Corpus delicti -:
In Rama Nand and Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1981) 1 SCC 511, this Court summed up the legal position on the subject as:
“....…….In other words, we would take it that the corpus delicti, i.e., the dead-body of the victim was not found in this case. But even on that assumption, the question remains whether the other circumstances established on record were sufficient to lead to the conclusion that within all human probability, she had been murdered by Rama Nand appellant? It is true that one of the essential ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide required to be proved by the prosecution is that the accused caused the death" of the person alleged to have been killed.
28. This means that before seeking to prove that the accused is the perpetrator of the murder, it must be established that homicidal death has been caused. Ordinarily, the recovery of the dead-body of the victim or a vital part of it, bearing marks of violence, is sufficient proof of homicidal death of the victim. There was a time when under the old English Law, the finding of the body of the deceased was held to be essential before a person was convicted of committing his culpable homicide. "I would never convict", said Sir Mathew Hale, "a person of murder or manslaughter unless the fact were proved to be done, or at least the body was found dead". This was merely a rule of caution, and not of law. But in those times when execution was the only punishment for murder, the need for adhering to this cautionary rule was greater. Discovery of the dead-body of the victim bearing physical evidence of violence, has never been considered as the only mode of proving the corpus delicti in murder. Indeed, very many cases are of such a nature where the discovery of the dead-body is impossible. A blind adherence to this old "body" doctrine would open the door wide open for many a heinous murderer to escape with impunity simply because they were cunning and clever enough to destroy the body of their victim. In the context of our law, Sir Hale's enunciation has to be interpreted no more than emphasising that where the dead-body of the victim in a murder case is not found, other cogent and satisfactory proof of the homicidal death of the victim must be adduced by the prosecution. Such proof may be by the direct ocular account of an eye-witness, or by circumstantial evidence, or by both. But where the fact of corpus delicti, i.e. 'homicidal death' is sought to be established by circumstantial evidence alone, the circumstances must be of a clinching and definitive character unerringly leading to the inference that the victim concerned has met a homicidal death. Even so, this principle of caution cannot be pushed too far as requiring absolute proof. Perfect proof is seldom to be had in this imperfect world, and absolute certainty is a myth. That is why under Section 3, Evidence Act, a fact is said to be "proved", if the Court considering the matters before it, considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. The corpus delicti or the fact of homicidal death, therefore, can be proved by telling and inculpating circumstances which definitely lead to the conclusion that within all human probability, the victim has been murdered by the accused concerned….” (emphasis supplied)
To the same effect is the decision in Ram Chandra & Ram Bharosey v. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1957 SC 381, where this Court said:
“It is true that in law a conviction for an offence does not necessarily depend upon the corpus delicti being found. There may be reliable evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the commission of the murder though the corpus delicti are not traceable.”
In Lakshmi and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2002) 7 SCC 198 the legal position was reiterated thus :
“16. Undoubtedly, the identification of the body, cause of death and recovery of weapon with which the injury may have been inflicted on the deceased are some of the important factors to be established by the prosecution in an ordinary given case to bring home the charge of offence under Section 302 I.P.C. This, however, is not an inflexible rule. It cannot be held as a general and broad proposition of law that where these aspects are not established, it would be fatal to the case of the prosecution and in all cases and eventualities, it ought to result in the acquittal of those who may be charged with the offence of murder. It would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. A charge of murder may stand established against an accused even in absence of identification of the body and cause the death.”
Supreme Court of India
Rishi Pal vs State Of Uttarkhand on 8 January, 2013
In the absence of corpus delicti what the court looks for is clinching evidence that proves that the victim has been done to death. If the prosecution is successful in providing cogent and satisfactory proof of the victim having met a homicidal death, absence of corpus delicti will not by itself be fatal to a charge of murder. Failure of the prosecution to assemble such evidence will, however, result in failure of the most essential requirement in a case involving a charge of murder.
Last seen theory :-
In Mohibur Rahman and Anr. v. State of Assam (2002) 6 SCC 715, this Court held that the circumstance of last seen does not by itself necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. It depends upon the facts of each case. There may however be cases where, on account of close proximity of place and time between the event of the accused having been last seen with the deceased and the factum of death, a rational mind may be persuaded to reach an irresistible conclusion that either the accused should explain how and in what circumstances the victim suffered the death or should own the liability for the homicide. Similarly in Arjun Marik and Ors. V. State of Bihar 1994 Supp (2) SCC 372, this Court reiterated that the solitary circumstance of the accused and victim being last seen will not complete the chain of circumstances for the Court to record a finding that it is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. No conviction on that basis alone can, therefore, be founded. So also in Godabarish Mishra v. Kuntala Mishra and Another (1996) 11 SCC 264, this Court declared that the theory of last seen together is not of universal application and may not always be sufficient to sustain a conviction unless supported by other links in the chain of circumstances.
In Bharat v. State of M.P (2003) 3 SCC 106; two circumstances on the basis whereof the appellant had been convicted were :-
(i) the appellant having been last seen with the deceased and (ii) Recovery of ornaments made at his instance. This Court held :
“........Mere non-explanation cannot lead to the proof of guilt against the appellant. The prosecution has to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The chain of circumstances, in our opinion, is not complete so as to sustain the conviction of the appellant.....”
Bodh Raj alias Bodha and Ors. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (2002) 8 SCC 45 where this Court held :
“The last-seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases....”
In Jaswant Gir v. State of Punjab (2005) 12 SCC 438, this Court held that it is not possible to convict Appellant solely on basis of 'last seen' evidence in the absence of any other links in the chain of circumstantial evidence, the Court gave benefit of doubt to accused persons.
Where the prosecution is relying upon the last seen theory, it must essentially establish the time when the accused and deceased were last seen together as well as the time of the death of the deceased. If these two aspects are not established, the very application of the ‘last seen theory’ would be impermissible and would create a major dent in the case of the prosecution. In support of this contention, reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in the case of S.K. Yusuf v. State of West Bengal [(2011) 11 SCC 754].
Application of the ‘last seen theory’ requires a possible link between the time when the person was last seen alive and the fact of the death of the deceased coming to light. There should be a reasonable proximity of time between these two events. This proposition of law does not admit of much excuse but what has to be seen is that this principle is to be applied depending upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. This Court in para 21 of Yusuf’s case (supra) while referring to the case of Mohd. Azad @ Samin v. State of West Bengal [(2008) 15 SCC 449] and State through Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Mahender Singh Dahiya [(2011) 3 SCC 109], held as under:-
“The last seen theory comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. (Vide Mohd. Azad v. State of W.B and State v. Mahender Singh Dahiya)”
Supreme Court of India
Shyamal Ghosh vs State Of West Bengal on 11 July, 2012
The reasonableness of the time gap is, therefore, of some significance. If the time gap is very large, then it is not only difficult but may even not be proper for the court to infer that the accused had been last seen alive with the deceased and the former, thus, was responsible for commission of the offence. The purpose of applying these principles, while keeping the time factor in mind, is to enable the Court to examine that where the last seen together and the time when the deceased was found dead is short, it inevitably leads to the inference that the accused person was responsible for commission of the crime and the onus was on him to explain how the death occurred.
What to prove in a case based on circumstantial evidence ?
Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs State Of Maharashtra 1984 AIR 1622
following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that Supreme Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved'
"Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions."
(2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.
These five golden principles,, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.
