Supreme Court of India
Frank Anthony Public School ... vs Union Of India & Ors on 17 November, 1986
The leading case is that a Consti- tution bench of seven judges, In re The Kerala Education Bill  SCR 995. In an oft quoted passage S.R. Das, Chief Justice, explained the content of Art. 30(1) as fol- lows:
"The first point to note is that the article gives certain rights not only to religious minorities but also to linguistic minorities. In the next place, the right conferred on such minorities is to establish educational insti- tutions of their choice. It does not say that minorities based on religion should establish educational institutions for teaching religion only, or that linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational insti- tutions for teaching their language only. What the article says and means is that the religious and the linguistic minorities should have the right to establish educational institutions of their choice. There is no limitation placed on the subjects to be taught in such educational institutions. As such minorities will ordinarily desire that their children should be brought up properly and efficiently and be eligible for higher university education and go out in the world fully equipped with such intellectual attain- ments as will make them fit for entering the public services, educational institutions of their choice will necessarily include institu- tions imparting general secular education also. In other words, the article leaves it to their choice to establish such educational institutions as will serve both purposes, namely, the purpose of conserving their reli- gion, language or culture, and also the pur- pose of giving a thorough, good general educa- tion to their children. The next thing to note is that the article, in terms, gives all minorities whether based on religion or lan- guage, two rights, namely, the right to estab- lish and the right to administer educational institutions of their choice. The key to the understanding of the true meaning and implica- tion of the article under consideration are the words "of their own choice". It is said that the dominant words is "choice" and the content of that article is as wide as the choice of the particular minority community may make it. The ambit of the rights conferred by Art. 30(1) has, therefore, to be determined on a consideration of the matter from the points of view of the educational institutions themselves."
Educational Institutions, it was said, could be classi-
fied into three categories(1) those which did not seek aid or recognition from the State (2) those which sought aid and (3) those which wanted recognition only but not aid. It was said that the institutions of the first category were out- side the scope of the Kerala Education Bill the question of vires of whose provisions was referred to the court in the reference. In the second category of schools, it was pointed out, there were two classes, those entitled to receive grants under the Constitution and those which were not entitled to any grant under any provision of the Constitu- tion. but, nevertheless, sought aid. Under Art. 337 of the Constitution. Anglo-Indian Schools which were receiving the grant upto March, 31, 1948 were entitled to receive the grants for a period of ten years subject to a graded trien- nial diminution. Anglo-
Indian Schools which were receiving grants. but not more than what they were entitled to receive under Art. 337 of the Constitution. came within the first class of the second category and it was held that their Constitutional right to receive the grant could not be subjected to any restrictions as those sought to be imposed by the provisions of the Kerala Education Bill. Any attempt to impose any such re- strictions on Anglo-Indian Schools which received no more aid than that to which they were entitled to receive under the Constitution would infringe their fights under Art. 337 and under Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. We may straight away mention here that the period of ten years stipulated by Art. 337 having expired there is now no question of Anglo- Indian Schools being entitled to any special protection. Shri Frank Anthony sought to argue that what was truly decided by the Court was that any condition imposed for granting recognition to unaided minority Educational Insti- tutions would infringe on the right of administration grant- ed to them by Art. 30(1) of the Constitution. We do not read the decision as laying down any such proposition. What was decided was that Anglo-Indian Schools which were entitled to receive grants under the Constitution and which received no more aid than that to which they were entitled under the Constitution could not be subjected to stringent terms as fresh or additional conditions precedent to enable then to obtain the grant. Such conditions would infringe their fights under Art. 337 and violate their fights under Art. 30(1). To place an interpretation as that suggested by Shri Anthony would be subversive of the right guaranteed by Art. 30(1) since it would make the extent of the right depend on the receipt or non-receipt of aid. If one thing is clear. it is this that the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Art. 30(1) cannot be surrendered, wholly or partly. and the authorities cannot make the grant of aid conditional on the surrender of a part of the Fundamental Right. In the very case it was observed:
"Recognition and grant of aid, says Shri G.S. Pathak. is the governmental function and. therefore. the State cannot impose terms as condition precedent to the grant of recogni- tion or aid which will be violative of Art. 30(1). According to the statement of case filed by the State of Kerala. every Christian school in the State is aided by the State. Therefore. the conditions imposed by the said Bill on aided institutions established and administered by minority communities. like the Christians. including the Anglo-Indian commu- nity. will lead to the closing down of all these aided schools unless they are agreeable to surrender their fundamental right of man- agement. No educational institution can in actual practice be carried on without aid from the State and if they will not get it unless they surrender their fights they will, by compulsion of financial necessities, be compelled to give up their fights under Art. 30(1). The legislative powers conferred on the legislative of the States by Arts. 245 and 246 are subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and certainly to the provisions of Part III which confers fundamental rights which are, therefore, binding on the State legislature. The State legislature cannot, it is clear, disregard or override those provi- sions merely by employing indirect methods of achieving exactly the same result. Even the Legislature cannot do indirectly what it certainly cannot do directly."
