Facts not otherwise relevant are made relevant by Section 11. The effect of this section is, therefore, to clearly enlarge the classes of relevant facts. If a fact is relevant under this section, it would be relevant even if it is not relevant under any other section of the Act. At first sight, it would appear that this section would make every fact relevant because of the wording of clause (b) But care must be taken not to give this section an improperly wide scope by a liberal interpretation of the phrase “highly probable or improbable”.
Otherwise, this section might seem to supersede all the other provisions of the Act as to relevancy. Though the terms of section 11 are wide, they are controlled by the provisions regarding the relevancy contained in other sections of the Act. Further, the fact relied on must be proved according to the provisions of the Act.
The observations of West. J, in Reg. v. Prabhudas, (1874 11 B.H.C. 90) on S. 11 of the Act are :
“S. 11 of the Evidence Act is, no doubt, expressed in terms so extensive, that any fact which can, by a chain of ratiocination, be brought into connection with another, so as to have a bearing upon a point in issue, may possibly be held to be relevant within its meaning. But the connetions of human affairs are so infinitely various and far- reaching, that thus to take the section in its widest admissible sense, would be to complicate every trial with a mass of collateral inquiries limited only by the patience and the means of the parties.”
The words “highly probable or improbable” indicate that the connection between the facts in issue the collateral facts sought to be proved must be immediate so as to render the co-existence of the two highly probable. The relevant facts under this section either (i) exclude, or (ii) imply, more or less distinctly, the existence of the fact sought to be proved. (Jhabwala v. Emporer ., A.I.R. 1933 All. 690)
Khaver Sultan V. Rukha Sultan , (1904) 6 Bom LR 983
Collateral facts are admissible if :
1 - The collateral fact is established by a reasonably conclusive evidence
2 - That it must , when established , afford a reasonable presumption or inference as to the matter in dispute.
Kalu Mirza v. Emperor, 1909 37 Cal. 91
where the question was whether a person was a habitual cheat, the fact that he belonged to an organisation which was formed for the purpose of habitually cheating people was held to be relevant, and it was open to the prosecution to prove, against each person, that the members of the gang did cheat people.
Emperor v. Wahiddudin, 32 B.L.R. 324
in a case of conspiracy to commit dacoity, facts showing that the object of the illegal association, during a period of several months prior to the dacoity in question, had been the commission of thefts and other discreditable acts, was held to be inadmissible to prove the nature and character of the association.
In Sheikh Ketab-Uddin v. Nagarchand Pattak  AIR 230 (Cal), it was held, that where the executants of an archive holding presentations of boundaries of land are alive and don’t give their evidence, such archives are not acceptable under this segment.
In Ambikacharan v. Kumuk Mohan AIR 893 (Cal)., Cummin and Mukherji held that as a general rule, S.11 is controlled by S.32, “when the evidence consists of statement of persons who are dead and the test whether such a statement is relevant under S.11, though not relevant and admissible under S.32, is that it is admissible under S.11, when it is altogether immaterial whether what said was true or false, but highly material that it was said.”
In Mohan Singh and another v. State of M.P. Apex Court has held:
“11. The question is how to test the veracity of the prosecution story especially when it is with some variance with the medical evidence. Mere variance of the prosecution story with the medical evidence, in all cases, should not lead to the conclusion, inevitably to reject the prosecution story. Efforts should be made to find the truth, this is the very object for which courts are created. To search it out, the courts have been removing the chaff from the grain. It has to disperse the suspicious cloud and dust out the smear of dust as all these things clog the very truth. So long as chaff, cloud and dust remain, the criminals are clothed with this protective layer to receive the benefit of doubt. So it is a solemn duty of the courts, not to merely conclude and leave the case the moment suspicions are created. It is the onerous duty of the court, within permissible limit, to find out the truth. It means on one hand, no innocent man should be punished but on the other hand, to see no person committing an offence should get scot-free. If in spite of such effort, suspicion is not dissolved, it remains writ at large, benefit of doubt has to be credited to the accused. For this, one has to comprehend the totality of the facts and the circumstances as spelled out through the evidence, depending on the facts of each case by testing the credibility of eyewitnesses including the medical evidence, of course, after excluding those parts of the evidence which are vague and uncertain. There is no mathematical formula through which the truthfulness of a prosecution or a defence case could be concretised. It would depend on the evidence of each case including the manner of deposition and his demeanour , clarity, corroboration of witnesses and overall, the conscience of a judge evoked by the evidence on record. So courts have to proceed further and make genuine efforts within the judicial sphere to search out the truth and not stop at the threshold of creation of doubt to confer benefit of doubt.”
