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section 10 - Theory of agency

Supreme Court of India

Sardar Sardul Singh Caveeshar vs State Of Maharashtra(And ... on 18 March, 1963

The essence of conspiracy is, therefore, that there should be an agreement between persons to do one or other of the acts described in the section. The said agreement may be proved by direct evidence or may be inferred from acts and conduct of the parties. There is no difference between the mode of proof of the offence of conspiracy and that of any other offence : it can be established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. But s. 10 of the Evidence Act introduces the doctrine of agency and if the conditions laid down therein are satisfied, the acts done by one are admissible against the co-conspirators. The said section reads :


"Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of such persons in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it."

This section, as the opening words indicate, will come into play only when the Court is satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable wrong, that is to say, there should be a prima facie evidence that a person was a party to the conspiracy before his acts can be used against his co-conspirators. Once such a reasonable ground exists, anything said, done or written by one of the conspirators in reference to the common intention, after the said intention was entertained, is relevant against the others, not only for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy but also for proving that the other person was a party to it. The evidentiary value of the said acts is limited by two circumstances, namely, that the acts shall be in reference to their common intention and in respect of a period after such intention was entertained by any one of them. The expression "'in reference to their common intention" is very comprehensive and it appears to have been designedly used to give it a wider scope than the words "in furtherance of" in the English law ; with the result, anything said, done or written by a coconspirator, after the conspiracy was formed, will be evidence against the other before he entered the field of conspiracy or after he left it. Another important limitation implicit in the language is indicated by the expressed scope of its relevancy. Anything so said, done or written is a relevant fact only "as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it. It can only be used for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy or that the other person was a party to it. It cannot be used in favour of the other party or for the purpose of showing that such a person was not a party to the conspiracy. In short, the section can be analysed as follows : (1) There shall be a prima facie evidence affording a reasonable ground for a Court to believe that two or more persons are members of a conspiracy ; (2) if the said condition is fulfilled, anything said, done or written by any one of them in reference to their common intention will be evidence against the other; (3) anything said, done or written by him should have been said, done or written by him after the intention was formed by any one of them ; (4) it would also be relevant for the said purpose against another who entered the conspiracy whether it was said, done or written before he entered the conspiracy or after he left it ; and (5) it can only be used against a co-conspirator and not in his favour.


In Mirza Akbar vs. King Emperor (AIR 1940 PC 176) the Privy Council said the following on the scope of Section 10 :


"This being the principle, their Lordships think the words of S.10 must be construed in accordance with it and are not capable of being widely construed so as to include a statement made by one conspirator in the absence of the other with reference to past acts done in the actual course of carrying out the conspiracy, after it has been completed. The common intention is in the past. In their Lordships' judgment, the words "common intention" signify a common intention existing at the time when the thing was said, done or written by the one of them. Things said, done or written while the conspiracy was on foot are relevant as evidence of the common intention, once reasonable ground has been shown to believe in its existence. But it would be a very different matter to hold that any narrative or statement or confession made to a third party after the common intention or conspiracy was no longer operating and had ceased to exist is admissible against the other party. There is then no common intention of the conspirators to which the statement can have reference. In their Lordships' judgment S.10 embodies this principle. That is the construction which has been rightly applied to S.10 in decisions in India. In these cases the distinction was rightly drawn between communications between conspirators while the conspiracy was going on with reference to the carrying out of conspiracy and statements made, after arrest or after the conspiracy has ended, by way of description of events then past."



Supreme Court of India

Badri Rai & Another vs The State Of Bihar on 18 August, 1958


Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, has been deliberately enacted in order to make such acts and statements of a co-conspirator admissible against the whole body of conspirators, because of the nature of the crime. A conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and executed in darkness. Naturally, therefore, it is not feasible for the prosecution to connect each isolated act or statement of one accused with the acts or statements of the others, unless there is a common bond linking all of them together. Ordinarily, specially in a criminal case, one person cannot be made responsible for the acts or statements of another. It is only when there is evidence of a concerted action in :furtherance of a common intention to commit a crime, that the law has introduced this rule of common responsibility, on the principle that every one concerned in a conspiracy is acting as the agent of the rest of them. As soon as the court has reasonable grounds to believe that there is identity of interest or community of purpose between a number of persons, any act done, or any statement or declaration made, by any one of the co- conspirators is, naturally, held to be the act or statement of the other conspirators, if the act or the declaration has any relation to the object of the conspiracy. Otherwise, stray acts done in darkness in prosecution of an object hatched in secrecy, may not become intelligible without reference to the common purpose running through the chain of acts or illegal omissions attributable to individual members of the conspiracy.



