Supreme Court of India
Uttam Singh Dugal & Co.Ltd vs United Bank Of India & Ors on 8 August, 2000
Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that Order XII Rule 6 comes under the heading admissions and a judgment on admission could be given only after due opportunity to the other side to explain the admission, if any, made; that such admission should have been made only in the course of the pleadings or else the other side will not have an opportunity to explain such admission; that even though, the provision reads that the court may at any stage of the suit make such order as it thinks fit effect of admission, if any, can be considered only at the time of trial; that the admission even in pleadings will have to be read along with order VIII Rule 5(1) of CPC and Court need not necessarily proceed to pass an order or a judgment on the basis of such admission but call upon the party relying upon such admission to prove its case independently; that during pendency of other suits and the nature of contentions raised in the case, it would not be permissible at all to grant the relief before trial as has been done in the present case; that the expression admissions made in the course of the pleadings or otherwise will have to be read together and the expression otherwise will have to be interpreted ejusdem generis.
As to the object of the Order XII Rule 6, we need not say anything more than what the legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and reasons set out while amending the said rule, it is stated that where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled. We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. Where other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which, it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that admissions referred to in Order XII, Rule 6 CPC should be of the same nature as other admissions referred to in other rule preceding this Rule. Admissions generally arise when a statement is made by a party in any of the modes provided under Sections 18 to 23 of the Evidence Act, 1872. Admissions are of many kinds : they may be considered as being on the record as actual if that is either in the pleadings or in answer to interrogatories or implied from the pleadings by non-traversal. Secondly as between parties by agreement or notice. Since we have considered that admission for passing the judgment is based on pleadings itself it is unnecessary to examine as to what kinds of admissions are covered by Order XII, Rule 6 CPC.
Supreme Court of India
Himani Alloys Ltd vs Tata Steel Ltd on 5 July, 2011
It is true that a judgment can be given on an b�admissionb� contained in the minutes of a meeting. But the admission should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it. Order 12 Rule 6 being an enabling provision, it is neither mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary. The court, on examination of the facts and circumstances, has to exercise its judicial discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant, by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. In short the discretion should be used only when there is a clear b�admissionb� which can be acted upon. (See also Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India [2000 (7) SCC 120], Karam Kapahi vs. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust [2010 (4) SCC 753] and Jeevan Diesels and Electricals Ltd. vs. Jasbir Singh Chadha [2010 (6) SCC 601]. There is no such admission in this case.
Supreme Court of India
Karam Kapahi & Ors vs M/S Lal Chand Public Charitabl ... on 7 April, 2010
he principles behind Order 12 Rule 6 are to give the plaintiff a right to speedy judgment. Under this Rule either party may get rid of so much of the rival claims about `which there is no controversy' [See the dictum of Lord Jessel, the Master of Rolls, in Thorp versus Holdsworth in (1876) 3 Chancery Division 637 at 640]. In this connection, it may be noted that order 12 Rule 6 was amended by the Amendment Act of 1976.
47. Prior to amendment the Rule read thus:-
"6. Judgment on admissions. - Any party may, at any stage of a suit, where admissions of facts have been made, either on pleadings or otherwise, apply to the Court for such judgment or order as upon such admission he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties and the Court may upon such application make such order or give such judgment, as the Court may think just."
48. In the 54th Law Commission Report, an amendment was suggested to enable the Court to give a judgment not only on the application of a party but on its own motion. It is thus clear that the amendment was brought about to further the ends of justice and give these provisions a wider sweep by empowering judges to use it `ex debito justitial, a Latin term, meaning a debt of justice. In our opinion the thrust of the amendment is that in an appropriate case, a party, on the admission of the other party, can press for judgment, as a matter of legal right. However, the Court always retains its discretion in the matter of pronouncing judgment.
49. If the provision of order 12 Rule 1 is compared with Order 12 Rule 6, it becomes clear that the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 is wider in as much as the provision of order 12 Rule 1 is limited to admission by `pleading or otherwise in writing' but in Order 12 Rule 6 the expression `or otherwise' is much wider in view of the words used therein namely: `admission of fact.........either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing'.
50. Keeping the width of this provision in mind this Court held that under this rule admissions can be inferred from facts and circumstances of the case [See Charanjit Lal Mehra and others v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan (Smt.) and another, (2005) 11 SCC 279 at page 285 (para 8)]. Admissions in answer to interrogatories are also covered under this Rule [See Mullas's commentary on the Code, 16th Edition, Volume II, page 2177].
54. In Uttam Singh (supra) this Court made a distinction between a suit just between the parties and a suit relating to Specific Relief Act where a declaration of status is given which not only binds the parties but also binds generations. The Court held such a declaration may be given merely on admission (para 16, page 128 of the report).
Rule 6 of Order 12, in my opinion, must bear the same construction as was put upon the corresponding English rule by Sargent, J. The words "either on the pleadings or otherwise" in rule 6 enable us not only to see the admissions made in pleadings or under Rules 1 to 4 of the same order but also admissions made elsewhere during the trial."
in Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code, the word `pleading' has been suffixed by the expression `or otherwise'. Therefore, a wider interpretation of the word `pleading' is warranted in understanding the implication of this rule.
However, the provision under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code is enabling, discretionary and permissive and is neither mandatory nor it is peremptory since the word "may" has been used.
Supreme Court of India
Nagindas Ramdas vs Dalpatram Ichharam @ Brijram And ... on 30 November, 1973
From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction, though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself, Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under s. 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the. foundation of the rights of the parties On the other hand evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.