It is well settled in law that when a plea of alibi is taken by an accused, the burden is upon him to establish the same by positive evidence after the onus as regards the presence on the spot is established by the prosecution. In this context, we may usefully reproduce a few paragraphs from Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar : “22. We must bear in mind that an alibi is not an exception (special or general) envisaged in the Penal Code, 1860 or any other law. It is only a rule of evidence recognised in Section 11 of the Evidence Act that facts which are inconsistent with the fact in issue are relevant. Illustration
(a) given under the provision is worth reproducing in this context:
‘The question is whether A committed a crime at Calcutta on a certain date. The fact that, on that date, A was at Lahore is relevant.”
The Latin word alibi means ‘elsewhere’ and that word is used for convenience when an accused takes recourse to a defence line that when the occurrence took place he was so far away from the place of occurrence that it is extremely improbable that he would have participated in the crime. It is a basic law that in a criminal case, in which the accused is alleged to have inflicted physical injury to another person, the burden is on the prosecution to prove that the accused was present at the scene and has participated in the crime. The burden would not be lessened by the mere fact that the accused has adopted the defence of alibi. The plea of the accused in such cases need be considered only when the burden has been discharged by the prosecution satisfactorily. But once the prosecution succeeds in discharging the burden it is incumbent on the accused, who adopts the plea of alibi, to prove it with absolute certainty so as to exclude the possibility of his presence at the place of occurrence. When the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence has been established satisfactorily by the prosecution through reliable evidence, normally the court would be slow to believe any counter-evidence to the effect that he was elsewhere when the occurrence happened. But if the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a quality and of such a standard that the court may entertain some reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the scene when the occurrence took place, the accused would, no doubt, be entitled to the benefit of that reasonable doubt. For that purpose, it would be a sound proposition to be laid down that, in such circumstances, the burden on the accused is rather heavy. It follows, therefore, that strict proof is required for establishing the plea of alibi. (vide "Mukesh & Anr vs State For Nct Of Delhi & Ors on 5 May, 2017)
Supreme Court of India
Mukesh & Anr vs State For Nct Of Delhi & Ors on 5 May, 2017
While weighing the plea of ‘alibi’, the same has to be weighed against the positive evidence led by the prosecution, i.e., not only the substantive evidence of PW-1 and the dying declarations, Ex.PW-27/A and Ex.PW-30/D-1, but also against the scientific evidence, viz., the DNA analysis, finger print analysis and bite marks analysis, the accuracy of which is scientifically acclaimed. Considering the inconsistent and contradictory nature of the evidence of ‘alibi’ led by the accused against the positive evidence of the prosecution, including the scientific one, we hold that the accused have miserably failed to discharge their burden of absolute certainty qua their plea of ‘alibi’. The plea taken by them appears to be an afterthought and rather may be read as an additional circumstance against them.
[Suman Nama v. State of Tripura, Crl. A. (J) No. 33 of 2015, decided on 03-05-2019]
“When the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence is established satisfactorily by the prosecution through reliable evidence, normally the court would be slow to believe any counter-narrative to the effect that he was elsewhere when the occurrence happened. But if the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a quality and of such a standard that the court may entertain some reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the scene when the occurrence took place, the accused would, no doubt, be entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt. For that purpose, it would be a sound proposition that in such circumstances, the burden on the accused is rather heavy. It follows, therefore, that strict proof is required for establishing the plea of alibi.”
In the present case, the prosecution had failed to prove appellant’s presence at the scene of the crime. Thus, there was no occasion to consider whether his plea of alibi could be considered or not. Accordingly, the impugned order was set aside and the appellant was set at liberty on the benefit of doubt.
Supreme Court of India
Jayantibhai Bhenkarbhai vs State Of Gujarat on 11 September, 2002
The short question for decision in this appeal was whether Jayantibhai, the accused- appellant can be held to have participated in the incident of assault and as a member of unlawful assembly?
