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Rape Case to extort money :-

Delhi High Court

Chandan Sawhney vs State on 13 February, 2020

Facts: Present petition is preferred under section 397 read with section 401 Cr.P.C. against order on charge dated 14.02.2017 and order framing charge dated 22.02.2017 passed by learned ASJ.

It is stated in present petition that above FIR came to be registered on a complaint dated 08.04.2014 for an incident which purportedly took place on 12.08.2013. Entire substance of accusation is based on the allegation that having entered into a settlement dated 13.02.2012 and promising to pay a sum of Rs.9 Crore towards permanent alimony, petitioner induced complainant to execute settlement deed dated 31.08.2012 and obtained divorce by making a payment of Rs.5 Crores (Rs.2.5 Crore in favour of their daughter and Rs.2.5 crore in favour of the complainant). It has been alleged that after obtaining divorce on 04.09.2012, the petitioner did not pay any money to complainant in terms of agreement dated 13.02.2012 thereby cheated the complainant. It has further been alleged that despite verbally demanding for an amount payable under agreement dated 13.02.2012, the petitioner refused to make any payment. In order to avoid payment to complainant, petitioner induced her with a false promise of marriage (re- marriage) stating that upon marriage, the question of payment of such amounts would not arise. By making false promise of marriage, petitioner indulged in a physical relation with complainant on 12.08.2013.

Undisputed facts are that on 26.07.2013, complainant preferred a complaint against one Sumit Walia and same was culminated into FIR 280/2013 at PS Vasant Vihar u/s 376/406/506 IPC. In said FIR, complainant had alleged that Sumit Walia had engaged in sexual intercourse with her after giving false promise of marriage. In the present case also, complainant states that on 12.08.2013, i.e. after about 3 weeks of preferring a complaint against Sumit Walia, she was assured by petitioner that he would remarry her, on the basis of which, she agreed to have sexual relation with him. Thus, conduct of complainant is unnatural in as much as she being an educated lady and having known to petitioner for about 20 years. It is unbelievable that such an educated person who having been a victim of crime, gets falsely induced by none other than her ex-husband of 20 years, that too on false assurance of re-marriage. The admitted facts are that due to elicit relation of the complainant with Sumit Walia, petitioner and complainant got divorced by mutual consent. Regarding relation, it is evident that on 08.09.2012, petitioner preferred a complaint against Sumit Walia which was registered as FIR No.294/12 with PS Vasant Vihar, New Delhi, for the offences punishable u/s 384/506/509 IPC and 66(1)/67 of Information Technology Act, 2000. In the said FIR, allegations were that Sumit Walia demanded Rs.40 lacs from complainant and threatened to circulate nude pictures and video of complainant to malign her image. Said case is presently under investigation and is pending before Cyber Cell of EOW, Delhi Police. In addition to above, on 26.07.2013, complainant preferred a complaint against said Sumit Walia alleging rape and criminal misappropriation of Rs.4 Crores. Consequently, FIR no.280/13 was registered u/s 376/406/506 IPC with PS Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. On 27.07.2013, complainant stated in her statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. that Sumit Walia was the sole reason for divorce with petitioner. Thus, present FIR is nothing but arm twisting for extorting money from petitioner, which can not be allowed such misuse of judicial system as happened in the present case.

Law : -It is settled law that due weightage to the age, educational qualifications, family and societal background of the victim to ascertain whether her consent could have been obtained by fraud in such like cases ,a promise to marry without anything more will not give rise to „misconception of fact‟ within the meaning of Section 90, it needs to be clarified that a representation deliberately made by the accused with a view to elicit the assent of the victim without having the intention or inclination to marry her, will vitiate the consent. If on the facts it is established that at the very inception of the making of promise, the accused did not really entertain the intention of marrying her and the promise to marry held out by him was a mere hoax, the consent ostensibly given by the victim will be of no avail to the accused to exculpate him from the ambit of Section 375 clause Secondly.

Order :- Consequently, FIR no.280/13 was registered u/s 376/406/506 IPC with PS Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. On 27.07.2013, complainant stated in her statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. that Sumit Walia was the sole reason for divorce with petitioner. Thus, present FIR is nothing but arm twisting for extorting money from petitioner, which can not be allowed such misuse of judicial system as happened in the present case.


