest by 30.07.2017. In addition to two separate deadlines for filing of the written statement within Page | 8 the 90­day timeframe prescribed by the ‘original’ Order VIII Rule 1, the Civil Court even post expiry of the 90­day period again gave one last and final opportunity on 18.09.2017 subject to payment of costs of Rs 3,000. None of these deadlines were complied with. Even on 11.10.2017, when the Court finally closed the appellant’s ability to file written statement and struck­off his defence from the record, no attempt was made to comply with the process of law.

18. It was only on 02.11.2017, after a delay of 95 days post the maximum extendable period under the Proviso of Order VIII Rule 1, CPC that the appellant claimed to have filed his written statement. Curiously however, even by the next hearing on 03.11.2017, the appellant had failed to provide a copy of the written statement to the respondent as had been noted by the Civil Court.

19. The only defence taken to these repeated and blatant lapses is that the appellant’s counsel was not turning up. No attempt has been made to even proffer a reasoned justification or explanation, and it is clear that appellant is seeking condonation in a casual manner. This ought not to be permitted or encouraged. Courts must act stringently to ensure that all proceedings are decided within reasonable time, and it is but the duty of the judicial system to cultivate a culture of respecting deadlines and time Page | 9 of the Court, its officers as well as of adversaries.

20. Routine condonations and cavalier attitudes towards the process of law affects the administration of justice. It affects docket management of Courts and causes avoidable delays, cost escalations and chaos. The effect of this is borne not only by the litigants, but also commerce in the country and the public­in­general who spend decades mired in technical processes.

21. It is obvious from the record that nothing prevented the appellant from filing the written statement through counsel or in person. He has, thus, failed to give any cogent reason for the delay and is unable to satisfy due diligence on his part though he is right in his submission that the High Court erroneously relied upon the ratio of Oku Tech (supra).

22. Having held so, there could be no escape but to dismiss this appeal. However, taking a lenient view given the unique circumstances of the case, and without laying down the discretion being exercised hereinafter, as a precedent, we direct that the written statement filed by the appellant on 02.11.2017 (as claimed), be taken on record with a copy to counsel for the respondent within one week from today and further subject to payment of costs of Rs. 25,000/­ to the respondent.

M/s SCG Contracts India Pvt. Ltd. V/s. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 1638 of 2019 arising out of S.L.P (C) No. 103/2019) held that the 120-day deadline to file the written statement in Commercial Suits is mandatory, thereby, leaving no room for courts to exercise their discretion to relax the same. Court held - "However, grace period of a further 90 days is granted which the Court may employ for reasons to be recorded in writing and payment of such costs as it deems fit to allow such written statement to come on record. What is of great importance is the fact that beyond 120 days from the date of service of summons, the defendant shall forfeit the right to file the written statement and the Court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record. This is further buttressed by the proviso in Order VIII Rule 10 also adding that the Court has no further power to extend the time beyond this period of 120 days.

We are of the view that the view taken by the Delhi High Court in these judgments is correct in view of the fact that the consequence of forfeiting a right to file the written statement; non-extension of any further time; and the fact that the Court shall not allow the written statement to be taken on record all points to the fact that the earlier law on Order VIII Rule 1 on the filing of written statement under Order VIII Rule 1 has now been set at naught."

Supreme Court of India

Balraj Taneja & Anr vs Sunil Madan & Anr on 8 September, 1999

Order 8 Rule 1 provides that the defendant shall file a Written Statement of his defence. It is further provided by Rule 3 of Order 8 that it shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his Written Statement to deny generally the grounds alleged by the plaintiff, but defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth. The further requirement as set out in Rule 4 is that if the allegation made in the plaint is denied by the defendant, the denial must not be evasive. It is, inter alia, provided in Rule 5 of Order 8 that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication or stated to be not admitted in the written statement, shall be taken to be admitted.

This Rule provides as under :

"Order 8 Rule 5 - Specific denial (1) Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability :

Provided that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.

(2) Where the defendant has not filed a pleading, it shall be lawful for the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts contained in the plaint, except as against a person under a disability, but the Court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved.

(3) In exercising its discretion under the proviso to sub- rule (1) or under sub-rule (2), the Court shall have due regard to the fact whether the defendant could have, or has, engaged a pleader.

(4) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under this rule, a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with such judgment and such decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced."

The scheme of this Rule is largely dependent upon the filing or non-filing of the pleading by the defendant. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 provides that any fact stated in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be treated as admitted. Under Rule 3 of Order 8, it is provided that the denial by the defendant in his written statement must be specific with reference to each allegation of fact made in the plaint. A general denial or an evasive denial is not treated as sufficient denial and, therefore, the denial, if it is not definite, positive and unambiguous, the allegations of facts made in the plaint shall be treated as admitted under this Rule.

The proviso appended to this Rule is important in the sense that though a fact stated in the plaint may be treated as admitted, the Court may, in its discretion, still require such "admitted fact" to be proved otherwise than by such admission. This is an exception to the general rule of evidence that a fact which is admitted need not be proved.

Sub-rule (2) provides that if the defendant has not filed his written statement, it would be lawful for the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts contained in the plaint. The rule further proceeds to say that notwithstanding that the facts stated in the plaint are treated as admitted, the Court, though it can lawfully pass the judgment, may before passing the judgment require such fact to be proved. The rule is thus in consonance with the Proviso which also requires the fact, even though treated as admitted, to be proved. Thus, the Proviso and Sub- rule (2) read together indicate that where

(i) an allegation of fact made in the plaint is not denied specifically, or

(ii) by necessary implication, or