These simple but efficacious rules of evidence have been recognised for long, and it will be enough to refer' to this Courts decision in Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh v. State of Bombay(1) for the genesis of the doctrine and its development over the years culminating in the present section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The section, with its six explanations, covers almost the whole field, and has admirably served the purpose of the doctrine. But it relates to suits and former suits, and has, in terms, no direct application to a petition for the issue of a high preroga- tive writ. The general principles of res judicata and ,constructive res judicata have however been acted upon in cases of renewed applications for a writ.
Supreme Court of India
Workmen Of Cochin Port Trust vs Board Of Trustees Of The Cochin ... on 5 May, 1978
It is well known that the doctrine of res judicata is codified in section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure but it is not exhaustive. Section 11 generally comes into play in relation to civil suits. But apart from the codified law the doctrine of res judicata or the principle of res judicata has been applied since long in various other kinds of proceedings and situations by Courts in England, India and other countries. The rule of constructive res judicata is engrafted in Explanation IV of section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in many other situations also principles not only of direct res judicata but of constructive res judicata are also applied. If by any judgment or order any matter in issue has been directly and explicity decided the decision operates as res judicata and bars the trial of an identical issue in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. The principle of res judicata also comes into play when by the judgment and order a decision of a particular issue is implicit in it, that is, it must be deemed to have been necessarily decided by implication; then also the principle of res judicata on that issue is directly applicable. When any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in a former proceeding but was not so made, then such a matter in the eye of law, to-avoid multiplicity of litigation and to bring about finality in its decision is deemed to have been constructively in issue and, therefore, is taken as decided.
Supreme Court of India
Jaswant Singh & Anr vs The Custodian Of Evacuee ... on 7 May, 1985
That section provides that no court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court. Explanation IV to that section provides that any matter which might or ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue in such suit. It is well settled that in order to decide the question whether a subsequent proceeding is barred by res judicata it is necessary to examine the question with reference to the (i) forum or the competence of the Court, (ii) parties and their representatives, (iii) matters in issue, (iv) matters which ought to have been made ground for defence or attack in the former suit and (v) the final decision.
Supreme Court of India
Forward Construction Co. & Ors. ... vs Prabhat Mandal (Regd.) Andheri & ... on 26 November, 1985
Explanation IV to s.11 C.P.C. provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming with the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The principle underlying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided.But it is only when the conditions of Explanation VI are satisfied that a decision in the litigation will bind all persons interested in the right litigated and the onus of proving the want of bona fides in respect of the previous litigation is on the party seeking to avoid the decision. The words "public right" have been added in Explanation VI in view of the new s.91 C.P.C. and to prevent multiplicity of litigation in respect of public right. In view of Explanation VI it cannot be disputed that s. 11 applies to public interest litigation as well but it must be proved that the previous litigation was the public interest litigation not by way of a private grievance. It has to be a bonafide litigation in respect of a right which is common and is agitated in common with others.
Supreme Court of India
State Of Uttar Pradesh vs Nawab Hussain on 4 April, 1977
The principle of estoppel per rem judicatam is a rule of evidence. As has been stated in Marginson v. Blackburn Borough council,(1) it may be said to be "the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the reassertion of a cause of action." This doctrine is based on two theories: (i) the finality and conclusiveness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of the community as a matter of public policy, and (ii) the inter- est of the indidual that he should be protected from multi- plication of litigation. It therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopen- ing of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief .on the same cause of action, for other- wise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to con- flicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of actions and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action, and that is why it is necessary for the courts to recognise that a cause of action which results in a judgment must lose its identity and vitality. and merge in the judg- ment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgment, or give rise to another cause of action on the same facts. This is what is known as the general principle of res iudicata.