Constitutionality of death penalty was upheld for the first time in Jagmohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh .
Supreme Court of India
Jagmohan Singh vs The State Of U. P on 3 October, 1972
As regards the rest of the offences, even those cases where the maximum punishment is the death penalty, a wide discretion to punish is given to the Judge. The reasons are explained by Ratanlal on the page referred to above.
"Circumstances which are properly and expressly recognized by the law as aggravations calling for in creased severity of punishment are principally such as consist in the manner in which the offence is perpetrated; whether it be by forcible or fraudulent means, or by aid of accomplices or in the malicious motive by which the offender was actuated, or the consequences to the public or to individual sufferers, or the special necessity which exists in particular cases for counteracting the temptation to offend, arising from the degree of expected gratification, or the facility of perpetration peculiar to the case. These considerations naturally include a number of particulars, as of time, place, per- sons and things, varying according to the nature of the case. Circumstances which are to be considered in alleviation of punishment are : (1) the minority of the offender; (2) the old age of the offender; (3) the condition of the offender e.g., wife, apprentice; (4) the order of a superior military officer; (5) provocation; (6) when offence was committed under a combination of circumstances and influence of motives which are not likely to recur either with respect to the offender or to any other; (7) the state of health and the sex of the delinquent. Bentham mentions the following circumstances in mitigation of punishment which should be inflicted : (1) absence of bad intention; (2) provocation; (3) self preservation; (4) preservation of some near friends; (5) transgression of the limit of self-defence; (6) submission to the menaces; (7) submission to authority; (8) drunkenness; (9) childhood."
Indeed these are not the only aggravating or mitigating circumstances which should be considered when sentencing an offender.
In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court held thus:
“(a) The normal rule is that the offence of murder shall be punished with the sentence of life imprisonment. The court can depart from that rule and impose the sentence of death only if there are special reasons for doing so. Such reasons must be recorded in writing before imposing the death sentence.
(b) While considering the question of sentence to be imposed for the offence of murder under Section 302 of the Penal Code, the court must have regard to every relevant circumstance relating to the crime as well as the criminal. If the court finds, but not otherwise, that the offence is of an exceptionally depraved and heinous character and constitutes, on account of its design and the manner of its execution, a source of grave danger to the society at large, the court may impose the death sentence.”
In the said case, the Court, after referring to the authority in Furman v. Georgia , noted the suggestion given by the learned counsel about the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances. The aggravating circumstances suggested by the counsel read as follows:
“Aggravating circumstances: A court may, however, in the following cases impose the penalty of death in its discretion:
(a) if the murder has been committed after previous planning and involves extreme brutality; or
(b) if the murder involves exceptional depravity; or
(c) if the murder is of a member of any of the armed forces of the Union or of a member of any police force or of any public servant and was committed—
(i) while such member or public servant was on duty; or
(ii) in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such member or public servant in the lawful discharge of his duty as such member or public servant whether at the time of murder he was such member or public servant, as the case may be, or had ceased to be such member or public servant; or
(d) if the murder is of a person who had acted in the lawful discharge of his duty under Section 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or who had rendered assistance to a Magistrate or a police officer demanding his aid or requiring his assistance under Section 37 and Section 129 of the said Code.” After reproducing the same, the Court opined:
“Stated broadly, there can be no objection to the acceptance of these indicators but as we have indicated already, we would prefer not to fetter judicial discretion by attempting to make an exhaustive enumeration one way or the other.”
Thereafter, the Court referred to the suggestions pertaining to mitigating circumstances:
“Mitigating circumstances.—In the exercise of its discretion in the above cases, the court shall take into account the following circumstances: (1) That the offence was committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(2) The age of the accused. If the accused is young or old, he shall not be sentenced to death.
(3) The probability that the accused would not commit criminal acts of violence as would constitute a continuing threat to society.
(4) The probability that the accused can be reformed and rehabilitated. The State shall by evidence prove that the accused does not satisfy the conditions (3) and (4) above.
(5) That in the facts and circumstances of the case the accused believed that he was morally justified in committing the offence.
(6) That the accused acted under the duress or domination of another person.
(7) That the condition of the accused showed that he was mentally defective and that the said defect impaired his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct.” The Court then observed:
“We will do no more than to say that these are undoubtedly relevant circumstances and must be given great weight in the determination of sentence.”
In the said case, the Court has also held thus:
“It is, therefore, imperative to voice the concern that courts, aided by the broad illustrative guide-lines indicated by us, will discharge the onerous function with evermore scrupulous care and humane concern, directed along the highroad of legislative policy outlined in Section 354(3) viz. that for persons convicted of murder, life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence an exception. A real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law’s instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed.”
In Machhi Singh v. state of Punjab , a three-Judge Bench has explained the concept of ‘rarest of the rare cases’ by observing thus: “The reasons why the community as a whole does not endorse the humanistic approach reflected in ‘death sentence-in-no-case’ doctrine are not far to seek. In the first place, the very humanistic edifice is constructed on the foundation of ‘reverence for life’ principle. When a member of the community violates this very principle by killing another member, the society may not feel itself bound by the shackles of this doctrine. Secondly, it has to be realised that every member of the community is able to live with safety without his or her own life being endangered because of the protective arm of the community and on account of the rule of law enforced by it. The very existence of the rule of law and the fear of being brought to book operates as a deterrent for those who have no scruples in killing others if it suits their ends. Every member of the community owes a debt to the community for this protection.”
Thereafter, the Court has adverted to the aspects of the feeling of the community and its desire for self-preservation and opined that the community may well withdraw the protection by sanctioning the death penalty. What has been ruled in this regard is worth reproducing: “But the community will not do so in every case. It may do so ‘in the rarest of rare cases’ when its collective conscience is so shocked that it will expect the holders of the judicial power centre to inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards desirability or otherwise of retaining death penalty.”
It is apt to state here that in the said case, stress was laid on certain aspects, namely, the manner of commission of the murder, the motive for commission of the murder, anti-social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime, magnitude of the crime and personality of the victim of murder.
After so enumerating, the propositions that emerged from Bachan Singh (supra) were culled out which are as follows:
“The following propositions emerge from Bachan Singh case:
“(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme culpability.
(ii) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances of the ‘offender’ also require to be taken into consideration along with the circumstances of the ‘crime’.
(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In other words death sentence must be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the relevant circumstances.
(iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded full weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the option is exercised.”
The three-Judge Bench further opined that to apply the said guidelines, the following questions are required to be answered: “(a) Is there something uncommon about the crime which renders sentence of imprisonment for life inadequate and calls for a death sentence?
(b) Are the circumstances of the crime such that there is no alternative but to impose death sentence even after according maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances which speak in favour of the offender?” In the said case, the Court upheld the extreme penalty of death in respect of three accused persons.