Supreme Court of India

State Of W.B vs Mohammed Khalid on 24 November, 1994

It is not necessary to bring home the charge of conspiracy to establish the time and the place of conspiracy or even the actual words of communication. It is not necessary to prove who entered into conspiracy and the nature of conspiracy. The existence of conspiracy can be inferred from the conduct of the various accused prior to and subsequent to the conspiracy. Existence of explosive materials is enough to prove the conspiracy when there was preparation for a large number of bombs. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India, dealing with the law relating to conspiracy. On the basis of this citation it is submitted, even if the explosion has not taken place, the very possession of bomb would amount to conspiracy.


In Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar v. State of Maharashtra - it was held that for an offence under Section 120-B IPC, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the conspirators expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act, the agreement may be proved by necessary implication."


IN the case of R v. Blake and Tye - Blake was working as a landing waiter at the Customs House. Tye worked at the same place as an agent for the importers. They were charged with conspiracy to dodge the customs by passing goods without paying full duty. Tye made certain entries in two books. One of them was used for carrying out the fraud and the entries were necessary for that purpose. But the other was for his private record, or convenience, such as, the counterfoil of his cheque book.

It was held that the entries in the former book were admissible against Blake, but the latter were not. The essence of the decision was that evidence of an act of a conspirator is relevant against other only it the act was done to carry out the conspiracy. The act should “relate to the furtherance of the common object.”

THE basic principle which is underlined under Sec. 10 is the theory of agency and hence every conspirator is agent of this association in carrying out the object of conspiracy. Sec. 10 renders anything said or done or written by any one of the conspirators in reference to their common intention as relevant fact not only as (i) against each of the Conspirators but (ii) proving the conspiracy itself. The only condition for application of the rule of Sec. 10 is that there must be reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence.



Bombay High Court (Lamington Road Shooting Conspiracy case)

Emperor vs G.V. Vaishampayan on 7 April, 1931

"An objection has been raised to the proof by the approver of some of the statements made to him by a man called Swamirao, who is alleged to have been a co-conspirator but is not an accused before this Court. The statements had reference to the alleged attack on the Lamington Road police station and were alleged to have been made after the return of the attacking party to the approver at his residence. The objection is that such statements made after the completion of the attack do not come within Section 10 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as they were not made in reference to the common intention of the conspitators. The word 'intention' implies that the act intended is in the future and the section makes relevant statements made by a conspirator with reference to the future. I interpret the words "in reference to their common intention" to mean in reference to what at the time of statement was intended in the future. From this it appears that Swamirao proposed to start propaganda in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy. It is permissible under Section 10 to prove what that propaganda was to be; and if the pamphlet was to contain an account of the attack on the Lamington Road police-station, the prosecution must be entitled to prove what that version was, not as a mere narrative of past events but as a statement which Swami intended to publish in the future in reference to the common intention."




Supreme Court of India

State Of Tamil Nadu vs J. Jayalalitha on 9 May, 2000


The question of using anything said, done or written by any one of such conspirators would arise only if the facts would help to sustain the first limb of the section i.e. there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired together to commit an offence. Unless the court has some materials to believe that respondent is one of those persons referred to in the first limb of the section, so far as the conspiracy in this case is concerned, any consideration for what she had said, done or written would not be a relevant fact as against each of the conspirators. Nevertheless, it is open to the court, even at this stage to consider the materials relating to what an accused would have said, done or written with reference to the common intention between the accused for the purpose of deciding whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the said accused would have been one of the conspirators. In State vs. Nalini {1999 (5) SCC 253} a three Judge Bench of this Court has stated the legal position thus regarding the first limb of Section 10 of the Evidence Act:


"The first condition which is almost the opening lock of that provision is the existence of `reasonable ground to believe' that the conspirators have conspired together. This condition will be satisfied even when there is some prima facie evidence to show that there was such a criminal conspiracy. If the aforesaid preliminary condition is fulfilled then anything said by one of the conspirators becomes substantive evidence against the other, provided that should have been a statement `in reference to their common intention'. Under the corresponding provision in the English law the expression used is `in furtherance of the common object'. No doubt, the words `in reference to their common intention' are wider than the words used in English law.