While observing that the rule of constructive res judicata was "in a sense a somewhat technical or artificial rule prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure", this Court declared the law in the following terms,--
"This rule postulates that if a plea could have been taken by a party in a procceding between him and his opponent, he would not be permitted to take that plea against the same party in a subsequent proceeding which is based on the same cause of action; but basically, even this view is founded on the same considerations of public policy, because if the doctrine of constructive res judicata is not applied to writ proceedings, it would be open. to the party to take one proceeding after another an urge new grounds every time; and that plainly is inconsistent with considerations of public policy to which we have just referred."
It was this other observation which led the High Court to take the view that the question whether the principle of constructive res judicata could be invoked by a party to a subsequent suit on the ground that a plea which might or ought to have been raised in the earlier proceeding but was not so raised therein, was left open. That in turn led the High Court to the conclusion that the principle of constructive res judicata could not be made applicable to a writ petition, and that was why it took the view that it was competent for the plaintiff in this case to. raise an additional plea in the suit even though it was available to him in the writ petition which was filed by him earlier but was not taken. As is obvious, the High Court went wrong in taking that view because the law in regard to the applicability of the principle of constructive res judicata having been clearly laid down in the decision in Devilal Modi's case (supra), .it was not necessary to reiterate it in Gulabchand's case (supra) as it did not arise for consid- eration there. The clarificatory observation of this Court in Gulabchand's case (supra) was thus misunderstood by the High Court in observing that the matter had been "left open"' by this Court.
It is not in controversy before us that the respondent did not raise the plea, in the writ petition which had been filed in the High Court, that by virtue of clause (1) of article 311 of the Constitution he (1)  1 S.C.R. 574. (2)  Supp. 1 S.C.R.172 could not be dismissed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police as he had been appointed by the Inspector General of Police. It is also not in controversy that that was an important plea which was within the knowledge of the re- spondent and could well have been taken in the writ peti- tion, but he contented himself by raising the other pleas that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to meet the Case against him in the departmental inquiry and that the action taken against him was mala fide. It was there- fore not permissible for him to challenge his dismissal, in the subsequent suit, on the other ground that 'he had been dismissed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. That was clearly barred by the principle constructive res judicata and the High Court erred in taking a contrary view.
The appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment of the High 'Court dated March 27, 1968, is set aside and the respondent's suit is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we direct that the parties shall pay and bear their own costs.
Supreme Court of India
Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal & Ors vs Dossibai N. B. Jeejeebhoy on 26 February, 1970
"The object of the doctrine of res judicata is not to fasten upon parties special principles of law as applicable to them inter se, but to ascertain their rights and the facts upon which these rights directly and substantially depend; and to prevent this ascertainment from becoming nugatory by precluding the parties from reopening or recontesting that which has 'been finally decided."
A question relating to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of the Court. If by an erroneous interpretation of the statute the Court holds that it has no jurisdiction, the question would not, in our judgment, operate as res judicata. Similarly by an erroneous decision if the Court assumes jurisdiction which it does. not possess under the statute, the question cannot operate as res judicata between the same parties, whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the same or otherwise. It is true that in determining the application of the rule of res judicata the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment. The matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided-in the earlier proceeding by a competent court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be, reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be questioned a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question law, i.e. the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same for the expression "the matter in issue" in s. 11 Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between the parties, i.e. the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata,for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land.
Supreme Court of India
Canara Bank vs N.G. Subbaraya Setty on 20 April, 2018
Res judicata is, thus, a doctrine of fundamental importance in our legal system, though it is stated to belong to the realm of procedural law, being statutorily embodied in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. However, it is not a mere technical doctrine, but it is fundamental in our legal system that there be an end to all litigation, this being the public policy of Indian law. The obverse side of this doctrine is that, when applicable, if it is not given full effect to, an abuse of process of the Court takes place. However, there are certain notable exceptions to the application of the doctrine. One well known exception is that the doctrine cannot impart finality to an erroneous decision on the jurisdiction of a Court. Likewise, an erroneous judgment on a question of law, which sanctions something that is illegal, also cannot be allowed to operate as res judicata. This case is concerned with the application of the last mentioned exception to the rule of res judicata.