The learned Chief Justice then proceeded to consider the case of the Anglo-Indian Schools which received aid in excess of that granted by Art. 337 and the other minority schools which received aid from the Government. One of the principal submissions there was that the gist of the right of administration of a school was the power of appointment, control and dismissal of teachers and other staff and that under the Kerala Education Bill such power of management was practically taken away. Dealing with the submission the learned Chief Justice observed, "The right to administer cannot obviously include the right to maladminister. The minor- ity cannot surely ask for aid or recognition for an educational institution run by them in unhealthy surroundings, without any competent teachers possessing any semblance of qualifi- cation, and which does not maintain even a fair standard of teaching or which teaches matters subversive of the welfare of the scholars. It stands to reason, then, that the constitutional right to administer an educa- tional institution of their choice does not necessarily militate against the claim of the State to insist that in order to grant aid the State may prescribe reasonable regulations to ensure the excellence of the institutions to be aided".
Proceeding to consider whether the various clauses of the Bill merely prescribed reasonable regulations or condi- tions for the grant of aid, the Court observed that clauses 7, 10, 11(1), 12(1)(2)(3) and (5) might easily be regarded as reasonable regulations or conditions for the grant of aid. We may mention here that Clause 10 of the Bill required the Government to prescribe the qualifications to be pos- sessed by persons for appointments as teachers in Government schools and in private schools. The procedure for selection of teachers in Government schools and aided schools was laid down in Clause 11. Clause 12 prescribed the conditions of service of the teachers of aided schools, obviously intended to afford some security of tenure to the teachers of aided schools. It provided that the scales of pay applicable to the teachers of Government schools shall apply to all the teachers of aided schools. Sub-Clause (4) of C1. 12 which was not mentioned by the Court as a clause which could easily be regarded as reasonable regulation, provided that no teacher of an aided school shall be dismissed, removed, reduced in rank or suspended by the Manager without the previous sanction of the authorised officer. Clause 11 sub- clause (2) was another clause which the court was unable to readily identify as reasonable. In regard of Clauses 9, 11 and 12 the court while holding that they were 'serious inroads on the right of administration' and that they came 'perilously near violating their right', nevertheless held, "but considering that these provisions are applicable to all educational institutions and that the impugned parts of Cls. 9,11 and 12 are designed to give protection and security to the ill paid teachers who are engaged in rendering service to the nation and protect the backward classes, we are prepared as at present advised, to treat these clauses 9, 11 (2) and 12(4) as permissible regulations which the State may impose on the minorities as a condition for granting aid to their educational institutions."
In Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai and others v. State of Bombay and another,  3 SCR 837 the Court summarised the decision in the' reference in regard to the Kerala Education Bill and proceeded to observe:
"The right established by Art. 30(1) is a fundamental right declared in terms absolute. Unlike the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by Art. 19, it is not subject to reasonable restrictions. It is intended to be a real right for the protection of the minorities in the matter of setting up of educational insti- tutions of their own choice. The right is intended to be effective and is not to be whittled down by so-called regulative measures conceived in the interest not of the minority educational institution, but of the public or the nation as a whole. If every order Which while maintaining the formal character of a minority institution destroys the power of administration is held justifiable because it is in the public or national interest, though not in its interest as an educational institution, the right guaran- teed by Art. 30(1) will be but a "teasing illusion", a promise of unreality. Regulations which may lawfully be imposed either by legis- lative or executive action as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed to making the institution while retaining its character as a minority institu- tion effective as an educational institution. Such regulation must satisfy a dual test--the test of reasonableness, and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution and is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or other persons who resort to it."