The plea of alibi flows from Section 11 and is demonstrated by illustration
(a). Sarkar on Evidence (Fifteenth Edition, p. 258) states the word 'alibi' is of Latin origin and means "elsewhere". It is a convenient term used for the defence taken by an accused that when the occurrence took place he was so far away from the place of occurrence that it is highly improbable that he would have participated in the crime. Alibi is not an exception (a special or general) envisaged in the Indian Penal Code or any other law. It is only a rule of evidence recognized in Section 11 of the Evidence Act that facts which are inconsistent with the fact in issue are relevant. The burden of proving commission of offence by the accused so as to fasten the liability of guilty on him remains on the prosecution and would not be lessened by the mere fact that the accused had adopted the defence of alibi. The plead of alibi taken by the accused needs to be considered only when the burden which lies on the prosecution has been discharged satisfactorily. If the prosecution has failed in discharging its burden of proving the commission of crime by the accused beyond any reasonable doubt, it may not be necessary to go into the question whether the accused has succeeded in proving the defence of alibi. But once the prosecution succeeds in discharging its burden then it is incumbent on the accused taking the plea of alibi to prove it with certainty so as to exclude the possibility of his presence at the place and time of occurrence. An obligations is cast on the Court to weigh in scales the evidence adduced by the prosecution in proving of the guilt of the accused and the evidence adduced by the accused in proving his defence of alibi. If the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a quality and of such a standard that the Court may entertain some reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the place and time of occurrence, the Court would evaluate the prosecution evidence to the see if the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution leaves any slot available to fit therein the defence of alibi. The burden of the accused is undoubtedly heavy. This flows from Section 103 of the Evidence Act which provides that the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence. However, while weighing the prosecution case and the defence case, pitted against each other, if the balance tilts in favour of the accused, the prosecution would fail and the accused would be entitled to benefit of that reasonable doubt which would emerge in the mind of the Court.
Supreme Court of India
Gade Lakshmi Mangraju @ Ramesh vs State Of Andhra Pradesh on 10 July, 2001
Presence of a fingerprint at the scene of occurrence is a positive evidence. But the absence of a fingerprint is not enough to foreclose the presence of the persons concerned at the scene. If during perpetration of the crime the fingerprint of the culprit could possibly be remitted at the scene it is equally a possibility that such a remnant would not be remitted at all. Hence absence of finger impression is not guarantee of absence of the person concerned at the scene.
Supreme Court of India
Munshi Prasad And Ors vs State Of Bihar on 10 October, 2001
"On the western side of the road 25-30 yards towards East there was a dead body in the sugar cane field. There I also asked the people but I was not known as to who had killed. The dead body was at four-five hundred yards from this place of panchayat, we stayed [here near the dead body till 5-5, 1/2 o'clock. Jamadar Sahib came there after we reached there." (Emphasis supplied), Without attributing any motive and taking the evidence on its face value, therefore, it appears that the place of occurrence was at 400 - 500 yards from the place of panchayat and it is on this piece of evidence, the learned Advocate for the State heavily relied upon and contended that the distance was far too short so as lo be an impossibility for the accused lo be at the place of occurrence - we cannot but lend concurrence to such a submission : A distance of 400-500 yards cannot possibly be said to be "presence elsewhere'- it is not an impossibility to be at the place of occurrence and also at the panchayat meet, the distance being as noticed above : The evidence on record itself negates the plea and we are thus unable lo record our concurrence as regards acceptance of the plea of alibi as raised in the appeal. Before drawing the curtain on this score however, we wish to clarify that the evidence tendered by the defence witnesses cannot always be termed to be a tainted one by reason of the factum of the witnesses being examined by the defence. The defence - witnesses arc entitled to equal respect and treatment as that of the prosecution The issue of credibility and the trustworthiness ought also to be attributed to the defence witnesses at par with that of" the prosecution a lapse on the part of the defence witness cannot be differentiated and be treated differently than that of the prosecutors' witnesses.