conspectus of the above authorities shows that until the limitation period for filing of an appeal is over, the res remains sub judice. After the limitation period is over, the res decided by the first Court would then become judicata.f the period of limitation for filing an appeal has not yet expired or has just expired, the Court hearing the second proceeding can very well ask the party who has lost the first round whether he intends to appeal the aforesaid judgment. If the answer is yes, then it would be prudent to first adjourn the second proceeding and then stay the aforesaid proceedings, after the appeal has been filed, to await the outcome of the appeal in the first proceeding. If, however, a sufficiently long period has elapsed after limitation has expired, and no appeal has yet been filed in the first proceeding, the Court hearing the second proceeding would be justified in treating the first proceeding as res judicata. No hard and fast rule can be applied. The entire fact circumstance in each case must be looked at before deciding whether to proceed with the second proceeding on the basis of res judicata or to adjourn and/or stay the second proceeding to await the outcome in the first proceeding. Many factors have to be considered before exercising this discretion – for example, the fact that the appeal against the first judgment is grossly belated; or that the said appeal would, in the ordinary course, be heard after many years in the first proceeding; or, the fact that third party rights have intervened, thereby making it unlikely that delay would be condoned in the appeal in the first proceeding. As has been stated, the judicious use of the weapon of stay would, in many cases, obviate a Court of first instance in the second proceeding treating a matter as res judicata only to find that by the time the appeal has reached the hearing stage against the said judgment in the second proceeding, the res becomes sub judice again because of condonation of delay and the consequent hearing of the appeal in the first proceeding. This would result in setting aside the trial Court judgment in the second proceeding, and a de novo hearing on merits in the second proceeding commencing on remand, thereby wasting the Court’s time and dragging the parties into a second round of litigation on the merits of the case.
In strictness, therefore, the ratio decidendi of Mathura Prasad’s case is confined to the issue of jurisdiction of the Court but is equally well-settled that the obiter dicta of their Lordships is entitled to the greatest respect and weight and is indeed binding if it can be found that they intended to lay down a principle of law. The issue, therefore, is as to what else, apart from the ratio, was sought to be laid down by the Supreme Court in this case. The very closely guarded language used by their Lordships in the body of the judgment leads me to conclude that they wished to confine their observations within the narrowest limits. The expression used (which is sought to be extended on behalf of the respondent) is “a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties to a previous suit.” It is very significant that their Lordships, with their meticulous precision of language, have no where laid down in the judgment that a pure question of law can never be res judicata between the parties. Indeed it has been said to the contrary in terms. The emphasis, therefore, in the expression abovesaid is on the fact that such a pure question of law must be unrelated to the rights of the parties. It stands noticed that a decision by a Court on a question of law cannot be absolutely dissociated from the decision on the facts on which the right is founded. Consequently what was exactly to be connoted by the expression “a pure question of law unrelated to the rights of the parties” was itself expounded upon by their Lordships. Without intending to be exhaustive, the Court has indicated specifically the exceptional cases in which special considerations apply for excluding them from the ambit of the general principle of res judicata. The principle of law which their Lordships herein have reiterated is that a pure question of law including the interpretation of a statute will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. To this salutary rule, four specific exceptions are indicated. Firstly, the obvious one, that when the cause of action is different, the rule of res judicata would not be attracted. Secondly, where the law has, since the earlier decision, been altered by a competent authority. Thirdly, where the earlier decision between the parties related to the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceedings, the same would not be allowed to assume the status of a special rule of law applicable to the parties and therefore, the matter would not be res judicata. Fourthly, where the earlier decision declared valid a transaction which is patently prohibited by law, that is to say, it sanctifies a glaring illegality.” On facts, the majority judgment of the Full Bench held that the earlier decision inter parties was res judicata as it was on a question of law which was not unrelated to the rights of the parties.
(1) The general rule is that all issues that arise directly and substantially in a former suit or proceeding between the same parties are res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding between the same parties. These would include issues of fact, mixed questions of fact and law, and issues of law.