Kerala High Court

Tijo Varghese vs State Of Kerala on 2 July, 2020

Facts - The informant is aged about 37 years and the mother of a girl child. In her complaint, she alleges that she got married to one Sreenath in the year 2007. After marriage, the spouses fell apart and they started residing separately. While so, she met the petitioner herein in the month of May 2017. During this period, she was residing in a rented house at Pala. The petitioner used to call her often and he also used to bring food and other items for her. She alleges that on a day in the month of November 2017, the petitioner came to her residence, while her daughter was not at home and caught her. When she cried, the petitioner is alleged to have threatened her. She alleges that the petitioner committed rape on her. She, however, did not disclose the incident to any person. She later realized that she had become pregnant. When this fact was mentioned to the petitioner he is alleged to have assured her that he would marry the lady as and when she gets a divorce from her husband. On 29.07.2018, she gave birth to a boy and in the hospital records, her husband Sreenath was mentioned as the father of the child. Later when the petitioner stopped contacting the lady, she approached the Police and set the law in motion.

Held - " At the time of consideration of bail applications, Courts are not expected to go into the minute details of the allegations nor discuss the merits and demerits of the materials collected against the accused lest it causes prejudice either of the parties. For the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether the petitioner has made out a prima facie case for pre-arrest bail, I have meticulously scanned the materials. The records suggest that the de facto complainant is a married lady. Her marriage with her husband still subsists though litigation is pending before the Family Court. The Apex Court has held that there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. The question to be considered in such cases is whether the accused had actually wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to that effect only to satisfy his lust. The former is not rape but the latter will fall within the ambit of cheating and deception. If the materials, prima facie, suggest that the prosecutrix agreed to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do, such cases will not fall within the ambit of rape and will have to be considered differently. It is difficult to accept at this stage that a false promise was given to engage her in a sexual relationship and that it was under such misconception of fact that she had acceded to the wishes of the petitioner. Having considered the facts and circumstances in all its perspectives, I am of the considered opinion that the custodial interrogation of the petitioner is not necessitous for an effective investigation."


Supreme court in Sajjan Kumar vs. Central Bureau of Investigation (2010) 9 SCC 368 as follows:-

"21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:

(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case.

(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence.

(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible.

(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.

(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal."

(emphasis supplied)

Recently, on 08.03.2019, this Court, in the case of Gurpreet Singh Rakhi vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.: 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7830, refused to discharge the Petitioner therein.

Delhi High Court

Gurpreet Singh Rakhi @ Michal vs State (Nct Of Delhi) & Anr. on 8 March, 2019

The petitioner is facing trial as accused in sessions case (SC no. 58925/2016) in the court of Additional Sessions Judge on the charge for offences punishable under Sections 376/313/506 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The prosecutrix (second respondent) of the case is married woman with children. While lodging the FIR on 25.07.2015 she had, iter alia, alleged that she had come to be acquainted with the petitioner (the accused) for about two years, he having been introduced to her by a friend and at the instance of such friend she having arranged engagement of her younger sister with him, the said engagement having been later cancelled. She alleged that after the engagement of her sister had been broken, the petitioner started pursuing and stalking her. He would often visit her house during the absence of her husband, who would ordinarily be away in connection with his work. She alleged that the petitioner had extended threats to her and suggested that she should give up on her husband by threatening to kill her family and eventually persuaded her to abide by his wishes. It is alleged by her that, over the period, the petitioner engaged her in sexual intimacy as a result of which she had even conceived. She claimed that she had been subjected by the petitioner to physical assaults on several occasions and having arranged for the pregnancy to be aborted at a nursing home on 24.07.2015. According to her version in the FIR, her husband had come to see her in the company of the petitioner at the time of her visit to the nursing home for abortion and it is then that she revealed the background facts to him. . In her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. recorded by Metropolitan Magistrate on 27.07.2015, the prosecutrix reiterated the background facts elaborating further on some aspects, stating on oath, inter alia, that she had been raped by the petitioner multiple times, he having used fire arm or knife to intimidate her also making an attempt to throw acid at her sister. She further stated that the petitioner had arranged some medicinal tablets to induce abortion but since the same did not bear the result, he had arranged abortion to be carried out at the nursing home by making a call pretending to be her husband. While the medical doctor who runs the nursing home, on being examined during investigation, has confirmed that there was a request made for aborting the pregnancy, a call having been received by her on phone from a person who had introduced himself as the husband, she has denied having met any person by such description as that of the petitioner.