The Court in Haresh Mohandas Rajput v. State of Maharashtra, while dealing with the situation where the death sentence is warranted, referred to the guidelines laid down in Bachan Singh (supra) and the principles culled out in Machhi Singh (supra) and opined as follows:
“19. In Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab this Court expanded the “rarest of rare” formulation beyond the aggravating factors listed in Bachan Singh to cases where the “collective conscience” of the community is so shocked that it will expect the holders of the judicial power centre to inflict the death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion as regards desirability or otherwise of retaining the death penalty, such a penalty can be inflicted. But the Bench in this case underlined that full weightage must be accorded to the mitigating circumstances in a case and a just balance had to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances.” After so stating, the Court ruled thus:
“20. The rarest of the rare case” comes when a convict would be a menace and threat to the harmonious and peaceful coexistence of the society. The crime may be heinous or brutal but may not be in the category of “the rarest of the rare case”. There must be no reason to believe that the accused cannot be reformed or rehabilitated and that he is likely to continue criminal acts of violence as would constitute a continuing threat to the society. The accused may be a menace to the society and would continue to be so, threatening its peaceful and harmonious coexistence. The manner in which the crime is committed must be such that it may result in intense and extreme indignation of the community and shock the collective conscience of the society. Where an accused does not act on any spur-of-the- moment provocation and indulges himself in a deliberately planned crime and [pic]meticulously executes it, the death sentence may be the most appropriate punishment for such a ghastly crime. The death sentence may be warranted where the victims are innocent children and helpless women. Thus, in case the crime is committed in a most cruel and inhuman manner which is an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting and dastardly manner, where his act affects the entire moral fibre of the society e.g. crime committed for power or political ambition or indulging in organised criminal activities, death sentence should be awarded.
Supreme Court, while dealing with the murder of a young girl of about 18 years in Dhananjoy Chatterjee V. State of West Bengal , took note of the fact that the accused was a married man of 27 years of age, the principles stated in Bachan Singh’s case and further took note of the rise of violent crimes against women in recent years and, thereafter, on consideration of the aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances, opined that: “In our opinion, the measure of punishment in a given case must depend upon the atrocity of the crime; the conduct of the criminal and the defenceless and unprotected state of the victim. Imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the courts respond to the society’s cry for justice against the criminals. Justice demands that courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The courts must not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of crime and the society at large while considering imposition of appropriate punishment.”
After so stating, the Court took note of the fact that the deceased was a school-going girl and it was the sacred duty of the appellant, being a security guard, to ensure the safety of the inhabitants of the flats in the apartment but to gratify his lust, he had raped and murdered the girl in retaliation which made the crime more heinous. Appreciating the manner in which the barbaric crime was committed on a helpless and defenceless school-going girl of 18 years, the Court came to hold that the case fell in the category of rarest of the rare cases and, accordingly, affirmed the capital punishment imposed by the High Court.
Cases where the death penalty has been confirmed:
Jumman Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1991) 1 SCC 752 was a case in which the death penalty was confirmed by this Court for the rape and murder of a 6 year old child on the basis of the brutality of the crime and on circumstantial evidence. This Court quoted the order dismissing the special leave petition of the accused against his conviction, in which it was said:
“Although the conviction of the petitioner under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 rests on circumstantial evidence, the circumstantial evidence against the petitioner leads to no other inference except that of his guilt and excludes every hypothesis of his innocence……...
Failure to impose a death sentence in such grave cases where it is a crime against the society - particularly in cases of murders committed with extreme brutality - will bring to naught the sentence of death provided by Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. It is the duty of the court to impose a proper punishment depending upon the degree of criminality and desirability to impose such punishment. The only punishment which the appellant deserves for having committed the reprehensible and gruesome murder of the innocent child to satisfy his lust, is nothing but death as a measure of social necessity and also as a means of deterring other potential offenders. The sentence of death is confirmed.”
In Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, (1994) 2 SCC 220 this Court confirmed the death sentence of the 27 year old married accused taking into consideration the rising crime graph, particularly violent crime against women; society’s cry for justice against criminals; and the fact that the rape and murder of an 18 year old was premeditated and committed in a brutal manner by a security guard against a young defenceless person to satisfy his lust and in retaliation for a complaint made by her against him. This is what this Court had to say:
“In recent years, the rising crime rate — particularly violent crime against women has made the criminal sentencing by the courts a subject of concern……….
“In our opinion, the measure of punishment in a given case must depend upon the atrocity of the crime; the conduct of the criminal and the defenceless and unprotected state of the victim. Imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the courts respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminals. Justice demands that courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The courts must not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of crime and the society at large while considering imposition of appropriate punishment.
“The sordid episode of the security guard, whose sacred duty was to ensure the protection and welfare of the inhabitants of the flats in the apartment, should have subjected the deceased, a resident of one of the flats, to gratify his lust and murder her in retaliation for his transfer on her complaint, makes the crime even more heinous. Keeping in view the medical evidence and the state in which the body of the deceased was found, it is obvious that a most heinous type of barbaric rape and murder was committed on a helpless and defenceless school-going girl of 18 years……..”
In Laxman Naik v. State of Orissa, (1994) 3 SCC 381 this Court was of the opinion that since the accused was the guardian of the helpless victim, his 7 year old niece, and since the crime was pre-planned, cold blooded, brutal and diabolical, the appropriate punishment would be a sentence of death. This Court held:
“The hard facts of the present case are that the appellant Laxman is the uncle of the deceased and almost occupied the status and position that of a guardian. Consequently the victim who was aged about 7 years must have reposed complete confidence in the appellant and while reposing such faith and confidence in the appellant must have believed in his bona fides and it was on account of such a faith and belief that she acted upon the command of the appellant in accompanying him under the impression that she was being taken to her village unmindful of the preplanned unholy designs of the appellant. The victim was a totally helpless child there being no one to protect her in the desert where she was taken by the appellant misusing her confidence to fulfil his lust. It appears that the appellant had preplanned to commit the crime by resorting to diabolical methods and it was with that object that he took the girl to a lonely place to execute his dastardly act.”
Kamta Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) 6 SCC 250 was a case where the accused was close to the family of the victim, a 7 year old child. In fact, she would address him as ‘Uncle Tiwari’. He was, therefore, in the nature of a person of trust, while the victim was in a hapless condition and was brutally raped and murdered in a premeditated manner. This Court held:
“Taking an overall view of all the facts and circumstances of the instant case in the light of the above propositions we are of the firm opinion that the sentence of death should be maintained. In vain we have searched for mitigating circumstances — but found aggravating circumstances aplenty. …… When an innocent hapless girl of 7 years was subjected to such barbaric treatment by a person who was in a position of her trust his culpability assumes the proportion of extreme depravity and arouses a sense of revulsion in the mind of the common man. In fine, the motivation of the perpetrator, the vulnerability of the victim, the enormity of the crime, the execution thereof persuade us to hold that this is a “rarest of rare” cases where the sentence of death is eminently desirable not only to deter others from committing such atrocious crimes but also to give emphatic expression to society's abhorrence of such crimes.”
Nirmal Singh v. State of Haryana, (1999) 3 SCC 670 One of the accused Dharampal, had been convicted for rape and had filed an appeal. Pending the appeal, he applied for and was granted bail. While on bail, he killed five members of the family who had given evidence against him in the case for which he was convicted of rape, thereby carrying out the threat he had earlier given. The crime was pre- planned and executed in a brutal manner. Confirming the death penalty awarded to him, this Court held:
“…… Coming to the question of sentence, however, we find that the High Court has not considered the individual role played by each of the appellants. So far as accused Dharampal is concerned, it is he who had given the threat on the previous occasion that if anybody gives evidence in the rape case, the whole family will be wiped off. It is he who after being convicted in the said rape case preferred an appeal and obtained a bail from the High Court and has totally misutilised that privilege of bail by killing 5 persons who were all the members of the family of P whose deposition was responsible for his conviction in the rape case. It is he who has assaulted each of the 5 deceased persons by means of a kulhari and the nature of the injuries as found by the doctor would indicate that the act is an act of a depraved mind and is most brutal and heinous in nature. It is he who had consecrated the plan to put into action his earlier threat but he has taken the help of his brother Nirmal.”