(2) To this general proposition of law, there are certain exceptions when it comes to issues of law:
(i) Where an issue of law decided between the same parties in a former suit or proceeding relates to the jurisdiction of the Court, an erroneous decision in the former suit or proceeding is not res judicata in a subsequent suit or proceeding between the same parties, even where the issue raised in the second suit or proceeding is directly and substantially the same as that raised in the former suit or proceeding. This follows from a reading of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure itself, for the Court which decides the suit has to be a Court competent to try such suit. When read with Explanation (I) to Section 11, it is obvious that both the former as well as the subsequent suit need to be decided in Courts competent to try such suits, for the “former suit” can be a suit instituted after the first suit, but which has been decided prior to the suit which was instituted earlier. An erroneous decision as to the jurisdiction of a Court cannot clothe that Court with jurisdiction where it has none. Obviously, a Civil Court cannot send a person to jail for an offence committed under the Indian Penal Code. If it does so, such a judgment would not bind a Magistrate and/or Sessions Court in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties, where the Magistrate sentences the same person for the same offence under the Penal Code. Equally, a Civil Court cannot decide a suit between a landlord and a tenant arising out of the rights claimed under a Rent Act, where the Rent Act clothes a special Court with jurisdiction to decide such suits. As an example, under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, the Small Causes Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide proceedings between a landlord and a tenant in respect of rights which arise out of the Bombay Rent Act, and no other Court has jurisdiction to embark upon the same. In this case, even though the Civil Court, in the absence of the statutory bar created by the Rent Act, would have jurisdiction to decide such suits, it is the statutory bar created by the Rent Act that must be given effect to as a matter of public policy. (See, Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios & Anr., (1981) 2 SCR 466 at
An erroneous decision clothing the Civil Court with jurisdiction to embark upon a suit filed by a landlord against a tenant, in respect of rights claimed under the Bombay Rent Act, would, therefore, not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit filed before the Small Causes Court between the same parties in respect of the same matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit.
(ii) An issue of law which arises between the same parties in a subsequent suit or proceeding is not res judicata if, by an erroneous decision given on a statutory prohibition in the former suit or proceeding, the statutory prohibition is not given effect to. This is despite the fact that the matter in issue between the parties may be the same as that directly and substantially in issue in the previous suit or proceeding. This is for the reason that in such cases, the rights of the parties are not the only matter for consideration (as is the case of an erroneous interpretation of a statute inter parties), as the public policy contained in the statutory prohibition cannot be set at naught. This is for the same reason as that contained in matters which pertain to issues of law that raise jurisdictional questions. We have seen how, in Natraj Studios (supra), it is the public policy of the statutory prohibition contained in Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act that has to be given effect to. Likewise, the public policy contained in other statutory prohibitions, which need not necessarily go to jurisdiction of a Court, must equally be given effect to, as otherwise special principles of law are fastened upon parties when special considerations relating to public policy mandate that this cannot be done.
(iii) Another exception to this general rule follows from the matter in issue being an issue of law different from that in the previous suit or proceeding. This can happen when the issue of law in the second suit or proceeding is based on different facts from the matter directly and substantially in issue in the first suit or proceeding. Equally, where the law is altered by a competent authority since the earlier decision, the matter in issue in the subsequent suit or proceeding is not the same as in the previous suit or proceeding, because the law to be interpreted is different.
Supreme Court of India
Iftikhar Ahmed And Others vs Syed Meharban Ali And Others on 26 February, 1974
Now it is settled by a large number of decisions that for a judgment o operate as res judicata between or among co- defendants, it is necessary to establish that (1) there was a conflict of interest between codefendants; (2) that it was necessary to decide the conflict in order to give the relief which the plaintiff claimed in the suit; and (3) that the court actually decided the question.