It does appear that the petitioner seeks to place reliance on certain material including social media chat in support of his claim of consent for sexual relationship. But then, that is a matter of defence, the material or documents requiring to be authenticated or proved in accordance with law. The statement of the prosecutrix alleging criminal intimidation of various kinds at different points of time cannot be disbelieved at this stage. When the case is for consideration of charge, it is not proper to ask for a scrutiny of the evidence in the manner it would require to be done at the stage of final analysis.It does appear that in the first head of charge on the allegations concerning the offence under Section 376 IPC, no specific dates have been indicated. But it has to be remembered that the version of the prosecutrix is that she had been raped multiple times over the period which, given the plea of the petitioner himself, might run into more than two years, may be for almost five years. If the prosecutrix has not remembered the specific dates on which she was raped, the charge cannot mention the specific dates. It will be for the petitioner to bring out necessary facts, if possible, during the cross-examination. There is, thus, no error or defect or deficiency in the charge which has been framed for the said offence on 23.05.2016.For the foregoing reasons, this court finds no ground to order discharge. The prayer for quashing of the criminal case is, thus, declined.

Ataullah Fakruddin Ansari Vs. The State of Maharashtra Bail Application No.390 of 2020

According to the alleged victim in the case who filed a complaint in January this year, she came to be in touch with the applicant via Facebook and she uploaded her mobile number on the Facebook Account. The applicant contacted her and there used to be frequent telephonic conversations between the two. In 2019, she went to Uttar Pradesh which happened to be her native place and the applicant also visited there.

The complainant said that she has divulged to the applicant that she had married to one person and he has divorced her. The complainant further alleged that a proximity developed between her and the applicant which resulted into establishing a physical relationship. Then, a discord arose between the two and the FIR contains details of the same.

"The complaint lodged by the prosecutrix is an immediate response to the said discord. The complainant herself alleged that the Applicant severed contact with the prosecutrix and she reported the matter to her father which resulted into filing of the FIR at Kandivali Police Station.

The case of the Applicant is to the effect that the prosecutrix maintained a physical relationship with the Applicant as they shared a close bond of friendship and she never objected to the said act of physical proximity. The prosecutrix at the time of incident was 24 years of age and, according to the Applicant, it was a decision taken by a major person in her full consciousness."

"The Applicant and the prosecutrix are major and as per the version of the complaint, she encouraged the friendship initially which slowly resulted into a physical one. She had accompanied the Applicant at several places where the Applicant established physical contact with her. She never objected to the same and from January, 2019 till filing of the complaint in March, 2020, allowed the relationship to flourish.

Then, one fine day, when the relationship turned sour, she filed the complaint. Prima facie reading of the complaint does not make out a case of sexual indulgence without her consent or against her will but points out a consensual act. The Applicant has been arrested since March 2019. In the backdrop of the allegations in the complaint, when prima facie no case of forcible sexual act is made out, he is entitled to be set on bail."

Supreme Court of India

Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs The State Of Maharashtra on 21 August, 2019

The allegations in the FIR are summarised thus:

(i) According to the complainant, she and the appellant have known each other since 1998. She would speak to the appellant on the phone and met him regularly as early as 2004. In 2008 the appellant proposed marriage and assured her that their belonging to different castes would not be a hindrance. The appellant allegedly promised to marry the complainant after the marriage of his elder sister. On 23 January 2009 the appellant allegedly re-iterated his promise to marry her at the Patnadevi Temple in Chalisgaon;

(ii) The complainant completed her B.Sc. in Agriculture in 2002 and worked as a Junior Research Assistant. In 2007 she was selected as a Naib Tahsildar at Chalisgaon. In March 2009 she was appointed to the post of Assistant Sales Tax Commissioner at Mazgaon. The appellant would, it is alleged, come to meet her and lived with her in November 2009. During his visit, the complainant alleges that she refused to engage in sexual intercourse with the appellant, but “on the promise of marriage he forcibly established corporeal relationships”;