Supreme Court of India

Central Bureau Of Investigation vs V.C. Shukla & Ors on 2 March, 1998

" (1) There shall be a prima facie evidence affording a reasonable ground for a Court to believe that two or more persons are members of a conspiracy; (2) if the said condition is fulfilled, any thing said, done or written by any one of them in reference to their common intention will be evidence against the other; (3) any thing said, done or written by him should have been said, done or written by him after the intention was formed by any one of them; (4) it would also be relevant for the said purpose against another who entered the conspiracy whether it was said , done or written before the entered the conspiracy or after the left it' and (5) it can only be used against a co-conspirator and not in his favour."


Would entries in books of accounts be sufficient to prove liability under conspiracy ?


Such entries though relevant were only corroborative evidence and it is to be shown further by some independent evidence that the entries represent honest and real transactions and that monies were paid in accordance with those entries.t even correct and authentic entries in books of account cannot without independent evidence of their trustworthiness, fix a liability upon a person. Even correct and authentic entries in books of account cannot without independent evidence of their trustworthiness, fix a liability upon a person. Keeping in view the above principles, even if we proceed on the assumption that the entries made in MR 71/91 are correct and the entries in the other books and loose sheets which we have already found to be not admissible in evidence under Section 34 are admissible under Section 9 of the Act to support an inference about the formers' correctness still those entries would not be sufficient to charge Shri Advani and Shri Shukla with the accusations levelled against them for there is not an iota of independent evidence in support thereof.


From a combined reading of the above Sections it is manifest that an oral or documentary statement made by a party or his authorised agent, suggesting any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact may be proved against a party t the proceeding or his authorised agent as 'admission' but, apart form exceptional cases (as contained in Section 21), such a statement cannot be proved by or on their behalf. While on this point the distinction between 'admission' and concession' needs to be appreciated.It is thus seen that only voluntary and direct acknowledgement of guilt is a confession but when a confession falls short of actual admission guilt it may nevertheless be used as evidence against the person who made it or his authorised agent as an 'admission' .





In the case of Badri Rai v. State of Bihar the Supreme Court referred to the state of English Law as expounded in R vs. Blake, and said that “ section 10 of the Evidence Act is on the same lines” :

Ramji and Badri were prosecuted for conspiracy under S.120- and for bribing a police officer under S.165-A. An inspector of police was on his way to the police station. Both Ramji and Badri approached him and requested that they would duly reward him if he could hush up the case relating to stolen ornaments and molten silver recovered from Ramji's house and which was under investigation. The inspector told them he could not talk to them on the road and that they should come to the police station. The inspector reported the matter to his senior officer. Badri alone came to the police station and offered him a packet wrapped in a piece of old newspaper containing Rs. 500 in currency notes. He told the inspector that Ramji had sent the money as a consideration for hushing up the case against him. In the presence of other persons, who became witnesses, the inspector seized the money and drew up the first information report.

The only question before the Supreme Court was whether the offer of money and the accompanying statement made by Badri were relevant against Ramji. The court said that when both the accused approached the inspector and requested him to hush up the case, that clearly showed that they had conspired to bribe a public servant. That being so, anything said or doneor written by any of them in reference of their conspiracy to bribe was relevant against the other also. The statement and the offer of bribe had clear reference to their common intention and were, therefore, relevant against both.

The Supreme Court further said, Sec.10 of the Evidence Act has been deliberately enacted in order to make such acts and statements of a co-conspirator admissible against the whole body of conspirators, because of the nature of crime. A conspiracy is hatched in secrecy, and executed in darkness. Naturally, therefore, it is not feasible for the prosecution to connect each isolated act or statement of one accused with the acts of statements of the others, unless there is a common bond linking all of them together.