"It may be added that the doctrine may apply even though the party, against whom it is sought to enforce it, "I did not in the previous suit think fit to enter an appearance and contest the question. But to this the qualification must be added that, if such a party is to be bound by a previous judgment it must be proved clearly that he had or must be deemed to have had notice that the relevant question was in issue and would have to be decided".
We see no reason why a previous decision should not operate as res judicata between co-plaintiffs if all these conditions are mutatis mutandis satisfied. In considering any question of res judicata we have to bear in mind the statement of the Board in Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramanandan Prasad Narayan Singh(2) that the rule of res judicata "while founded on ancient precedent is dictated by a wisdom which is for all time' and that the application of the rule by the courts "should be influenced by no technical considerations of form, but by matter of substance within the limits.,allowed by law.
"The raison detre of the rule is to confer finality on decisions arrived at by competent Courts between interested parties after genuine contest; and to allow persons who had deliberately chosen a position to reprobate it and to blow hot now when they were blowing cold before would be completely to ignore the whole foundation of the rule."
Shebaitship, property dedicated to an idol vests in it in an ideal sense only; ex necessitas, the possession and management has to be entrusted to some human agent. Such an agent of the idol is known as shebait in Northern India. The legal character of a shebait cannot be defined with precision and exactitude. Broadly described, he is the human ministrant and custodian of the idol, its earthly spokesman, its authorised representative entitled to deal with all its temporal affairs and to manage its property. As regards the administration of the debutter, his position is analogous to that of a trustee; yet, he is not precisely in the position of a trustee in the English sense, because under Hindu Law, property absolutely dedicated to an idol, vests in the idol, and not in the shebait. Although the debutter never vests in the shebait, yet, peculiarly enough, almost in every case, the shebait has a right to a part of the usufruct, the mode of enjoyment; and the amount of the usufruct depending again on usage and custom, if not devised by the founder. Shebaitship being property, it devolves like any other species of heritable property. It follows that, where the founder does not dispose of the shebaiti rights in the endowment created by him, the shebaitship devolves on the heirs of the founder according to Hindu Law, if no usage or custom of a different nature is shown to exist, Profulla Chrone Requitte v. Satya Chorone Requitte, AIR 1979 SC 1682 (1686): (1979) 3 SCC 409: (1979) 3 SCR 431.
(ii) Shebaitship is in the nature of immovable property heritable by the widow of the last male holder unless there is an usage or custom of a different nature in cases where the founder has not disposed of the shebaiti right in the endowment created by him. Shebaitship is a property which is heritable. The devolution of the office of shebait depends on the terms of the deed or the Will or on the endowment or the act by which the deity was installed and property consecrated or given to the deity
Supreme Court of India
Alka Gupta vs Narender Kumar Gupta on 27 September, 2010
Res judicata means `a thing adjudicated' that is an issue that is finally settled by judicial decision. The Code deals with res judicata in section 11, relevant portion of which is extracted below (excluding Explanations I to VIII):
"11. Res judicata.--No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court"
Section 11 of the Code, on an analysis requires the following essential requirements to be fulfilled, to apply the bar of res judicata to any suit or issue:
(i) The matter must be directly and substantially in issue in the former suit and in the later suit.
(ii) The prior suit should be between the same parties or persons claiming under them.
(iii) Parties should have litigated under the same title in the earlier suit.
(iv) The matter in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided in the first suit.
(v) The court trying the former suit must have been competent to try particular issue in question.
To define and clarify the principle contained in Section 11 of the Code, eight Explanations have been provided. Explanation I states that the expression `former suit' refers to a suit which had been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto. Explanation II states that the competence of a court shall be determined irrespective of whether any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such court. Explanation III states that the matter directly and substantially in issue in the former suit, must have been alleged by one party or either denied or admitted expressly or impliedly by the other party. Explanation IV provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. The principle of constructive res judicata emerges from Explanation IV when read with Explanation III both of which explain the concept of "matter directly and substantially in issue".