Supreme Court of India
Dudh Nath Pandey vs The State Of U.P on 11 February, 1981
The appellant, Dudh Nath Pandey, who was a motor-car driver by occupation, used to live as a tenant in an out- house of a sprawling bungalow belonging to the family of the deceased, situated at 17, Stanley Road, Allahabad. The appellant developed a fancy for Ranjana who was about 20 years of age when he came to live in the out-house. The overtures made by the appellant to Ranjana created resentment in her family and its only surviving male member, her brother Pappoo, took upon himself the task of preventing the appellant from pursuing his sister. As a first step, the appellant was turned out of the out-house. Soon thereafter, he filed an application before the City Magistrate, Allahabad, asking for the custody of Ranjana, alleging that she was his lawfully wedded wife. That application was dismissed by the learned Magistrate after recording the statement of Ranjana, in which she denied that she was married to the appellant. The appellant thereafter filed a habeas corpus petition in the Allahabad High Court alleging that Ranjana was detained unlawfully by the members of her family, including her uncle K. P. Saxena, and asking that she be released from their custody. Ranjana denied in that proceedings too that she was married to the appellant or that she was unlawfully detained by the members of her family. The habeas corpus petition was dismissed by the High Court on November 8, 1973. On August 1, 1975, the Principal of St. Anthony's Convent made a complaint to the police that the appellant had made indecent overtures to Ranjana. The appellant was arrested as a result of that complaint. On November 1, 1976, Ranjana was having an evening stroll with her brother, the deceased Pappoo, in the compound of their house. The appellant came there in a rickshaw, abused Pappoo and is alleged to have threatened to kill him, if he dared oppose his, the appellant's marriage with Ranjana. As a result of these various incidents and the family's growing concern for Ranjana's safety, Pappoo used to escort Ranjana every morning to the school where she was teaching.
On the following day, i.e. on November 2, 1976, Pappoo took Ranjana to her school on his scooter as usual. The classes used to begin at 9-30 A.M. but Ranjana used to go to the school 30 to 40 minutes before time for correcting the students' home-work. After dropping Ranjana at the school, Pappoo started back for home on his scooter. While he was passing by the Children's Park, known as the Hathi Park, the appellant is alleged to have fired at him with a country- made pistol. Pappoo fell down from his scooter and died almost instantaneously.
The occurrence is said to have been witnessed by Harish Chandra (P. W. 3), a domestic servant of the family of the deceased and by Harish Chandra's friend Ashok Kumar (P. W.1)
The plea of alibi postulates the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at the scene of offence by reason of his presence at another place. The plea can therefore succeed only if it is shown that the accused was so far away at the relevant time that he could not be present at the place where the crime was committed. The evidence of the defence witnesses, accepting it at its face value, is consistent with the appellant's presence at the Naini factory at 8-30 A.M. and at the scene of offence at 9.00 A.M. So short is the distance between the two points. The workers punch their cards when they enter the factory but when they leave the factory, they do not have to punch the time of their exit. The appellant, in all probability, went to the factory at the appointed hour, left it immediately and went in search of his prey. He knew when, precisely, Pappoo would return after dropping Ranjana at the school. The appellant appears to have attempted to go back to his work but that involved the risk of the time of his re-entry being punched again. That is how he was arrested at about 2- 30 P.M. while he was loitering near the pan-shop in front of the factory. There is no truth in the claim that he was arrested from inside the factory.
That settles the issue of guilt. We agree with the view of the High Court and the Sessions Court and uphold the appellant's conviction under section 302 of the Penal Code.
Jumni v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court held that it is not as if the accused person is required to prove his innocence, in fact, it is for the prosecution to prove his guilt. It was further held in this case that:
“It is no doubt true that when an alibi is set up, the burden is on the accused to lend credence to the defence put up by him or her. However, the approach of the court should not be such as to pick holes in the case of the accused person. The defence evidence has to be tested like any other testimony, always keeping in mind that a person is presumed innocent until he or she is found guilty.”
On the standard of proof, it was held in Mohinder Singh v. State - that the standard of proof required in regard to a plea of alibi must be the same as the standard applied to the prosecution evidence and in both cases it should be a reasonable standard. Dudh Nath Pandey goes a step further and seeks to bury the ghost of disbelief that shadows alibi witnesses, in the following words:
“Defence witnesses are entitled to equal treatment with those of the prosecution. And, courts ought to overcome their traditional, instinctive disbelief in defence witnesses. Quite often, they tell lies but so do the prosecution witnesses.”
Supreme Court of India
Dasari Siva Prasad Reddy vs The Public Prosecutor, High Court ... on 20 August, 2004
the accused, in the normal course, is expected to be at his house in the night. However, these factors need not give rise to an irresistible inference that the accused remained in the house in the previous night and the accused alone must have been responsible for the murder. At best, it can be said that the view taken by the trial Court is not the only possible view. But, that is not enough to reverse the acquittal.