Jai Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999) 5 SCC 1 was a case in which the death penalty was confirmed since this Court accepted the view of the High Court that the accused was a “living danger” and incapable of rehabilitation. The crime was that of an attempted rape of a 30 year old pregnant woman followed by her murder and the murder of her 8 year old child. This Court held that the crime was brutal and committed in a gruesome and depraved manner. The fact that the accused was a young man of 22 years was held not to be a relevant factor, given the nature of the crime. The judicial conscience of this Court was shocked by the facts of the case. It was held:
“….. [W]e are unable to record our concurrence with the submissions of Mr Muralidhar that there are some mitigating circumstances and there is likelihood of the accused being reformed or rehabilitated. Incidentally, the High Court has described the accused as “a living danger” and we cannot agree more therewith in view of the gruesome act as noticed above.
“The facts establish the depravity and criminality of the accused in no uncertain terms. No regard being had for the precious life of the young child also. The compassionate ground of the accused being 22 years of age cannot in the facts of the matter be termed to be at all relevant…… “In the present case, the savage nature of the crime has shocked our judicial conscience. The murder was cold-blooded and brutal without any provocation. It certainly makes it a rarest of the rare cases in which there are no extenuating or mitigating circumstances.
36. In Molai & Anr. v. State of M.P., (1999) 9 SCC 581 death penalty awarded to both the accused for the rape and murder of a 16 year old was confirmed. Molai was a guard in a Central Jail and Santosh was undergoing a sentence in that jail. The victim was the daughter of the Assistant Jailor. Taking into account the manner of commission of the offence and the fact that they took advantage of the victim being alone in a house, the death penalty was confirmed by this Court although the case was one of circumstantial evidence. This Court held:
“…… It cannot be overlooked that N, a 16-year-old girl, was preparing for her Class 10th examination at her house and suddenly both the accused took advantage of she being alone in the house and committed a most shameful act of rape. The accused did not stop there but they strangulated her by using her undergarment and thereafter took her to the septic tank along with the cycle and caused injuries with a sharp- edged weapon. The accused did not even stop there but they exhibited the criminality in their conduct by throwing the dead body into the septic tank totally disregarding the respect for a human dead body. Learned counsel for the accused (appellants) could not point any mitigating circumstance from the record of the case to justify the reduction of sentence of either of the accused.”
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114 is a remarkable case for the reason that the accused was acquitted by the High Court and yet the death penalty awarded by the Trial Court was upheld by this Court for the rape and murder of a school going child. The case was also one of circumstantial evidence. The special reasons for awarding the death penalty were the diabolic and inhuman nature of the crime. It was held:
“Considering the view expressed by this Court in Bachan Singh case and Machhi Singh case we have no hesitation in holding that the case at hand falls in the rarest of rare category and death sentence awarded by the trial court was appropriate. The acquittal of the respondent- accused is clearly unsustainable and is set aside. In the ultimate result, the judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. The appeals are allowed.”
Shivu & Anr. v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 713 was a case in which the special reasons for confirming the death penalty given to both the accused who were aged about 20 and 22 years old respectively were the heinous rape and murder of an 18 year old. It was noted that the accused had twice earlier attempted to commit rape but were not successful. Though no case was lodged against them, they were admonished by the village elders and the Panchayat and asked to mend their ways. It was held:
“Considering the view expressed by this Court in Bachan Singh case and Machhi Singh case we have no hesitation in holding that the case at hand falls in rarest of rare category and death sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court was appropriate.”
In Bantu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 11 SCC 113 the death sentence was confirmed for the special reason of the depraved and heinous act of rape and murder of a 5 year old child, which included the insertion of a wooden stick in her vagina to the extent of 33 cms. to masquerade the crime as an accident. This Court held:
“The case at hand falls in the rarest of the rare category. The depraved acts of the accused call for only one sentence, that is, death sentence.”
In Shivaji v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 15 SCC 269 this Court categorically rejected the view that death sentence cannot be awarded in a case where the evidence is circumstantial. The death sentence was upheld also because of the depraved acts of the accused in raping and murdering a 9 year old child. This Court held:
“The plea that in a case of circumstantial evidence death should not be awarded is without any logic. If the circumstantial evidence is found to be of unimpeachable character in establishing the guilt of the accused, that forms the foundation for conviction. That has nothing to do with the question of sentence as has been observed by this Court in various cases while awarding death sentence. The mitigating circumstances and the aggravating circumstances have to be balanced. In the balance sheet of such circumstances, the fact that the case rests on circumstantial evidence has no role to play..........
“The case at hand falls in the rarest of the rare category. The circumstances highlighted above establish the depraved acts of the accused, and they call for only one sentence, that is, death sentence.”
In Ankush Maruti Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 667 of the six accused, three were awarded life sentence by the High Court while for the remaining three, the death sentence was confirmed. The accused were found to have committed five murders and had raped a lady (who survived) and a child of 15 years of age (who died). This Court awarded the death penalty to all the six accused. This Court found the crime to be cruel and diabolic; the collective conscience of the community was shocked; the victims were of a tender age and defenceless; the victims had no animosity towards the accused and the attack against them was unprovoked. Considering these factors, this Court awarded the death penalty to all the accused and held:
“The murders were not only cruel, brutal but were diabolic. The High Court has held that those who were guilty of rape and murder deserve death sentence, while those who were convicted for murder only were to be awarded life sentence. The High Court noted that the whole incident is extremely revolting, it shocks the collective conscience of the community and the aggravating circumstances have outweighed the mitigating circumstances in the case of accused persons 1, 2 and 4; but held that in the case of others it was to be altered to life sentence.
“The High Court itself noticed that five members of a family were brutally murdered, they were not known to the accused and there was no animosity towards them. Four of the witnesses were of tender age, they were defenceless and the attack was without any provocation. Some of them were so young that they could not resist any attack by the accused. A minor girl of about fifteen years was dragged to the open field, gang-raped and done to death.
“Above being the position, the appeals filed by the accused persons deserve dismissal, which we direct and the State's appeals deserve to be allowed. A-2, A-3 and A-5 are also awarded death sentence. In essence all the six accused persons deserve death sentence.”
B.A. Umesh v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 85 was a case of the rape and murder of a lady, a mother of a 7 year old child. In the High Court, there was a difference of opinion on the sentence to be awarded – one of the learned judges confirmed the death penalty while the other learned judge was of the view that imprisonment for life should be awarded. The matter was referred to a third learned judge who agreed with the award of a death penalty. This Court confirmed the death penalty since the crime was unprovoked and committed in a depraved and merciless manner; the accused was alleged to have been earlier and subsequently involved in criminal activity; he was a menace to society and incapable of rehabilitation; the accused did not feel any remorse for what he had done. It was held:
“On the question of sentence we are satisfied that the extreme depravity with which the offences were committed and the merciless manner in which death was inflicted on the victim, brings it within the category of the rarest of rare cases which merits the death penalty, as awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court. None of the mitigating factors as were indicated by this Court in Bachan Singh case or in Machhi Singh case are present in the facts of the instant case. The appellant even made up a story as to his presence in the house on seeing PW 2 Suresh, who had come there in the meantime. Apart from the above, it is clear from the recoveries made from his house that this was not the first time that he had committed crimes in other premises also, before he was finally caught by the public two days after the present incident, while trying to escape from the house of one Seeba where he made a similar attempt to rob and assault her and in the process causing injuries to her.