APEX COURT HELD - " The allegations in the FIR do not on their face indicate that the promise by the appellant was false, or that the complainant engaged in sexual relations on the basis of this promise. There is no allegation in the FIR that when the appellant promised to marry the complainant, it was done in bad faith or with the intention to deceive her. The appellant’s failure in 2016 to fulfil his promise made in 2008 cannot be construed to mean the promise itself was false. The allegations in the FIR indicate that the complainant was aware that there existed obstacles to marrying the appellant since 2008, and that she and the appellant continued to engage in sexual relations long after their getting married had become a disputed matter. Even thereafter, the complainant travelled to visit and reside with the appellant at his postings and allowed him to spend his weekends at her residence. The allegations in the FIR belie the case that she was deceived by the appellant’s promise of marriage. Therefore, even if the facts set out in the complainant’s statements are accepted in totality, no offence under Section 375 of the IPC has occurred."

Under No Circumstances a Rape Case can be Compromised :-


The Supreme Court has emphasized that compromise between rape accused and victim is of no relevance in deciding criminal cases.

Before the bench, it was submitted that during the pendency of the appeals, both the accused have paid Rs. 1.5 lakhs each in favour of the prosecutrix and she has accepted the same willingly for getting the matter compromised. It said:

"However, it is imperative to emphasise that we do not accept such compromise in matters relating to the offence of rape and similar cases of sexual assault. Hence the aforesaid compromise is of no relevance in deciding this matter. "

Upholding the conviction recorded by the Trial Court, the bench observed that, in this case, evidence of the prosecutrix is coupled with the medical evidence and thus clearly proves that the offence of rape has been committed.

In this context, it is profitable to reproduce a passage from Shimbhu and Another v. State of Haryana wherein, a three-Judge Bench has ruled thus:-

“Further, a compromise entered into between the parties cannot be construed as a leading factor based on which lesser punishment can be awarded. Rape is a non-compoundable offence and it is an offence against the society and is not a matter to be left for the parties to compromise and settle. Since the Court cannot always be assured that the consent given by the victim in compromising the case is a genuine consent, there is every chance that she might have been pressurised by the convicts or the trauma undergone by her all the years might have compelled her to opt for a compromise. In fact, accepting this proposition will put an additional burden on the victim. The accused may use all his influence to pressurise her for a compromise. So, in the interest of justice and to avoid unnecessary pressure/harassment to the victim, it would not be safe in considering the compromise arrived at [pic]between the parties in rape cases to be a ground for the Court to exercise the discretionary power under the proviso of Section 376(2) IPC.”

Supreme Court of India

State Of M.P vs Madanlal on 1 July, 2015

In a case of rape or attempt of rape, the conception of compromise under no circumstances can really be thought of. These are crimes against the body of a woman which is her own temple. These are offences which suffocate the breath of life and sully the reputation. And reputation, needless to emphasise, is the richest jewel one can conceive of in life. No one would allow it to be extinguished. When a human frame is defiled, the “purest treasure”, is lost. Dignity of a woman is a part of her non-perishable and immortal self and no one should ever think of painting it in clay. There cannot be a compromise or settlement as it would be against her honour which matters the most. It is sacrosanct. Sometimes solace is given that the perpetrator of the crime has acceded to enter into wedlock with her which is nothing but putting pressure in an adroit manner; and we say with emphasis that the Courts are to remain absolutely away from this subterfuge to adopt a soft approach to the case, for any kind of liberal approach has to be put in the compartment of spectacular error. Or to put it differently, it would be in the realm of a sanctuary of error. We are compelled to say so as such an attitude reflects lack of sensibility towards the dignity, the elan vital, of a woman. Any kind of liberal approach or thought of mediation in this regard is thoroughly and completely sans legal permissibility.

It has to be kept in mind, as has been held in Shyam Narain v. State (NCT of Delhi)that:- “Respect for reputation of women in the society shows the basic civility of a civilised society. No member of society can afford to conceive the idea that he can create a hollow in the honour of a woman. Such thinking is not only lamentable but also deplorable. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the thought of sullying the physical frame of a woman is the demolition of the accepted civilised norm i.e. “physical morality”. In such a sphere, impetuosity has no room. The youthful excitement has no place. It should be paramount in everyone’s mind that, on the one hand, society as a whole cannot preach from the pulpit about social, economic and political equality of the sexes and, on the other, some perverted members of the same society dehumanise the woman by attacking her body and ruining her [pic]chastity. It is an assault on the individuality and inherent dignity of a woman with the mindset that she should be elegantly servile to men.”