In Mirza Akbar v. Emperor (1941) 43 BOMLR 20 - Mirza Akbar - Mst Mehr Teja and Umar Sher were convicted for the murder of Ali Askar, the husband of Mst. Mehar Teja. The prosecution case was that Mst. Mehar Teja and Mirza Akbar desired to get rid of Askar so that they could marry each other. Umar Sher was hired for the purpose. Umar Sher shot Ali Askar dead. After the murder was committed, Mst Mehr Teja was arrested on the charge of conspiracy. She was examined before a magistrate and there she made certain statement implicating Mirza Akbar. This statement was admitted in evidence both by the trial Judge and Judicial Commissioner as relevant against the appellant under Sec.10, Evidence Act. It was held that the words of Sec.10 are not capable of being widely construed so as to include a statement made by one conspirator in the absence of the other with reference to past acts done in the actual course of carrying out the conspiracy, after it has been completed. Appellant Mirza Akbar and Mst Teja were tried for conspiracy to commit the murder of Ali Askar, husband of Mst. Mehar Teja. After the murder was committed Mst. Mehar Teja was arrested. She made the statement to the effect that there was conspiracy for murdering Ali Askar. It was held that the statement was made with reference to past act 'common intention' in the section signify common intention existing at the time when the thing was done, written or said. Things said, written or done while the conspiracy is at foot are relevant. The statement was held to be not admissible.


It will be convenient to set out the relevant portions of the three letters. They are (1) exhibit P.A. in the handwriting of Mst. Mehr Taja:


Greetings to thee O my sweet-heart. Mind not in the least if I have been hard on thee at times--pray forgive me for the same. In fact I feel offended when; ill is spoken of thee. Khan Khela who had visited my house when Amir Jan was suffering from pain had a lot of talk against thee, but beware and lend not thy ears to these. They are arch devils. Partake not of anything from their hands. Now I shall sell myself and do this act if only I have thee at my back. What a blissful hour it would be when with Amir Jan wailing over Ali Askar we contract our Nikah and enjoy ourselves. Be not angry my darling for thy sorrow makes me sad. However hard on thee I have been in the past, that is all past. Henceforth I solemnly promise to desist. I do fervently cherish the hope that God will make thee mine. Try and send Mir Aftab often to me so that I may talk to him. I have found out money for thee but thou must unhesitatingly find out the man. My heart is bursting for thee and I long for thee immensely. In the end accept my greetings.


Exhibit P.B. (also in Mst. Mehr Taja's handwriting):--


Letter to the sweet-heart. Peace be on you. The fact, my darling is that I am in great distress: otherwise I would not have conveyed thee such harsh things. I say these to thee for I am extremely distressed. Whom but thee have I as my own in this land of the Lord ... I have a lot to tell you but I am helpless. For God's sake spare not a moment or thou wilt ever repent my loss. They are all one against me. It would be better if aught thou couldst do. Accept greetings.


Exhibit P.D. (in handwriting of the appellant):--

My sweet-heart and the bearer of my burden. If thou tauntest me in regard to my mother what do I care for her. I look to my God and to thee only for reliance. I cannot wait any more. For the sake of God and his Prophet do try or I will die. You, must find out the money or I would die. Is it of my choice, to be roaming about and thou be enjoying with him, but what shall I do. If I had my own way I would not have left you to remain with him. I am burning and have pity on me for God's sake. To me the passing of each day is like months and years. Once place thyself in my charge and satiate me with the honey of thy red lips. Even if thou cuttest my head off my neck I would still yearn for thy white breast. This is my last word if only thou wouldst attend to it. I have vowed for thy sake at many a shrine. The house of the torturer will be rendered desolate. Mirza Akbar's. limbs have grown sapless after thee.


The leading; case of The Queen v. Blake (1844) 6 Q.B. 126- this authority shows both what is admissible and what is inadmissible. What in that case was held to be admissible against the conspirator was the evidence of entries made by his fellow conspirator contained in various documents actually used for carrying out the fraud. But a document not created in the course of carrying out the transaction, but made by one of the conspirators after the fraud was completed, was held to be inadmissible against the other. No doubt what was contained in it amounted to a statement evidencing what had been done and also the common intent with which at the time it had been done, but it had nothing to do with carrying the conspiracy into effect. Lord Denman said at p. 138 that the evidence must be rejected the principle that a mere statement made by one conspirator to a third party or any act not done in pursuance of the conspiracy is not evidence for or against another conspirator.