“As has been indicated by the courts below, the antecedents of the appellant and his subsequent conduct indicates that he is a menace to the society and is incapable of rehabilitation. The offences committed by the appellant were neither under duress nor on provocation and an innocent life was snuffed out by him after committing violent rape on the victim. He did not feel any remorse in regard to his actions, inasmuch as, within two days of the incident he was caught by the local public while committing an offence of a similar type in the house of one Seeba."
Mohd. Mannan v. State of Bihar, (2011) 5 SCC 317 was a case which a 42 year old man had raped and killed a 7 year old child. This Court looked at the factors for awarding death sentence both in the negative as well as in the positive sense. It was held that the number of persons killed by the accused is not a decisive factor; nor is the mere brutality of the crime decisive. However if the brutality of the crime shocks the collective conscience of the community, one has to lean towards the death penalty. Additionally, it is to be seen if the accused is a menace to society and can be reformed or not. Applying these broad parameters, this Court held that the accused was a mature man of 43 years; that he held a position of trust in relation to the victim; that the crime was pre-planned; and that the crime was, pre-planned, unprovoked and gruesome against a defenceless child. It was held:
“……. The appellant is a matured man aged about 43 years. He held a position of trust and misused the same in a calculated and pre-planned manner. He sent the girl aged about 7 years to buy betel and few minutes thereafter in order to execute his diabolical and grotesque desire proceeded towards the shop where she was sent. The girl was aged about 7 years of thin built and 4 ft of height and such a child was incapable of arousing lust in normal situation. The appellant had won the trust of the child and she did not understand the desire of the appellant which would be evident from the fact that while she was being taken away by the appellant no protest was made and the innocent child was made prey of the appellant's lust.
“The post-mortem report shows various injuries on the face, nails and body of the child. These injuries show the gruesome manner in which she was subjected to rape. The victim of crime is an innocent child who did not provide even an excuse, much less a provocation for murder. Such cruelty towards a young child is appalling. The appellant had stooped so low as to unleash his monstrous self on the innocent, helpless and defenceless child. This act no doubt had invited extreme indignation of the community and shocked the collective conscience of the society. Their expectation from the authority conferred with the power to adjudicate is to inflict the death sentence which is natural and logical. We are of the opinion that the appellant is a menace to the society and shall continue to be so and he cannot be reformed.”
In Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 4 SCC 37 the accused, a 31 year old, had raped and murdered a 3 year old child. This Court considered the brutality of the crime and the conduct of the accused prior to, during and after the crime. Prior to the incident, the accused had worked under a false name and had gained the trust and confidence of the victim. The accused had, after committing a brutal crime, left the injured victim in the open field without any clothes, thereby exhibiting his unfortunate and abusive conduct. It was held:
“This Court has to examine the conduct of the accused prior to, at the time as well as after the commission of the crime. Prior thereto, the accused had been serving with PW 5 and PW 6 under a false name and took advantage of his familiarity with the family of the deceased. He committed the crime in the most brutal manner and, thereafter, he opted not to explain any circumstances and just took up the plea of false implication, which is unbelievable and unsustainable.
“Another aspect of the matter is that the minor child was helpless in the cruel hands of the accused. The accused was holding the child in a relationship of “trust-belief” and “confidence”, in which capacity he took the child from the house of PW 2. In other words, the accused, by his conduct, has belied the human relationship of trust and worthiness. The accused left the deceased in a badly injured condition in the open fields without even clothes. This reflects the most unfortunate and abusive facet of human conduct, for which the accused has to blame no one else than his own self.” Broad analysis:
The principal reasons for confirming the death penalty in the above cases include (1) the cruel, diabolic, brutal, depraved and gruesome nature of the crime (Jumman Khan, Dhananjoy Chatterjee, Laxman Naik, Kamta Tewari, Nirmal Singh, Jai Kumar, Satish, Bantu, Ankush Maruti Shinde, B.A. Umesh, Mohd. Mannan and Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik);
(2) the crime results in public abhorrence, shocks the judicial conscience or the conscience of society or the community (Dhananjoy Chatterjee, Jai Kumar, Ankush Maruti Shinde and Mohd. Mannan);
(3) the reform or rehabilitation of the convict is not likely or that he would be a menace to society (Jai Kumar, B.A. Umesh and Mohd. Mannan);
(4) the victims were defenceless (Dhananjoy Chatterjee, Laxman Naik, Kamta Tewari, Ankush Maruti Shinde, Mohd. Mannan and Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik);
(5) the crime was either unprovoked or that it was premeditated (Dhananjoy Chatterjee, Laxman Naik, Kamta Tewari, Nirmal Singh, Jai Kumar, Ankush Maruti Shinde, B.A. Umesh and Mohd. Mannan) and in three cases the antecedents or the prior history of the convict was taken into consideration (Shivu, B.A. Umesh and Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik).
However, what is more significant is that there are cases where the factors taken into consideration for commuting the death penalty were given a go-bye in cases where the death penalty was confirmed. The young age of the accused was not taken into consideration or held irrelevant in Dhananjoy Chatterjee aged about 27 years, Jai Kumar aged about 22 years and Shivu & another aged about 20 and 22 years while it was given importance in Amit v. State of Maharashtra, Rahul, Santosh Kumar Singh, Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod (2) and Amit v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The possibility of reformation or rehabilitation was ruled out, without any expert evidence, in Jai Kumar, B.A. Umesh and Mohd. Mannan in much the same manner, without any expert evidence, as the benefit thereof was given in Nirmal Singh, Mohd. Chaman, Raju, Bantu, Surendra Pal Shivbalakpal, Rahul and Amit v. State of Uttar Pradesh. Acquittal or life sentence awarded by the High Court was considered not good enough reason to convert the death sentence in Satish, Ankush Maruti Shinde and B.A. Umesh but it was good enough in State of Tamil Nadu v. Suresh, State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, Bharat Fakira Dhiwar and Santosh Kumar Singh. Even though the crime was not premeditated, the death penalty was confirmed in Molai notwithstanding the view expressed in Akhtar, Raju and Amrit Singh. Circumstantial evidence was held not to be a ‘mitigating’ factor in Jumman Khan, Kamta Tewari, Molai and Shivaji but it was so held in Bishnu Prasad Sinha.
Bachan Singh is more than clear that the crime is important (cruel, diabolic, brutal, depraved and gruesome) but the criminal is also important and this, unfortunately has been overlooked in several cases in the past (as mentioned in Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 498) and even in some of the cases referred to above. It is this individualized sentencing that has made this Court wary, in the recent past, of imposing death penalty and instead substituting it for fixed term sentences exceeding 14 years (the term of 14 years or 20 years being erroneously equated with life imprisonment) or awarding consecutive sentences. Some of these cases, which are not necessarily cases of rape and murder, are mentioned below.
Minimum fixed term sentences:
There have been several cases where life sentence has been awarded by this Court with a minimum fixed term of incarceration. Many of them have been discussed in Swamy Shraddananda and so it is not necessary to refer to them individually.
Swamy Shraddananda refers to Aloke Nath Dutta v. State of West Bengal, (2007) 12 SCC 230 which in turn refers to five different cases. Its relevant to refer to them at this stage.