A strong suspicion, no doubt, exists against the appellant but such suspicion cannot be the basis of conviction, going by the standard of proof required in a criminal case. The distance between 'may be true' and 'must be true' shall be fully covered by reliable evidence adduced by the prosecution.
Supreme Court of India
Babudas vs State Of M.P on 29 April, 2003
We agree with the learned counsel for the respondent-State that in a case of circumstantial evidence, a false alibi set up by the accused would be a link in the chain of circumstances as held by this Court in the case of Mani Kumar Thapa (supra) but then it cannot be the sole link or the sole circumstance based on which a conviction could be passed
Custom defined : - Custom is an established practice at variance with the general law.
Nature of custom - A custom varying the general law may be a general, local, tribal or family custom.
Explanation 1. - A general custom includes a custom common to any considerable class of persons.
Explanation 2. - A custom which is applicable to a locality, tribe, sect or a family called a special custom.
Custom cannot override express law. (1) Custom has the effect of modifying the general personal law, but it does not override the statute law, unless it is expressly saved by it.
(2) Such custom must be ancient, uniform, certain, peaceable, continuous and compulsory.
Invalid custom - No custom is valid if it is illegal, immoral, unreasonable or opposed to public policy.
Pleading and proof of custom (1) He who relies upon custom varying the general law must plead and prove it.
(2) Custom must be established by clear and unambiguous evidence."
(Customs cannot be extended by analogy or established by Apriori methods)
(See Sir HS. Gour's Hindu Code, Volume I.Fifth Edition.) Custom must be ancient, certain and reasonable as is generally said. It will be noticed that in the definition in Cl. (a) of Section 3 of the Act, the expression 'ancient' is not used, but what is intended is observance of custom or usage for a long time. The English rule that a 'custom, in order that it may be legal and binding, must have been used so long that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary' has not been strictly applied to Indian conditions. All that is necessary to prove is that the custom or usage has been acted upon in practice for such a long period and with such invariability and continuity as to show that it has by common consent been submitted to as the established governing rule in any local area, tribe, community, group of family. Certainty and reasonableness are indispensable elements of the rule. For determination of the question whether there is a valid custom or not, it has been emphasized that it must not be opposed to public policy.
The origin of custom of adoption is lost in antiquity. The ancient Hindu law recognized twelve kinds of sons of whom five were adopted. The five kinds of adopted sons in early times must have been of very secondary importance, for, on the whole, they were relegated to an inferior rank in the order of sons. Out of the five kinds of adopted sons, only two survive today; namely, the Dattaka from prevalent throughout India and the Kritrima for confined to Mithila and adjoining districts. The primary object of adoption was to gratify the means of the ancestors by annual offerings and, therefore, it was considered necessary that the offerer should be as much as possible a reflection of a real descendant and has to look as much like a real son as possible and certainly not be one who would never have been a son. Therefore, the body of rules was evolved out of a phrase of Saunaka that he must be the reflection of a son. The restrictions flowing from this maxim had the effect of eliminating most of the forms of adoption. (See Hindu Law by S.V. Gupta. Third edition at pages 899 -900). The whole law of Dattaka adoption is evolved from two important texts and a metaphor. The texts are of Manu and Vasistha, and the metaphor that of Saunaka. Manu provided for the identity of an adopted son with the family into which he was adopted. (See Manu Chapter IX, pages 141142, as translated by Sir W. Jones). The object of an adoption is mixed, being religious and secular. According to Mayne, the recognition of the institution of adoption in early times had been more due to secular reasons than to any religious necessity, and the religious motive was only secondary; but although the secular motive was only dominant, the religious motive was undeniable. The religious motive for adoption never altogether excluded the secular motive. (See Mayne's Hindu Law and Usage, Twelfth Edition, page 329.).
As held by this Court in V.T.S. Chandrashekhara Mudalier v. Kulandeivelu Mudalier (AIR 1963 SC 185), substitution of a son for spiritual reason is the essence of adoption, and consequent devolution of property is mere accessory to it; the validity of an adoption has to be judged by spiritual rather than temporal considerations; and, devolution of property is only of secondary importance.