The words written or spoken may be a declaration accompanying an act and indicating the quality of the act as being an act in the course of the conspiracy: or the words written or spoken may in themselves be acts done in the course of the conspiracy. This being the principle, their Lordships think the words of Section 10 must be construed in accordance with it and are not capable of being widely construed so as to include a statement made by one conspirator in the absence of the other with reference to past acts done in the actual course of carrying out the conspiracy, after it has been completed. The common intention is in the past. In their Lordships' judgment, the words "common intention" signify a common intention existing at the time when the thing was said, done or written by the one of them. Things said, done or written while the conspiracy was on foot are relevant as evidence of the common intention, once reasonable ground has been shown to believe in its existence. But it would be a very different matter to hold that any narrative or statement or confession made to a third party after the common intention or conspiracy was no longer operating and had ceased to exist is admissible against the other party. There is then no common intention of the conspirators to which the statement can have reference. In their Lordships' judgment Section 10 embodies this principle. That is the construction which has been rightly applied to Section 10 in decisions in India.

The terms of the letters are only consistent with a conspiracy between the prisoners to procure the death of Ali Askar. The vague suggestion that they related merely to a scheme to obtain a divorce and to raise money for that purpose is clearly untenable. The handwriting of the letters is clearly established."



Supreme Court of India

Ram Narain Popli vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 14 January, 2003

the expression "in reference to their common intention" in Section 10 is very comprehensive and it appears to have been designedly used to give it a wider scope than the words "in furtherance of in the English law; with the result, anything said, done or written by a co- conspirator, after the conspiracy was formed, will be evidence against the other before he entered the field of conspiracy or after he left it. Anything said, done or written is a relevant fact only.


Apex Court in B.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay held:


"The gist of the offence is an agreement to break the law. The parties to such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been done. So too, it is an ingredient of the offence that all the parties should agree to do a single illegal act. It may comprise the commission of a number of acts. Under Section 43 of the Indian Penal Code, an act would be illegal if it is an offence or if it is prohibited by law."


In Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab, [1977] 4 SCC 540 the rule was laid as follows: (SCC p. 543 para 9) 'The very agreement, concert or league is the ingredient of the offence. It is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of the conspiracy as long as they are co-participators in the main object of the conspiracy. There may be so many devices and techniques adopted to achieve the common goal of the conspiracy and there may be division of performances in the chain of actions with one object to achieve the real end of which every collaborator must be aware and in which each one of them must be interested. There must be unity of object or purpose but there may be plurality of means sometimes even unknown to one another, amongst the conspirators. In achieving the goal several offences may be committed by some of the conspirators even unknown to the others. The only relevant factor is that all means adopted and illegal acts done must be and purported to be in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy even though there may be sometimes misfire or overshooting by some of the conspirators.' In Mohammad Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, [1981] 2 SCC 443, it was held that for an offence under Section 120B IPC, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the perpetrators expressly agreed to do or cause to be done the illegal act, the agreement may be proved by necessary implication."



State Of Tamil Nadu... vs Nalini And 25 Others on 11 May, 1999


Some of the broad principles governing the law of conspiracy may be summarized though, as the name implies, a summary cannot be exhaustive of the principles.


1. Under Section 120A IPC offence of criminal conspiracy is committed when two or more persons agree to do or cause to be done an illegal act or legal act by illegal means. When it is legal act by illegal means overt act is necessary. Offence of criminal conspiracy is exception to the general law where intent alone does not constitute crime. It is intention to commit crime and joining hands with persons having the same intention. Not only the intention but there has to be agreement to carry out the object of the intention, which is an offence. The question for consideration in a case is did all the accused had the intention and did they agree that the crime be committed. It would not be enough for the offence of conspiracy when some of the accused merely entertained a wish, howsoever, horrendous it may be, that offence be committed.


2. Acts subsequent to the achieving of object of conspiracy may tend to prove that a particular accused was party to the conspiracy. Once the object of conspiracy has been achieved, any subsequent act, which may be unlawful, would not make the accused a part of the conspiracy like giving shelter to an absconder.