In Subhash Chander v. Krishan Lal, (2001) 4 SCC 458 it was held that the convict shall remain in prison “for the rest of his life. He shall not be entitled to any commutation or premature release under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Prisoners Act, Jail Manual or any other statute and the rules made for the purposes of grant of commutation and remissions.”
In Shri Bhagwan v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 6 SCC 296, Prakash Dhawal Khairnar (Patil) v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 35 and Ram Anup Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 686 the convict was directed to serve out at least 20 years of imprisonment.
In Mohd. Munna v. Union of India, (2005) 7 SCC 417 the convict had undergone 21 years of incarceration. This Court held that he was not entitled to release as a matter of course but was required to serve out his sentence till the remainder of his life subject to remissions by the appropriate authority or State Government.
Swamy Shraddananda also refers to Jayawant Dattatraya Suryarao v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 10 SCC 109 in which it was directed that the convict “will not be entitled to any commutation or premature release under Section 433-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, Prisoners Act, Jail Manual or any other statute and the Rules made for the purpose of commutation and remissions.”
Similarly, in Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC 461 while sentencing the convicts to imprisonment for 20 years it was held that they would not be entitled to any remission from this period.
The death sentence to the convict in Swamy Shraddananda was converted to imprisonment for life with a further direction that he shall not be released till the rest of his life.
Sebastian v. State of Kerala, (2010) 1 SCC 58 was a case of a 24 year old extremely violent pedophile accused of raping a two-year old child and then murdering her. While commuting the death sentence, this Court held that he should remain in jail for the rest of his life in terms of Swamy Shraddananda. It was observed:
“The evidence that the appellant was a paedophile with extremely violent propensities also stands proved on record in that he had been convicted and sentenced for an offence punishable under Section 354 in the year 1998 and later for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 376, 379, 302 and 201 IPC for the rape and murder of a young child and had been awarded a sentence of imprisonment for life under Section 302, and several other terms of imprisonment with respect to the other sections, though, an appeal in this connection was pending as on date. It is also extremely relevant that the appellant had, in addition, been tried for the murders of several other children but had been acquitted on 28-7-2005 with the benefit of doubt. The present incident happened three days later.
“We accordingly dismiss the appeals but modify the sentence of death to one for the rest of his life in terms of the judgment in Shraddananda case.”
The special sentencing theory evolved in Swamy Shraddananda (supra) has got the seal of approval of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India vs. Sriharan alias Murugan and others , laying down as follows:
“105. We, therefore, reiterate that the power derived from the Penal Code for any modified punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in the event of further appeal only by the Supreme Court and not by any other court in this country. To put it differently, the power to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convict's life as an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior court.
In Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2012) 4 SCC 257 this Court converted the death sentence of the accused to imprisonment for life though the crime of rape and murder was heinous, since the accused persons were young at the time of commission of the offence (between 21 and 31 years of age); the possibility of the death of the victim being accidental; and the accused not being a social menace with possibility of reforming themselves. It was held, while modifying the sentence that the accused serve a term of imprisonment of 21 years:
“While we cumulatively examine the various principles and apply them to the facts of the present case, it appears to us that the age of the accused, possibility of the death of the deceased occurring accidently and the possibility of the accused reforming themselves, they cannot be termed as “social menace”. It is unfortunate but a hard fact that all these accused have committed a heinous and inhumane crime for satisfaction of their lust, but it cannot be held with certainty that this case falls in the “rarest of rare” cases. On appreciation of the evidence on record and keeping the facts and circumstances of the case in mind, we are unable to hold that any other sentence but death would be inadequate.
“Accordingly, while commuting the sentence of death to that of life imprisonment (21 years), we partially allow their appeals only with regard to the quantum of sentence.”
In Neel Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2012) 5 SCC 766 this Court modified the death penalty awarded to the accused for the rape and murder of his 4 year old daughter to one of 30 years imprisonment without remissions. It was held:
“A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka, considering the facts of the case, set aside the sentence of death penalty and awarded the life imprisonment but further explained that in order to serve the ends of justice, the appellant therein would not be released from prison till the end of his life.
“Similarly, in Ramraj v. State of Chhattisgarh [(2010) 1 SCC 573] this Court while setting aside the death sentence made a direction that the appellant therein would serve minimum period of 20 years including remissions earned and would not be released on completion of 14 years’ imprisonment.
“Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we set aside the death sentence and award life imprisonment. The appellant must serve a minimum of 30 years in jail without remissions, before consideration of his case for premature release.”
In Sandeep v. State of U.P., (2012) 6 SCC 107 the death sentence awarded to the convict for the murder of his pregnant friend and pouring acid on her head was converted to sentence of life for a minimum period of 30 years without any remission before his case could be considered for premature release.
In Brajendrasingh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 4 SCC 289 the accused had murdered his wife and three children since he suspected his wife’s fidelity. The death penalty awarded to him was converted to imprisonment for life by this Court with a minimum imprisonment of 21 years. This is what was said by this Court:
“Considering the above aspects, we are of the considered view that it is not a case which falls in the category of the “rarest of rare” cases where imposition of death sentence is imperative. It is also not a case where imposing any other sentence would not serve the ends of justice or would be entirely inadequate.
“Once we draw the balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and examine them in the light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that this is not a case where this Court ought to impose the extreme penalty of death upon the accused. Therefore, while partially accepting the appeals only with regard to quantum of sentence, we commute the death sentence awarded to the accused to one of life imprisonment (21 years).”
In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sanjay Kumar, (2012) 8 SCC 537 this Court converted the death penalty awarded to the accused for the rape and murder of an 18 year old into one of life imprisonment with a further direction that he would not be granted premature release under the guidelines framed for that purpose, that is, the Jail Manual or even under Section 433-A of the Cr. P.C. It was said:
“In view of the above, we reach the inescapable conclusion that the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the State are unfounded. The aforesaid judgments make it crystal clear that this Court has merely found out the via media, where considering the facts and circumstances of a particular case, by way of which it has come to the conclusion that it was not the “rarest of rare cases”, warranting death penalty, but a sentence of 14 years or 20 years, as referred to in the guidelines laid down by the States would be totally inadequate. The life imprisonment cannot be equivalent to imprisonment for 14 years or 20 years, rather it always meant as the whole natural life. This Court has always clarified that the punishment so awarded would be subject to any order passed in exercise of the clemency powers of the President of India or the Governor of the State, as the case may be. Pardons, reprieves and remissions are granted in exercise of prerogative power. There is no scope of judicial review of such orders except on very limited grounds, for example, non-application of mind while passing the order; non-consideration of relevant material; or if the order suffers from arbitrariness. The power to grant pardons and to commute sentences is coupled with a duty to exercise the same fairly and reasonably. Administration of justice cannot be perverted by executive or political pressure. Of course, adoption of uniform standards may not be possible while exercising the power of pardon. Thus, such orders do not interfere with the sovereign power of the State. More so, not being in contravention of any statutory or constitutional provision, the orders, even if treated to have been passed under Article 142 of the Constitution do not deserve to be labelled as unwarranted. The aforesaid orders have been passed considering the gravity of the offences in those cases that the accused would not be entitled to be considered for premature release under the guidelines issued for that purpose i.e. under the Jail Manual, etc. or even under Section 433-A CrPC.”