In Hem Singh v. Harnam Singh (AIR 1954 SC 581), it was observed by this Court that under the Hindu Law adoption is primarily a religious act intended to confer spiritual benefit on the adopter and some of the rules have, therefore, been held to be mandatory, and compliance with them regarded as a condition of the validity of the adoption. The first important case on the question of adoption was decided by the Privy Council in the case of Amarendra Mansingh v. Sanatan Singh, (AIR 1933 PC 155). The Privy Council said:
"Among the Hindus, a peculiar religious significance has attached to the son through Brahminical influence, although in its origin the custom of adoption was perhaps purely secular. The texts of the Hindus are themselves instinct with this doctrine of religious significance. The foundation of the Brahminical doctrine of adoption is the duty which every Hindu owes to his ancestors to provide for the continuance of the line and solemnization of the necessary rites."
There are authorities for the proposition that a judgment not "inter partes" is admissible under Section 13, Evidence Act to establish an instance in which the relationship was asserted and recognised or denied.
In Gujja Lal v. Fatten Lull, (1881) ILR 6 Cal 171 a question arose whether a judgment not inter partes was admissible under Section 13, Evidence Act and Garth, C. J. expressed the view that the former judgment was not a transaction and that the right claimed in the particular suit was not a right within the meaning of Section 13.
A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Collector of Gorakhpur v. Palakdhari Singh, (1890) ILR 12 All 1 came to a different conclusion and held that such judgments were admissible under Section 13. Their Lordships observed that the majority view of the Calcutta decision referred to above had put too narrow a construction on the word "right" as used in Section 13 and that the term "right" includes not only incorporeal rights, but also rights of ownership. It was further held that though the judgment itself was not a transaction, the suit or the litigation in which it was pronounced might be treated as a transaction or/and instance in which a right may have been asserted, acknowledged or denied.
In the case of Sital Das v. Sant Ram, AIR 1954 SC 606 the Court held that in a dispute as to the succession to the office of a Mohunt, a previous judgment in a suit by the former Mohunt is admissible as a transaction in which a person from whom one of the parties purported to derive his title, asserted his right as a spiritual collateral of the former Mohunt and on that footing got a decree. Their Lordships also observed that although the judgment in the previous suit was not by any means conclusive and had got to be weighed and appraised for what it is worth, it could be used in support of the oral evidence adduced in the case (para 20).
In the case of Ajjarapu Subbarao v. Pulla Venkata Rama Rao, AIR 1964 Andh Pra 53 a Division Bench held that the previous judgment was admissible under Section 13 of the Evidence Act to show that the right of the plaintiff as the son of the sixth defendant was claimed and recognised. To the similar effect is another Division Bench decision reported in AIR 1964 Andh Pra 109 (Smt. Pentapati Venkatratnam v. Karri Venkatanarasavamma).
In the case of Yamunabai v. Dhannalal, (1929) 114 Ind Cas 616 a judgment not inter partes in a previous case in which an adoption was upheld was held to be a relevant piece of evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act.
In the case of the Secretary of State for India v. Subraya Karantha, 1915 Mad WN 962, Section 13 of the Evidence Act was held applicable to the class of cases where the alleged relationship admitted of assertion, denial and recognition.
In the case of Raj Fateh Singh v. Baldeo Singh, (1928) 109 Ind Cas 310 (Oudh) a judgment in which the illegitimacy of a person is recognised is admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act where the question of his legitimacy is in issue in a subsequent suit. In view of the authorities cited above, it may be taken to be fairly settled that the judgment in a previous suit though not inter partes is admissible in proof of a transaction or particular instance in which the relationship was asserted and recognised or denied. A judgment in the previous suit though not conclusive is admissible in evidence like any other fact to be weighed in the balance. It is not the correctness of the previous decision but the fact that there has been a previous decision that is established by the judgment. The finding of fact arrived at on the evidence in one case cannot be evidence of that fact in another case (See AIR 1929 PC 99, Gopika Raman Roy v. Atal Singh; AIR 1931 PC 89, Gobinda Narayan Singh v. Sham Lal Singh; AIR 1937 PC 69, Kesho Prasad Singh v. Mt. Bhagjogna Kuer). ( law point reiterated in Rama Chandra vs Gadadhar Mohapatra And Ors. on 6 November, 1979)