In State of Kerala etc. v. Mother Provincial etc.,  1 SCR 734. It was conceded by the petitioners representing the minority communities (as indeed they were bound to do having regard to the authorities of the Court) that the State or the University to which these institutions were affiliated may prescribed standards of teaching and the Scholastic efficiency expected from colleges. It was also conceded that to a certain extent conditions of employment of teachers, hygiene and physical training of students can be regulated. While administration was explained "management of the af- fairs" of the institution and it was said that this manage- ment should be free of control so that the institution could be moulded in accordance with the management's ideas of how the interests of the community in general and the institu- tion in particular would be best served. It was pointed out that there was an exception to this and it was that the standards of education were not a part of management as such. It was said, "These standards concern the body politic and. are dictated by considerations of the advance- ment of the country and its people. Therefore, if universities establish syllabi for examina- tions they must be followed, subject however to special subjects which the institutions may seek to teach, and to certain extent the State may also regulate the conditions of employment of teachers and the health and hygiene of students. Such regulations do not bear direct- ly upon management as such although they may indirectly affect it. Yet the right of the State to regulate education, educational standards and allied matters cannot be denied. The minority institutions cannot be allowed to fail below the standards of excellence expect- ed of educational institutions. or under the guise of exclusive right of management, to decline to follow the general pattern. While the manage- ment must be left to them, they may be com-
pelled to keep in step with others."
One of the questions in the case related to the validity of Section, 56 sub-sections (2) and (4). Section 56(2) provided that no teacher of a private college should to dismissed, removed or reduced in rank without the previous sanction of the Vice-Chancellor or placed under suspension for a contin- uous period exceeding fifteen days without such previous sanction. Section 56(4) provided that a teacher against whom disciplinary action was taken shall have a right of appeal to the Syndicate. It was held that these provisions clearly took away the disciplinary action from the governing body and the managing council and conferred it on the University. The view of the High Court that Subsections (2) and (4) were ultra vires Article 30(1) of the Constitutions in respect of minority institutions was upheld.
The Ahemedabad St. Xaviers College Society & Anr., v. State of Gujarat & Anr.,  1 SCR 173 was the decision of a Nine Judge Constitution Bench. Ray, C.J. with whom Palekar, J. agreed stated in his opinion, after referring to the State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial etc. (supra) as follows:
"Affiliation of minority institutions is intended to ensure the growth and excellence of their children and other students in the academic field. Affiliation mainly pertains to the academic and educational character of the institution. Therefore, measures which will regulate the courses of study, the qualifica- tions and appointment of teachers, the condi- tions of employment of teachers, the health and hygiene of students, facilities for li- braries and laboratories are all comprised in matters germane to affiliation of minority institutions. These regulatory measures for affiliation are for uniformity, efficiency and excellence in educational courses and do not violate any fundamental right of the minority institutions under Article 30."
Section 51A of the Act which was impugned in that case provided that no member of the teaching and non-teaching staff of an affiliated college shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except with the approval of the Vice- Chancellor: Ray, C.J. held that the provision could not be said to be permissive regulatory measure inasmuch it con- ferred arbitrary power on the Vice-Chancellor to take away the right of the minority institutions. It could not, therefore, be applied to minority institutions. Section 52A of the Act contemplated reference of any dispute connected with the conditions of service, between the governing body and any member. of the teaching and non-teaching staff of an affili- ated college to an Arbitration Tribunal consisting of one member nominated by the governing body, one member nominated by the affected member and an umpire appointed by the Vice- Chancellor. This provision was also held to be inapplicable to minority institutions as the references to arbitration would introduce an area of litigious controversy in educa- tional institutions and displace the domestic jurisdiction of the governing body. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. speaking for himself and Alagiri Swami, 3., agreed with the conclusions of Ray, C.J. and made some observations of his own. He observed:
"The right under Art. 30 cannot be exercised in vacue. Nor would it be right to refer to affiliation or recognition as privileges granted by the State. In a democratic system of Government with emphasis an education and enlightenment of its citizens, there must be elements which give protection to them. The meaningful exercise of the right under Art. 30(1) would and must necessarily involve recognition of the secular education imparted by the minority institutions without which the right will be a mere husk. This Court has so far consistently struck down all attempts to make affiliation or recognition on terms tentamount to surrender of its rights under Art. 30(1) as abridging or taking away those rights. Again as without affiliation there can be no meaningful exercise of the right under Art. 30(1), the affiliation to be given should be consistent with that right, nor can it indirectly try to achieve what it cannot directly do."