Delhi High Court

State (Govt Of Nct Of Delhi) vs Jitender Kumar & Anr. on 6 July, 2017

The woman had alleged that the two doctors gang-raped her at Lajpat Nagar in January 2014. She used to work in their clinic as administrative assistant (field) but her service was terminated in 2013. She alleged that both the doctors called her on the pretext of giving her job back and raped her.

FINDINGS - It is highly improbable that the rape was committed inside a running office which comprises of 6 cabins having transparent walls. To commit forcible sexual intercourse with a person in a running office when other persons are present, especially when the cabins have transparent walls is a work of fiction. Additionally, the behavior of the prosecutrix is highly doubtful. After the incident, she went to the office of her sister in Ballabhgarh. She claims to have not disclosed the incident to anyone including her husband and sisters until 13.02.2014, when she returned home and narrated the incident to her brother in-law Ram Pravesh (PW-6), who also had a grievance against the center. The only reason forthcoming is that her sister was ill and that she did not disclose it to her husband out of fear, even though she was close to her sister and had good relations with her husband. Nothing has come to prove the medical condition of her sister, as she was never examined. The prosecutrix stated that the reason for telling PW-6 is that he used to take care of her whenever she was in any trouble. After overcoming her fear, there is no probable reason for her to not disclose the incident to her sister or to her husband, but chose to confide in PW-6, who also had a tussle with the organization is hard to believe. Not only this, she travelled to Ballabhgarh to the office of her sister and then travelled back to her home and called PW-6 to narrate the incident to him after a gap of 22 days. To summarize, the disgruntled ex-employee of the center found none other than her brother in-law, whose services were also terminated, to confide in; even when she was close to her sister and had good relations with her husband. This is extremely hard to believe unless any special circumstance was shown as to why the prosecutrix would confide in her brother-in-law. Not even a whisper has come to the effect that the prosecutrix had any strange relations with her husband or her sister.In such a case, unless the testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-3) is supported by any evidence, direct or circumstantial, an order of conviction cannot be sustained. Here, there is none.In the present case, PW-12, DW-2, DW-3, DW-4 and DW-5 have categorically deposed that till the time they were in office, the prosecutrix did not come there. The defence evidence also shows that the prosecutrix during her stint under the Center was rude and abusive which led to the termination of her services and the taxi services of her brother in-law (PW-6) were discontinued and he used to threaten the employees of the office and a complaint and a complaint on which DD 84B was registered on 28.04.2015 at the Lajpat Nagar Police Station. There is ample of evidence to show that the prosecutrix never came to the office on 22.01.2014. The medical evidence also shows no trauma, bite marks and abrasions on her person. It has also been shown that the prosecutrix was a disgruntled employee of the office and the rental services of her brother in law had been terminated and hence, both had a motive to level false allegations. It seems the whole criminal machinery was put in force just to extract revenge from the respondents.

HELD - A false accusation of rape may be as damning to an accused as to a victim of rape. The accused may be shunned in the society and by his own family, spouse and children for no fault of his own only because one woman has levelled false allegations of rape in pursuance of her evil design. Present case seems to be no different when the sole purpose of the prosecutrix and PW-6 seems to extract revenge against the respondents.We are prima facie satisfied that there was a conscious and deliberate effort to misuse the process of law to initiate false proceedings against the respondents. t has been held in Mishrilal v. State of M.P., (2005) 10 SCC 701 (paragraph 6) that "[w]henever the witness speaks falsehood in the court, and it is proved satisfactorily, the court should take a serious action against such witnesses." ACQUITTAL BY TRIAL COURT UPHELD.The Trial Court is to proceed against the prosecutrix (PW-3) and Ram Pravesh (PW-6) for giving false evidence in court under Section 340 Cr.P.C. (PROSECUTION FOR PERJURY)

Supreme Court of India

Mahila Vinod Kumari vs State Of M.P on 11 July, 2008

Appellant had in January 1993 lodged a rape case, claiming the two men sexually assaulted her. On the basis of her complaint, the accused were arrested and faced the trial.

The complainant, however, retracted during her cross-examination and denied making the charges against the two. She also denied having registered the FIR against them.