15. Explanation III clarifies that a matter is directly and substantially in issue, when it is alleged by one party and denied or admitted (expressly or impliedly) by the other. Explanation IV provides that where any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence or attack in the former suit, even if was not actually set up as a ground of attack or defence, shall be deemed and regarded as having been constructively in issue directly and substantially in the earlier suit. Therefore, even though a particular ground of defence or attack was not actually taken in the earlier suit, if it was capable of being taken in the earlier suit, it became a bar in regard to the said issue being taken in the second suit in view of the principle of constructive res judicata. Constructive res judicata deals with grounds of attack and defence which ought to have been raised, but not raised, whereas Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code relates to reliefs which ought to have been claimed on the same cause of action but not claimed. The principle underlying Explanation IV to Section 11 becomes clear from Greenhalgh v. Mallard [1947 (2) All ER 257] thus:
"....it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.
(emphasis supplied) In Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra [1990 (2) SCC 715], a Constitution Bench of this Court reiterated the principle of constructive res judicata after referring to Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal [1986 (1) SCC 100) thus:
"an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had decided as incidental to or essentially connected with subject matter of the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence."
The Code enumerates the circumstances in which a civil suit can be dismissed without trial. We may refer to them (not exhaustive):
(a) Dismissal as a consequence of rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code in the following grounds : (i) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (ii) where the relief in the plaint is undervalued and plaintiff fails to correct the valuation within the time fixed; (iii) where the court fee paid is insufficient and plaintiff fails to make good the deficit within the time fixed by court: (iv) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by law; (v) where it is not filed in duplicate and where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Order 7 Rule 9 of the Code.
(b) Dismissal under Order 9 Rule 2 or Rule 3 or Rule 5 or Rule 8 for non- service of summary or non-appearance or failure to apply for fresh summons.
(c) Dismissal under Order 11 Rule 21 for non-compliance with an order to answer interrogatories, or for discovery or inspection of documents.
(d) Dismissal under Order 14 Rule 2(2) where issues both of law and fact arise in the same suit and the court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on an issue of law only and it tries such issue relating to jurisdiction of the court or a bar to a suit created by any law for the time being in force first and dismisses the suit if the decision on such preliminary issue warrants the same.
(e) Dismissal under Order 15 Rule 1 of the Code when at the first hearing of the suit it appears that the parties are not at issue on any question of law or fact.
(f) Dismissal under Order 15 Rule 4 of the Code for failure to produce evidence.
(g) Dismissal under Order 23 Rules 1 and 3 of the Code when a suit is withdrawn or settled out of court.
The following provisions provide for expeditious disposal in a summary manner :
(i) Order V Rule 5 of the Code requires the court to determine, at the time of issuing the summons, whether it shall be for the settlement of issues only, or for the final disposal of the suit (and the summons shall have to contain a direction accordingly). In suits to be heard by a court of small causes, the summons shall be for the final disposal of the suit.
(ii) Order 15 Rule 3 of the Code provides where the parties are at issue on some question of law or of fact, and issues have been framed by the court as hereinbefore provided, if the court is satisfied that no further argument or evidence than the parties can at once adduce is required upon such of the issues as may be sufficient for the decision of the suit, and that no injustice will result from proceeding with the suit forthwith, the court may proceed to determine such issues, and, if the finding thereon is sufficient for the decision, may pronounce judgment accordingly, whether the summons has been issued for the settlement of issues only or for the final disposal of the suit. (But where the summons has been issued for the settlement of issues only, such a summary course could be adopted only where the parties or their pleaders are present and none of them objects to such a course).
(iii) Order 37 Rule 1 read with Rules 2& 3 of the relating to summary suits.
19. But where the summons have been issued for settlement of issues, and a suit is listed for consideration of a preliminary issue, the court cannot make a roving enquiry into the alleged conduct of the plaintiff, tenability of the claim, the strength and validity and contents of documents, without a trial and on that basis dismiss a suit. A suit cannot be shortcircuited by deciding issues of fact merely on pleadings and documents produced without a trial.