Supreme Court of India
Basant Singh vs Janki Singh And Ors on 2 August, 1966
Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 makes no dis- tinction between an admission made by a party in a pleading and other admissions. Under the Indian law, an admission made by a party in a plaint signed and verified by him may be used as evidence against him in other suits. In other suits, this admission cannot be regarded as conclusive, and it is open to the party to show that it is not true.
Shri Armando Pereira Vs. Shri Jude D'Souza S/o John D'Souza and Ors.
The foremost contention that was raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent, is that there is no reason or cause for the defendant No. 1 to raise the objection to the amendment sought to be made by the co-defendant. He submits that it is the plaintiffs' objection alone, which needs to be considered and not of the co-defendant. He also submits that the dispute could be only in between the plaintiffs and the defendants and that alone needs to be resolved and not the dispute between the two sets of the defendants. He further submits that the plaintiffs gave no objection to such amendment being allowed and, therefore, there was nothing wrong when the amendment was allowed. While considering the application, the Court has to see if such amendment is allowed, any prejudice will be caused to the plaintiffs and whether any of the rights of the plaintiffs, would be affected or not. There is no doubt that in the routine course, the Courts are required to decide the question as to the granting of the application for amendment vis-a-vis the plaintiff and the defendant alone. I do not, however, agree with the submission of the learned Counsel Shri Sharma that the Court need not consider any of the objection of the co-defendant/ the defendant No. 1 in the present case. Apart from this case, the Court would certainly be required to decide a dispute between the two defendants when their interest could be adverse or become adverse. Such a contingency can arise even when the plaintiff abandons the claim and one of the defendants has substantial question to be decided as against any of the other defendants. Order 23 Rule 1(a) of Civil Procedure Code, permits the defendant to be transposed as a plaintiff. This is precisely because there could be a dispute between two defendants. Yet another reason why such an objection of the co-defendant, needed to be heard, is whether the other defendant was withdrawing any admission to his detriment. If there is any admission in the pleadings of one of the defendants, which may help the other defendant, he has every right to resist the admission being withdrawn. An admission has been defined in Section 17 of the Evidence Act as follows:
Section 17- Admission - An admission is a statement, oral or documentary or contained in electronic form, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, hereinafter mentioned." Not only Section 17 here is important, but to decide this question we need to look into two more provisions. Those provisions are Section 18 of the Indian Evidence Act as well as Rule 1 of Order 12 of Civil Procedure Code. What Section 18 says, is that a statement by a person interested in the subject matter, is an admission. It says if a person having proprietary or pecuniary interest in the subject matter of proceeding gives admissions, all admissions if they are made during continuance of interest of the person making the statements, are admissions. In the instant case, the plaintiffs have claimed that they are the owners of half property while the defendant No. 1 claims that he had purchased the suit property in the name of the defendant No. 3 from his own funds. The defendant Nos. 3 and 4, by their original written statement, had endorsed this stand of the defendant No. 1. Obviously, they had made statement as envisaged by Section 18 which could be treated as an admission. Rule 1 of Order 12 of Civil Procedure Code, says that any party to a suit, may give notice by his pleadings or otherwise in writing that he admits the truth of the whole or any part of the case of any other party. The words used in Rule, are "any other party" and not necessarily an adverse party. It could be either the plaintiff or the defendant also.
The above discussion clearly goes to show that the codefendant does have a right to challenge or oppose the amendment sought to be made by the other defendants.
Justice V.B. Gupta of the Delhi High Court has enunciated the 'Doctrine of Non-Traverse' in his judgment in Smt. Asha Kapoor v. Sh. Hari Om Sharda . The extract of the judgment is given below;
16. Order VIII Rule 3, 4 and 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short as Code) read as under;
"3. Denial to be specific.- It shall not be sufficient for a defendant in his written statement to deny generally the ground alleged by the plaintiff, but the defendant must deal specifically with each allegation of fact of which he does not admit the truth, except damages.
4. Evasive denial- Where a defendant denies an allegation of fact in the plaint, he must not do so evasively, but answer the point of substance. Thus, if it is alleged that he received a certain sum of money, it shall not be sufficient to deny that he received that particular amount, but he must deny that he received that sum or any part thereof, or else set out how much he received. And if an allegation is made with diverse circumstances, it shall not be sufficient to deny it along with those circumstances.
5. Specific denial-[(1)] Every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability; Provided that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.
(2) Where the defendant has not filed a pleading, it shall be lawful for the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of the fact contained in the plaint, except as against a person under a disability, but the Court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved. (3) In exercising its discretion under the proviso to sub-rule (1) or under sub-rule (2), the Court shall have due regard to the fact whether the defendant could have, or has, engaged a pleader.
(4) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under this rule, a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with such judgment and such decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.]"
17. The effect of Order 8 Rule 3 read along with rr 4 and 5 of the Code is that, defendant is bound to deal specifically with each allegation of fact not admitted by him; he must either deny or state definitely that the substance of each allegation is not admitted. The main allegations which form the foundation of the suit should be dealt with in that way and expressly denied. Facts not specifically dealt with will be taken to be admitted under Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code.
18. Order 8 Rule 5 of the Code is known as doctrine of non-traverse which means that where a material averment is passed over without specific denial, it is taken to be admitted. The rule says that any allegation of fact must either be denied specifically or by necessary implication or there should be a statement that the fact is not admitted. If the plea is not taken in that manner, then the allegation should taken to be admitted.
19. Supreme Court in M. Venkataraman Hebbar (D) By L.RS. Vs. M. Rajgopal Hebbar & Ors. 2007 (5) SCALE 598, observed;
"Thus, if a plea which was relevant for the purpose of maintaining a suit had not been specifically traversed, the Court was entitled to draw an inference that the same had been admitted. A fact admitted in terms of Section 58 of the Evidence Act need not be proved."