Khanna, J. pointed out, "The idea of giving special fights to the minorities is not to have a kind of a privileged or pampered section of the population but to give to the minor- ities a sense of security and a feeling of confidence." Later dealing with the 'scope' and 'ambit' of the right guaranteed by Art. 30(1), he said:
"The clause confers a right on all minorities, whether they are based on religion or lan- guage, to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The right con- ferred by the clause is in absolute terms and is not subject to restrictions as in the case of rights conferred by Article 19 of the Constitution. The right of the minorities to administer educational institutions does not, however, prevent the making of reasonable regulations in respect of those institutions, The regula- tions have necessarily to be made in the interest of the institution as a minority educational institution. They have to be so designed as to make it an effective vehicle for imparting education. The right to adminis- ter educational institutions can plainly not include the right to maladminister. Regula- tions can be made to prevent the housing of an educational institution in unhealthy surround- ings as also to prevent the setting up or continuation of an educational institution without qualified teachers. The State can prescribe regulations to ensure the excellence of the institution. Prescription of standards for educational institutions does not militate against the right of the minority to adminis- ter the institutions. Regulations made in the true interests of efficiency of instruction, discipline, health. sanitation, morality, public order and the like may undoubtedly be imposed. Such regulations are not restrictions on the substance of the right which is guaran- teed: they secure the proper functioning of the institution, in matters educational (see observations of Shah J. in Rev. Sidhajbhai Sabhai, supra p. 850). Further, as observed by Hidayatullah CJ., in the case of very Rev. Mother provincial (supra) the standards con- cern the body politic and are dictated by considerations of the advancement of the country and its people. Therefore, if univer- sities establish syllabi for examinations they must be followed, subject however to special subjects which the institutions may seek to teach, and to a certain extent the State may also regulate the conditions of employment of teachers and the health and hygiene of stu- dents. Such regulations do not bear directly upon management as such although they may indirectly affect it. Yet the right of the State to regulate education, educational standards and allied matters cannot be denied. The minority institutions cannot be allowed to fail below the standards of excellence expect- ed of educational institutions, or under the guise of exclusive right of management, to decline to follow the general pattern. While the management must be left to them, they may be compelled to keep in step with others.
It is, in my opinion, permissible to make regulations for ensuring the regular payment of salaries before a particular date of the month. Regulations may well provide that the funds of the institution should be spent for the purposes of education or for the betterment of the institution and not for extraneous purposes. Regulations may also contain provisions to prevent the diversion of funds of institutions to the pockets of those incharge of management or their embezzlement in any other manner. Provisions for audit of the accounts of the institution would be permissible regulation. Likewise, regulations may provide that no antinational activity would be permitted in the educational institu- tions and that those employed as members of the staff should not have been guilty of any activities against the national interest. Minorities are as much part of the nation as the majority, and anything that impinges upon national interest must necessarily in its ultimate operation affect the interests of all those who inhibit this vast land irrespective of the fact whether they belong to the majori- ty or minority sections of the population. It is, therefore, as much in the interest of minorities as that of the majority to ensure that the protection afforded to minority institutions is not used as a cloak for doing something which is subversive of national interests. Regulations to prevent antinational activities in educational institutions can, therefore, be considered to be reasonable. A regulation which is designed to prevent maladministration of an educational institution cannot be said to offend clause (1) of article 30. At the same time it has to be ensured that under the power of making regulations nothing is done as would detract from the character of the institution as a minority educational institution or which would impinge upon the rights of the minori- ties to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The right con- ferred by article 30(1) is intended to be real and effective and not a mere pious and ab- stract sentiment; it is a promise of reality and not a teasing illusion. Such a right cannot be allowed to be whittled down by any measure masquerading as a regulation. As observed by this Court in the case of Rev. Sidhajbhai Singh (supra, regulations which may lawfully be imposed either by legislative or executive action as a condition of receiving grant or of recognition must be directed to making the institution while retaining its character as minority institution effective as an educational insti- tution. Such regulation must satisfy a dual test-the test of reasonableness, and the test that it is regulative of the educational character of the institution and is conducive to making the institution an effective vehicle of education for the minority community or Other persons who resort to it."