3. Conspiracy is hatched in private or in secrecy. It is rarely possible to establish a conspiracy by direct evidence. Usually, both the existence of the conspiracy and its objects have to be inferred from the circumstances and the conduct of the accused.


4. Conspirators may, for example, be enrolled in a chain A enrolling B, B enrolling C, and so on; and all will be members of a single conspiracy if they so intend and agree, even though each member knows only the person who enrolled him and the person whom he enrolls. There may be a kind of umbrella-spoke enrollment, where a single person at the centre doing the enrolling and all the other members being unknown to each other, though they know that there are to be other members. These are theories and in practice it may be difficult to tell whether the conspiracy in a particular case falls into which category. It may, however, even overlap. But then there has to be present mutual interest. Persons may be members of single conspiracy even though each is ignorant of the identity of many others who may have diverse role to play. It is not a part of the crime of conspiracy that all the conspirators need to agree to play the same or an active role.


5. When two or more persons agree to commit a crime of conspiracy, then regardless of making or considering any plans for its commission, and despite the fact that no step is taken by any such person to carry out their common purpose, a crime is committed by each and every one who joins in the agreement. There has thus to be two conspirators and there may be more than that. To prove the charge of conspiracy it is not necessary that intended crime was committed or not. If committed it may further help prosecution to prove the charge of conspiracy.


6. It is not necessary that all conspirators should agree to the common purpose at the same time. They may join with other conspirators at any time before the consummation of the intended objective, and all are equally responsible. What part each conspirator is to play may not be known to everyone or the fact as to when a conspirator joined the conspiracy and when he left.


7. A charge of conspiracy may prejudice the accused because it is forced them into a joint trial and the court may consider the entire mass of evidence against every accused. Prosecution has to produce evidence not only to show that each of the accused has knowledge of object of conspiracy but also of the agreement. In the charge of conspiracy court has to guard itself against the danger of unfairness to the accused. Introduction of evidence against some may result in the conviction of all, which is to be avoided. By means of evidence in conspiracy, which is otherwise inadmissible in the trial of any other substantive offence prosecution tries to implicate the accused not only in the conspiracy itself but also in the substantive crime of the alleged conspirators. There is always difficulty in tracing the precise contribution of each member of the conspiracy but then there has to be cogent and convincing evidence against each one of the accused charged with the offence of conspiracy. As observed by Judge Learned Hand that "this distinction is important today when many prosecutors seek to sweep within the dragnet of conspiracy all those who have been associated in any degree whatever with the main offenders".


8. As stated above it is the unlawful agreement and not its accomplishment, which is the gist or essence of the crime of conspiracy. Offence of criminal conspiracy is complete even though there is no agreement as to the means by which the purpose is to be accomplished. It is the unlawful agreement, which is the gravaman of the crime of conspiracy. The unlawful agreement which amounts to a conspiracy need not be formal or express, but may be inherent in and inferred from the circumstances, especially declarations, acts, and conduct of the conspirators. The agreement need not be entered into by all the parties to it at the same time, but may be reached by successive actions evidencing their joining of the conspiracy.


9. It has been said that a criminal conspiracy is a partnership in crime, and that there is in each conspiracy a joint or mutual agency for the prosecution of a common plan. Thus, if two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor. This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them. And this joint responsibility extends not only to what is done by any of the conspirators pursuant to the original agreement but also to collateral acts incident to and growing out of the original purpose. A conspirator is not responsible, however, for acts done by a co-conspirator after termination of the conspiracy. The joinder of a conspiracy by a new member does not create a new conspiracy nor does it change the status of the other conspirators, and the mere fact that conspirators individually or in groups perform different tasks to a common end does not split up a conspiracy into several different conspiracies.


10. A man may join a conspiracy by word or by deed. However, criminal responsibility for a conspiracy requires more than a merely passive attitude towards an existing conspiracy. One who commits an overt act with knowledge of the conspiracy is guilty. And one who tacitly consents to the object of a conspiracy and goes along with other conspirators, actually standing by while the others put the conspiracy into effect, is guilty though he intends to take no active part in the crime. ( reiterated in Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs State Of Maharashtra Th:Cbi ... on 21 March, 2013)



005. Section 10 - Theory of agency
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