In Gurvail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2013) 2 SCC 713 the death sentence was converted to imprisonment for life with the requirement that the convict spends a minimum of thirty years in jail without remission. It was held:
“We are of the view, so far as this case is concerned, that the extreme sentence of capital punishment is not warranted. Due to the fact that the appellants are instrumental for the death of four persons and nature of injuries they have inflicted, in front of PW 1, whose son, daughter-in-law and two grandchildren were murdered, we are of the view that the appellants deserve no sympathy. Considering the totality of facts and circumstances of this case we hold that imposition of death sentence on the appellants was not warranted but while awarding life imprisonment to the appellants, we hold that they must serve a minimum of thirty years in jail without remission. The sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court is modified as above. Under such circumstances, we modify the sentence from death to life imprisonment. Applying the principle laid down by this Court in Sandeep we are of the view that the minimum sentence of thirty years would be an adequate punishment, so far as the facts of this case are concerned.” Consecutive sentence cases:
. Ravindra Trimbak Chouthmal v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 4 SCC 148 is perhaps among the earliest cases where consecutive sentences were awarded. This was not a case of rape and murder but one of causing a dowry death of his pregnant wife. It was held that it was not the “rarest of rare” cases “because dowry death has ceased to belong to that species of killing.” The death sentence was, therefore, not upheld. Since the accused had attempted to cause disappearance of the evidence by severing the head and cutting the body into nine pieces, this Court directed that he should undergo the sentence for that crime after serving out his life sentence. It was held:
“We have given considered thought to the question and we have not been able to place the case in that category which could be regarded as the “rarest of the rare” type. This is so because dowry death has ceased to belong to that species of killing. The increasing number of dowry deaths would bear this. To halt the rising graph, we, at one point, thought to maintain the sentence; but we entertain doubt about the deterrent effect of a death penalty. We, therefore, resist ourselves from upholding the death sentence, much though we would have desired annihilation of a despicable character like the appellant before us. We, therefore, commute the sentence of death to one of RI for life imprisonment.
“But then, it is a fit case, according to us, where, for the offence under Sections 201/34, the sentence awarded, which is RI for seven years being the maximum for a case of the present type, should be sustained, in view of what had been done to cause disappearance of the evidence relating to the commission of murder — the atrocious way in which the head was severed and the body was cut in nine pieces. These cry for maximum sentence. Not only this, the sentence has to run consecutively, and not concurrently, to show our strong disapproval of the loathsome, revolting and dreaded device adopted to cause disappearance of the dead body. To these sentences, we do not, however, desire to add those awarded for offences under Sections 316 and 498-A/34, as killing of the child in the womb was not separately intended, and Section 498-A offence ceases to be of significance and importance in view of the murder of Vijaya.
“The result is that the appeal stands allowed to the extent that the sentence of death is converted to one of imprisonment for life. But then, the sentence of seven years' RI for the offence under Sections 201/34 IPC would start running after the life imprisonment has run its course as per law.” Since imprisonment for life means that the convict will remain in jail till the end of his normal life, what this decision mandates is that if the convict is to be earlier released by the competent authority for any reason, in accordance with procedure established by law, then the second sentence will commence immediately thereafter.
Ronny v. State of Maharashtra, (1998) 3 SCC 625 is also among the earliest cases in the recent past where consecutive sentences were awarded. The three accused, aged about 35 years (two of them) and 25/27 years had committed three murders and a gang rape. This Court converted the death sentence of all three to imprisonment for life since it was not possible to identify whose case would fall in the category of “rarest of rare” cases. However, after awarding a sentence of life imprisonment, this Court directed that they would all undergo punishment for the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC consecutively, after serving the sentences for other offences. It was held:
“Considering the cumulative effect of all the factors, it cannot be said that the offences were committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for the whole thing was done in a pre- planned way; having regard to the nature of offences and circumstances in which they were committed, it is not possible for the Court to predict that the appellant would not commit criminal act of violence or would not be a threat to the society. A-1 is 35 years' old, A-2 is 35 years' old and A-3 is 25 (sic 27) years' old. The appellants cannot be said to be too young or too old. The possibility of reform and rehabilitation, however, cannot be ruled out. From the facts and circumstances, it is not possible to predict as to who among the three played which part. It may be that the role of one has been more culpable in degree than that of the others and vice versa. Where in a case like this it is not possible to say as to whose case falls within the “rarest of the rare” cases, it would serve the ends of justice if the capital punishment is commuted into life imprisonment. Accordingly, we modify the sentence awarded by the courts below under Section 302 read with Section 34 from death to life imprisonment. The sentences for the offences for which the appellants are convicted, except under Section 376(2)(g) IPC, shall run concurrently; they shall serve sentence under Section 376(2)(g) IPC consecutively, after serving sentence for the other offences.”
In Sandesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 2 SCC 479 this Court converted the death penalty awarded to the accused to imprisonment for life, inter alia, for the rape of a pregnant lady, attempted murder and the murder of her mother in law to imprisonment for life with a further direction that all the sentences were to run consecutively.
In Sanaullah Khan v. State of Bihar, MANU/SC/0165/2013 the death sentence awarded to the accused for the murder of three persons was converted by this Court to imprisonment for life for each of the three murders and further the sentences were directed to run consecutively.
These decisions clearly suggest that this Court has been seriously reconsidering, though not in a systemic manner, awarding life sentence as an alternative to death penalty by applying (though not necessarily mentioning) the “unquestionably foreclosed” formula laid down in Bachan Singh.
Off and on, the issue has been the interpretation of “life sentence” – does it mean imprisonment for only 14 years or 20 years or does it mean for the life of the convict. This doubt has been laid to rest in several cases, more recently in Sangeet where it has been unequivocally laid down that a sentence of imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the rest of the normal life of the convict. The convict is not entitled to any remission in a case of sentence of life imprisonment, as is commonly believed. However, if the convict is sought to be released before the expiry of his life, it can only be by following the procedure laid down in Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or by the Governor exercising power under Article 161 of the Constitution or by the President exercising power under Article 72 of the Constitution. There is no other method or procedure.
CASES IN WHICH DEATH PENALTY COMMUTED
Cases where the death penalty has been converted to imprisonment for life:
State of Tamil Nadu v. Suresh, (1998) 2 SCC 372 was a case of the rape and murder of a pregnant housewife. This Court took the view that though the crime was dastardly and the victim was a young pregnant housewife, it would not be appropriate to award the death penalty since the High Court had not upheld the conviction and also due to the passage of time. This is what was observed:
“The above discussion takes us to the final conclusion that the High Court has seriously erred in upsetting the conviction entered by the Sessions Court as against A-2 and A-3. The erroneous approach has resulted in miscarriage of justice by allowing the two perpetrators of a dastardly crime committed against a helpless young pregnant housewife who was sleeping in her own apartment with her little baby sleeping by her side and during the absence of her husband. We strongly feel that the error committed by the High Court must be undone by restoring the conviction passed against A-2 and A-3, though we are not inclined, at this distance of time, to restore the sentence of death passed by the trial court on those two accused.”