Dealing with the right of the management of a minority educational institution to exercise disciplinary control over the teachers, he observed:
"Although disciplinary control over the teach- ers of a minority educational institution would be with the governing council, regula- tions, in my opinion, can be made for ensuring proper conditions of service of the teachers and for securing a fair procedure in the matter of disciplinary action against the teachers. Such provisions which are calculated to safeguard the interest of teach- ers would result in security of tenure and this inevitably attract competent persons for the posts of teachers. Such a provision would also eliminate a potential cause of frustra- tion amongst the teachers. Regulations made for this purpose should be considered to be in the interest of minority educational institu- tions and as such they would not violate article 30(1)."
Supreme Court of India
St. Stephen'S College vs University Of Delhi on 6 December, 1991
Bench: M.H. Kania, K.J. Shetty, N.M. Kasliwal, M. Fathima Beevi, Y. Dayal
In State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society ( 1955 (1) SCR 568 : 1954 AIR(SC) 561) the concerned school known as Bernes High School at Deolali in Nasik District in the State of Bombay was recognised as that of belonging to Anglo-Indian community whose mother tongue is English. There was thus little difficulty for the Court to accept the claim of the Anglo- Indian School that it was a linguistic minority institution entitled to protection under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. In Sidhajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay ( 1963 (3) SCR 837 : 1963 AIR(SC) 540) this Court was concerned with a Training College for teachers, known as the "Mary Brown Memorial Training College", at Borsad, District Kaira. The cost of maintaining the training college was met out of donations received from the Irish Presbyterian Mission, fee from scholars and grant-in-aid under the Education Code of the State Government. The College and other forty-two primary schools are run for the benefit of the religious denomination of the United Church of Northern India and Indian Christians generally, though admission is not denied to students belonging to other communities. The Training College was therefore, held to have been established and administered by the Christian minority. In Rev. Father W. Proost v. State of Bihar ( 1969 (2) SCR 73 : 1969 AIR(SC) 465) there was again no serious dispute that the institution concerned i.e. St. Xavier's College was founded by Jesuits of Ranchi, who were a Christian minority. In Gandhi Faiz-E-Am-College, Shahjahanpur v. University of Agra ( 1965 (2) SCC 283 ) the appellant was a registered society formed by the members of the Muslim community at Shahjahanpur. It was running the G.F. College. The management claimed protection of Article 30(1) against interference by the Agra University. The Court proceeded on the basis that the community ranks as a minority in the country and the educational institution run by it has been found to be what may loosely be called a 'minority' institution, within the constitutional compass of Article 30. This conclusion was reached on a rapid glance at the evolution of the institution. In D. A. V. College, Jullundur v. State of Punjab ( 1971 (2) SCC 269 ), the College established by Arya Samaj in the State of Punjab claimed protection under Articles 29(1) and 30(1) of the Constitution. It was conceded by the State of Punjab that the Hindus of Punjab are a religious minority in the State though they may not be so in relation to the entire country. The claim of Arya Samaj to be a linguistic minority was, however, contested. This Court observed that linguistic minority for the purpose of Article 30(1) is one which must at least have a separate spoken language, but it is not necessary that that language should also have a distinct script of its own. The sections of people who speak a language which has no script will also be a linguistic minority entitled to protection of Article 30(1). Since Arya Samaj have a distinct script of their own, namely Devangri, this Court held that they are entitled to invoke the right guaranteed under Article 29(1) because they are a section of citizens having a distinct script. They are also held entitled to the right under Article 30(1) because of their being a religious minority in the State of Punjab. It was also observed that the religious or linguistic minorities need not be so in relation to the entire population of the country and it is enough if they are so in relation to the particular legislation or the State concerned. After referring to the history of Arya Samaj, it was stated that though the Hindu community is a majority community in the whole of India, the Arya Samaj which comprises members of the Hindu community, is a religious minority in Punjab and that they are entitled to claim the right under Articles 29(1) and 30(1) since the College was established and administered by that religious minority with a script of its own