The trial court acquitted the men but initiated perjury proceedings and convicted her to three months imprisonment.. The Supreme Court found her guilty of perjury (misleading the court with false evidence) and refused to accept her defence that she was illiterate.the Bench empathised with the two men, saying they had to “face the ignominy of a trial for a serious offence like rape”. “Their acquittal may, to a certain extent, have washed away the stigma, but that is not enough,”

courts should strive harder to tackle the evil of perjury. It has assumed alarming proportions in cases depending on oral evidence and in order to deal with the menace effectively, it is desirable for the courts to use the provision more effectively and frequently.”

Jammu & Kashmir High Court

Sunil Kumar vs State And Another on 14 December, 2018

The petitioner alleged in the complaint that she was subjected to sexual assault and was in love affair withthe petitioner since 2010 having friendly relation and love affair constantly for seven years and have the physical relationship and subsequently agreed tosolemnize the marriage. All the ceremonies were completed. However, subsequently the petitioner allegedly refused to marry with the respondent. It is submitted that respondent No.2 who is elder than the petitioner and is a mature lady developed the relationship with the petitioner and also alleged in the complaint that she used to stay with the petitioner and visited at various places of Himachal Pradesh, Katra and Patnitop. In such circumstances, no offence under Section 376 RPC is made out. Even if it is assumed without admitting this fact that there was friendly relationship between petitioner and respondent No.2 even then from the allegations leveled in the complaint be taken as it, no offence under Section 376 RPC is made out. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled Tilak Raj Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in 2016 (4) SCC 140 has held that the evidence as a whole including the FIR and testimony of the prosecutrix clearly indicates that the story of prosecutrix regarding sexual intercourse on false pretext of marrying her concocted and not believable. It is the admitted case that she was in relationship with the petitioner for the last seven years and the petitioner used to stay overnight at her residence, under these circumstances the offence cannot be said to have been made out because of the reason that from the bare perusal of the complaint it transpires that she was the consenting party, elder than the petitioner. Therefore, the FIR is liable to be quashed.

HELD - " the allegations made in the first information report on the basis of complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. The allegations made in the FIR are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. This FIR is manifestly attended with mala fide intention and has been maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. This petition is allowed and impugned FIR No.50/2017 registered with the Police Station, Ghagwal for commission of offences under Sections 376/506 RPC, is quashed."

Delhi High Court

Anita Suresh vs Union Of India & Ors on 9 July, 2019

The petitioner reported following two incidents dated 07 th July, 2011 in the complaint:-

(i) "Yesterday when I was seated with my colleagues on the 1st floor of the building, Sh. Verma came and commented indicating sexual advances. I cannot for the reasons of modesty bring on papers the filthy language he uses for me."

(ii) "Yesterday in the presence of my staff and other members he asked me to come alone to check the shortcomings of the male toilet when nobody is there and I will follow you soon."

On careful consideration of the record of the inquiry proceedings, this Court is of the view that the complaint dated 08th July, 2011 of the petitioner appears to be false. The complaint dated 08th July, 2011 contains two incidents out of which the first incident was in the presence of the petitioner's colleagues whereas the second incident was in the presence of the staff and other members. During the inquiry proceedings, the petitioner could not give the name of any person present at the time of the incidents. The petitioner was shown the record of the staff persons present on duty on the date of the incident but still she could not recollect the names of any colleague/staff member. It is not believable that the petitioner would not remember the names of any colleague/staff member. The Committee examined all the persons who were on duty on that day but no persons supported the allegations of the petitioner. The petitioner has not mentioned the alleged comments of respondent No.3 in the complaint on the ground of modesty. The petitioner did not even disclose the alleged comments before the Committee. No reason or justification was been given by the petitioner for not disclosing the same before the Committee. The entire complaint of the petitioner appears to be false and has been filed with some ulterior motive.

Held - "There is no merit in this writ petition which is dismissed with cost of Rs.50,000/- to be deposited by the petitioner with the Delhi High Court Advocates Welfare Trust within four weeks.

Respondent No.2 is at liberty to initiate appropriate action against the petitioner for filing false compliant against the respondent no.3 in accordance with law."

Delhi High Court

Mahmood Farooqui vs State (Govt Of Nct Of Delhi) on 25 September, 2017