Nirmal Singh v. State of Haryana, (1999) 3 SCC 670 was a case in which Dharampal had raped P and was convicted for the offence. Pending an appeal the convict was granted bail. While on bail, Dharampal along with Nirmal Singh murdered five members of P’s family. Death penalty was awarded to Dharampal and Nirmal Singh by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court. This Court converted the death sentence in the case of Nirmal Singh to imprisonment for life since he had no criminal antecedents; there was no possibility of his committing criminal acts of violence; he would not continue being a threat to society; and he was not the main perpetrator of the crime. It was held:
“There is nothing on record to suggest that Nirmal was having any past criminal antecedents or that there is a possibility that the accused would commit criminal acts of violence and would constitute a continuing threat to the society. The only aggravating circumstance is that he had come with his brother and had given 3 blows on deceased Krishna only after Dharampal chased Krishna and gave kulhari blows hitting on the neck while Krishna was running and on sustaining that blow, she fell down and then Dharampal gave two to three blows to Krishna and only thereafter Nirmal gave burchi blows on the said Krishna. It is no doubt true that the presence of Nirmal at the scene of the occurrence with a burchi in his hand had emboldened Dharampal to take the drastic action of causing murder of 5 persons of Tale's family as a result of which Tale's family was totally wiped off. But because of the fact that Nirmal has not assaulted any other person and assaulted Krishna only after Dharampal had given her 3 or 4 blows, the case of Nirmal cannot be said to be the rarest of rare case attracting the extreme penalty of death. While, therefore, we uphold his conviction under Sections 302/34, we commute his sentence of death into imprisonment for life.”
Kumudi Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1999) 4 SCC 108 was a case of rape and murder of a 14 year old. This Court was of the view that the applicability of the rarest of rare principle did not arise in this case apparently because the crime had no ‘exceptional’ feature. This Court noted as follows:
“The circumstances indicate that probably she (the victim) was not unwilling initially to allow the appellant to have some liberty with her. The appellant not being able to resist his urge for sex went ahead in spite of her unwillingness for a sexual intercourse who offered some resistance and started raising shouts at that stage. In order to prevent her from raising shouts the appellant tied the salwar around her neck which resulted in strangulation and her death. We, therefore, do not consider this to be a fit case in which the extreme penalty of death deserves to be imposed upon the appellant.”
Akhtar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1999) 6 SCC 60 was a case of rape and murder of a young girl. The sentence of death awarded to the accused was converted to one of life imprisonment since he took advantage of finding the victim alone in a lonely place and her murder was not premeditated. It was observed:
“But in the case in hand on examining the evidence of the three witnesses it appears to us that the accused-appellant has committed the murder of the deceased girl not intentionally and with any premeditation. On the other hand the accused-appellant found a young girl alone in a lonely place, picked her up for committing rape; while committing rape and in the process by way of gagging the girl has died. The medical evidence also indicates that the death is on account of asphyxia. In the circumstances we are of the considered opinion that the case in hand cannot be held to be one of the rarest of rare cases justifying the punishment of death.”
In State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471 death penalty was not awarded to the accused since he had been acquitted by the High Court, even though the case was said to be “perilously near” to falling within the category of rarest of rare cases. The test of whether the lesser option was “unquestionably foreclosed” was adopted by this Court, which held:
“We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment and restore the conviction passed by the trial court. Regarding sentence we would have concurred with the Sessions Court's view that the extreme penalty of death can be chosen for such a crime, but as the accused was once acquitted by the High Court we refrain from imposing that extreme penalty in spite of the fact that this case is perilously near the region of “rarest of the rare cases” envisaged by the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab. However, the lesser option is not unquestionably foreclosed and so we alter the sentence, in regard to the offence under Section 302 IPC, to imprisonment for life.”
In Mohd. Chaman v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 2 SCC 28 the accused, a 30 year old man, had raped and killed a one and a half year old child. Despite concluding that the crime was serious and heinous and that the accused had a dirty and perverted mind, this Court converted the death penalty to one of imprisonment for life since he was not such a dangerous person who would endanger the community and because it was not a case where there was no alternative but to impose the death penalty. It was also held that a humanist approach should be taken in the matter of awarding punishment. It was held:
“Coming to the case in hand, the crime committed is undoubtedly serious and heinous and the conduct of the appellant is reprehensible. It reveals a dirty and perverted mind of a human being who has no control over his carnal desires. Then the question is: Whether the case can be classified as of a “rarest of rare” category justifying the severest punishment of death. Treating the case on the touchstone of the guidelines laid down in Bachan Singh, Machhi Singh [(1983) 3 SCC 470] and other decisions and balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances emerging from the evidence on record, we are not persuaded to accept that the case can be appropriately called one of the “rarest of rare cases” deserving death penalty. We find it difficult to hold that the appellant is such a dangerous person that to spare his life will endanger the community. We are also not satisfied that the circumstances of the crime are such that there is no alternative but to impose death sentence even after according maximum weightage to the mitigating circumstances in favour of the offender. It is our considered view that the case is one in which a humanist approach should be taken in the matter of awarding punishment.”
Raju v. State of Haryana, (2001) 9 SCC 50 was a case in which this Court took into account three factors for converting the death sentence of the accused to imprisonment for life for the rape and murder of an eleven year old child. Firstly, the murder was committed without any premeditation (however, there is no mention about the rape being not premeditated); secondly, the absence of any criminal record of the accused; and thirdly, there being nothing to show that the accused could be a grave danger to society. This is what was said:
“[T]he evidence on record discloses that the accused was not having an intention to commit the murder of the girl who accompanied him. On the spur of the moment without there being any premeditation, he gave two brick-blows which caused her death. There is nothing on record to indicate that the appellant was having any criminal record nor can he be said to be a grave danger to the society at large. In these circumstances, it would be difficult to hold that the case of the appellant would be rarest of rare case justifying imposition of death penalty.”
In Bantu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2001) 9 SCC 615 this Court converted the death sentence awarded to the accused to imprisonment for life. The accused was a 22 year old man who had raped and murdered a 6 year old child. It was acknowledged that the rape and murder was heinous, but this Court took into account that the accused had no previous criminal record and that he would not be a grave danger to society at large. On this basis, the death penalty was converted to life imprisonment. This is what was said:
“In the present case, there is nothing on record to indicate that the appellant was having any criminal record nor can it be said that he will be a grave danger to the society at large. It is true that his act is heinous and requires to be condemned but at the same time it cannot be said that it is the rarest of the rare case where the accused requires to be eliminated from the society. Hence, there is no justifiable reason to impose the death sentence.”
In State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Fakira Dhiwar, (2002) 1 SCC 622 this Court converted the death sentence to imprisonment for life since the accused was acquitted by the High Court and imprisonment for life was not unquestionably foreclosed. This is what this Court held:
“Regarding sentence we would have concurred with the Sessions Court's view that the extreme penalty of death can be chosen for such a crime. However, as the accused was once acquitted by the High Court we refrain from imposing that extreme penalty in spite of the fact that this case is perilously near the region of “rarest of the rare cases”, as envisaged by the Constitution Bench in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab. However, the lesser option is not unquestionably foreclosed and so we alter the sentence, in regard to the offence under Section 302 IPC, to imprisonment for life.”
In Amit v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 8 SCC 93 the death penalty awarded to the accused for the rape and murder of an eleven year old child was converted to imprisonment for life for the reason that he was a young man of 20 years when the incident occurred; he had no prior record of any heinous crime; and there was no evidence that he would be a danger to society. This Court held:
“The next question is of the sentence. Considering that the appellant is a young man, at the time of the incident his age was about 20 years; he was a student; there is no record of any previous heinous crime and also there is no evidence that he will be a danger to the society, if t