21. In a more recent case A. P. Christian Medical Educational Society v. Government of A. P. ( 1986 (2) SCC 667 : 1986 (2) SCR 749) the appellant was a registered society. It claimed to have established and administered a medical college as a Christian Minorities Educational Institution. It went on admitting students for the medical college and claimed protection under Article 30(1). The State Government refused permission to establish the College. The University also refused affiliation. When the matter came before this Court, it was observed that the government, the University and ultimately the Court have the undoubted right to pierce the 'minority veil' and discover whether there is lurking behind it no minority at all and in any case no minority institution. The minority institutions must be educational institutions of the minorities in truth and in reality and not mere masked phantoms. It was emphasised that what is important and what is imperative is that there must exist some real positive index to enable the institution to be identified as an educational institution of the minorities
22. In Chikkala Samuel v. District Educational Officer Hyderabad 1982 AIR(SC) 64 : (1982) 1 Andh LT 50 : (1981) 2 Andh WR 457) the Andhra a Pradesh High Court observed that minority institution imparting general secular education in order to claim the benefit of Article 30(1) must show that it serves or promotes in some manner, the interest of the minority community or a considerable section thereof. Without such proof, it was said that there would be no nexus between the institution and the minority as such
23. In Rajershi Memorial Basic Training School v. State of Kerala 1973 AIR(Ker) 87 : 1973 Ker(LJ) 76 : 1972 Ker LT 920) the Kerala High Court said that the mere fact that the school was founded by a person belonging to a particular religious persuasion is not at all conclusive on the question. The petitioner has to prove by production of satisfactory evidence that the school in question was one established and administered by a minority whether based on religion or language
1. It was contended that St. Stephen's College after being affiliated to the Delhi University has lost its minority character. The argument was based on some of the provisions in the Delhi University Act and the Ordinances made thereunder. It was said that the students are admitted to the University and not to the College as such. But we find no substance in the contention. In the first place, it may be stated that the State or any instrumentality of the State cannot deprive the character of the institution, founded by a minority community by compulsory affiliation since Article 30(1) is a special right to minorities to establish educational institutions of their choice. The minority institution has a distinct identity and the right to administer with continuance of such identity cannot be denied by coercive action. Any such coercive action would be void being contrary to the constitutional guarantee. The right to administer is the right to conduct and manage the affairs of the institution. This right is exercised by a body of persons in whom the founders have faith and confidence. Such a management body of the institution cannot be displaced or reorganised if the right is to be recognised and maintained. Reasonable regulations however, are permissible but regulations should be of regulatory nature and not of abridgment of the right guaranteed under Article 30(1)
"54. The minorities whether based on religion or language have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The administration of educational institutions of their choice under Article 30(1) means 'management of the affairs of the institutions. This management must be free from control so that the founder or their nominees can mould the institution as they think fit, and in accordance with their ideas of how the interests of the community in general and the institution in particular will be best served. But the standard of education are not a part of the management as such. The standard concerns the body politic and is governed by considerations of the advancement of the country and its people. Such regulations do not bear directly upon management although they may indirectly of affect it. The state, therefore has the right to regulate the standard of education and allied matters. Minority institutions cannot be permitted to fall below the standards of excellence expected of educational institutions. They cannot decline to follow the general pattern of education under the guise of exclusive right of management. While the management must be left to them, they may be compelled to keep in step with others. There is a wealth of authority on these principles. See : State of Bombay Education Society, ( 1955 (1) SCR 568 : 1954 AIR(SC) 561), .Kerala Education Bill, 1957, Re 1959 SCR 995 : 1958 AIR(SC) 956) Sidhrajbhai Sabhai v. State of Bombay ( 1963 (3) SCR 837 : 1963 AIR(SC) 540), Rev. Father Proost v. State of Bihar ( 1969 (2) SCR 73 : 1969 AIR(SC) 465), and State of Kerala v. Mother Provincial ( 1970 (2) SCC 417 : 1971 (1) SCR 734)
55. Though Article 30(1) is couched in absolute terms in marked contrast with other fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution, it has to be read subject to the power of the State to regulate education, educational standards and allied matters. In Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society v. State of Gujarat ( 1974 (1) SCC 717 : 1975 (1) SCR 173) which was the decision of a nine Judge Bench, Ray, C.J., with whom Palekar, J., concurred, observed (at SCR pp. 197 - 200 : SCC p. 7490 that upon affiliation to a University, the minority and non-minority institutions must agree in the pattern and standards of education. Regulations which will serve the interest of the students, regulations which will serve the interests of the teachers are of paramount importance in good administration. Regulations in the interest of efficiency of teachers, discipline and fairness in administration are necessary for preserving harmony among affiliated institutions. It was further observed :That the ultimate goal of a minority.